\ 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



BY 



MARSHALL RANDLES, 

it 

AUTHOR OF "FOR EVER," "SUBSTITUTION/' ETC. 



- '» 

J J o 



NEW YORK: 
PHILLIPS & HUNT. 

CINCINNATI: 
CRANSTON & STOWE. 

1886. 



.to 



E 2 '09 



PREFACE 



Since the substance of the following treatise was 
written, some remarkably able works, handling many 
of the topics here discussed, have appeared, notably 
A Study of Origins, by Dr. Pressense ; The Philosophy 
of Theism, by Dr. Ward ; The Philosophical Basis of 
Theism, by Dr. Harris ; Physical and Moral Law, by 
Rev. W. Arthur, MA. ; and The Unity of Nature, by 
the Duke of Argyll. This fact led me to consider 
whether these productions met the want I had aimed 
at supplying, and thus rendered the publication of 
my manuscript superfluous. The result was a con- 
viction that, notwithstanding the rare excellence of 
these works, there was still need for such a book as 
I had attempted to provide. I therefore issue this 
production in the hope that it may, in some degree, 
take part in promoting the cause of truth and human 
well-being. Unbelief continues to project its shot and 
shell into the lines of Christian Theism ; and, though 
its former attacks have been well met, it must not be 
left to repeat them unresisted. The- present volume 
only aspires to be one of many contributions, made in 
vindication of those great principles which underlie 
the experience and practice of true religion. 

Marshall Randles. 

Leeds, August, 1884. 



CON TENTS. 



Introduction 



PAGB 

i 



Part I. — Various Kinds of Theistic Evidence. 

I. Intuitive; 2. Traditive ; 3. General Consent ; 4. Ontological ; 
5. Moral ; 6. Cosmological ; 7. Teleological ; 8. Argument 
of this Treatise, chiefly Etiological ..... 



Part II. — The Doctrine of Causality. 

1. Primary Truths — Their Meaning — Criteria — Examples — Rea- 

sonableness of taking them for granted — Confirmed by 
Experience .......... 25 

2. Essential Principle of Causality — Theory of Hume and Brown 

(1) Based on our Ignorance, (2) Involves Possibility of Self- 
origination, (3) Condemned by Consciousness, (4) Does not 
accord with Prevalence of the Idea of Causation, (5) Its 
Advocates betray the Presence of the Idea in their Conscious- 
ness, (6) An Unsatisfactory Explanation of Events . . 29 

3. Power in Cause .......... 44 

4. Cause belongs to Substance . 45 

5. Cause Proportionate to Effect . . . . . . • 47 

6. More than Second Causes ........ 50 

7. No Infinite Series . ...... 5 1 

8. Precedence of "Cause . . . . .. . . , 52 

9. Parsimony . . . . . . , . , «57 

IO. Final Causes ....... . . 60 



VI CONTENTS. 



Part III. — Theistic Evidence. 

PAGE 

Proposition I, The Present Universe is the Effect of a FIRST CAUSE. 
(i) Chance? (2) Necessity? (3) Self-caused? (4) Infinite 
Series ? (i.) No Real Efficiency ; (ii.) Absurd ; (iii.) Inconceiv- 
able. (5) Substratum of Matter the Cause of all ? (i.) An 
Assumption ; (ii.) Matter not One, but Many ; (iii.) Matter 
changes ; (iv.) Insufficient ; (v.) Matter Inert , (vi.) Eternity 
of Matter Assumed. (6) All resolved into Change ? (i.) This 
and the previous Theory of Mill cannot both be true ; (ii.) 
Assumes Infinite Series. (7) Force? (8) Matter and Force? 
(9) Theistic Solution . . . . . . . 65 

Proposition 2, The First Cause is Eternal . . . '85 

Proposition 3, The First Cause is Self-existent and Necessary 86 
Proposition 4, The First Cause is Intelligent, (i) Mind Pro- 
ducible by Mind only ; (2) Intelligence proved by Co-ordina- 
tion of Nature, (3) by Final Causes, (i.) Explanations ; (ii.) 

Proofs 87 

Proposition 5, The First Cause is a Moral Being. (1) Facts, (i.) 
Moral Qualities ; (ii.) Moral Judgments ; (iii.) Freedom ; (iv.) 
Praise and Blame ; (v.) Responsibility ; (vi.) Society ; (vii.) 
Moral Order of Nature. (2) Inferences, (i.) None but Moral 
Cause Adequate ; (ii.) Moral Government implies a Moral 
Governor ; (a) Moral Judgments ; (/>) Moral Purpose ; (c) 
Moral Relations ; (d) Providential Government. (3) Good 
Moral Character of God. (i.) Conscience ; (ii.) Results of 
Right and Wrong ; (iii.) Benevolence. (4) Objections, (i.) 
Pessimism ; (ii.) Moral Order from Evolution . . .115 

Proposition 6, The First Cause is a Personal Being . . .130 

Proposition 7, The First Cause is One and Simple, (i) Law of 
Parsimony ; (2) Original Cause not Complex ; (3) Unity of 
Plan 133 

Proposition 8, The First Cause is Infinite, (i) Definitions ; (2) 
Infinity not proved by Finite Effect ; (3) Alleged Gulf between 
the Infinite and our Thought ; (4) Reasons for believing God 
is Infinite (i.) Suggested by Greatness of the Universe, (ii.) by 
the Interests of the Universe ; (iii.) Infinite Duration already 
proved ; (iv.) No Limit from within or without ; (v.) Onto- 
logical Proof 136 



CONTENTS. Vil 



Part IV. — How the Theistic Argument is affected by 
the Advances of Science and Philosophy. 



PAGE 



Question not to be confounded with Spread of Theism or Anti- 
Theism — Atheistic Boasting 149 

1. Theistic Evidences strengthened by Advances of Science and 

Philosophy l S I 

2. Evolution, (i) Truth of its Essential Features no Disproof of 

Theism, (i.) The Universe still to be accounted for as a 
Whole ; (ii.) also its Parts ; (iii.) Final Causes still hold good ; 
(iv.) Atheism not logically necessary to the Theory of Evolu- 
tion. (2) Some Elements non-essential to the Theory, (i.) 
Spontaneous Generation ; (ii.) Transmutation of Species ; (iii.) 
Continuity in a Sense ; (iv.) Life minus Protoplasm ; (v.) 
Materiality of Mind ; (vi.) Evolved Morality . . . .160 

3. The Philosophy of the Infinite— History— Bearing on our Ques- 

tion — Definitions. (1) The Infinite alleged to be Inconceivable, 
(i.) Answer to the Contention that Conceivability involves 
Pantheism, (ii.) and that it involves Self-contradictions ; (iii.) 
Conceivability implied in Belief oi the Infinite ; (iv.) Attested 
by Consciousness. (2) The Infinite alleged to be unknowable 
— Answer, (i.) Relativity of Knowledge no Bar to Knowledge 
of the Infinite ; (ii.) Knowledge necessary to Belief. (3.) The 
Infinite Ascertainable ; (4) The Negative Philosophy adverse 
to Devotion ; (5) Discredits Reason. Mr. Spencer's " Recon- 
ciliation " 189 

4. Connection of Natural Effects with their First Cause — Various 

Theories : — (1) Divine Sustenance of Natural Being and Cau- 
sation ; (2) No Causation but the Direct Energy of God; 
(3) Plastic Nature ; (4) Pre-established Harmony ; (5) Occa- 
sionalism ; (6) Mechanical Theory associated with (i.) Theism ; 
(ii.) Pantheism ; (iii.) Atheistic Materialism. First Cause in 
Matter, in Law, in Force — Fortuitous Combination — Atheism 
impotent to explain Life, Mind, Morals, Religion . . .231 

Part V. — Relation of Natural to Revealed Theology. 

Value of the Foregoing Argument from Nature— Meaning of 

Revealed Theology 273 



Vin CONTENTS. 



PAGE 

I. Natural Theology as a Postulate of Revealed . . . .281 
2 Natural Theology as a Confirmation of Revealed . . . 284. 

3. Natural Theology Inadequate. (1) Divine Attributes ; (2) Tri- 

unity of God ; (3) Genesis of the Finite ; (4) Providence ; (5) 
Moral Government ; (6) Redemption ; (7) The Person of 
Christ; (8) Worship; (9) Man's Chief Good. . . .288 

4. Reaction of Revealed on Natural Theology . , . . 298 



INTRODUCTION. 



INTRODUCTION. 



IT is sometimes the boast of scepticism that Theism 
is founded in sentiment, and shrinks from the test 
of reason. Speaking of the teleological argument, 
Dr. L. Buchner says : " Modern natural science has 
pretty well emancipated itself from such empty notions, 
and abandons these innocent studies to such as delight 
in contemplating nature, rather with the eyes of the 
feelings than with those of the intellect." 1 Another 
Atheist intimates that before the production of his 
book, 2 neither Theists nor anti-Theists dealt with the 
subject from the standpoint of pure reason. So far as 
the reproach is just, it certainly belongs not to Theism 
alone. If the indifference desiderated be that which 
would examine the subject without an earnest wish 
that Theism may be proved true, and a reverent 
sympathy with the Theistic side of the question, the 
desire is unreasonable. In one whc deems the certainty 
of God's existence an inestimable boon, such an indiffer- 
ent state of mind were more faulty than it would be in an 
heir investigating his disputed title to his patrimony. 

By no means would I undervalue some Theistic 
arguments which are based on the facts of feeling. 

1 Force and Matter, p. 89. 
A Ca?idid Examination of Theism % by Physicus. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



For example, the heart of man craves for a God of 
infinite power and wisdom, of perfect righteousness 
and benevolence, to whom it may render loving homage, 
and in whom it may confide for deliverance, protection, 
and happiness. Even " unbelievers," as Calvin observes, 
" flee from God, and yet seek Him through some kind 
of involuntary impulse." Reason, not feeling, may 
well infer that there is probably a reality corresponding 
to this deep natural want ; and when the response to 
that feeling comes in the idea of a God of these per- 
fections, reason and feeling unite in accepting Him as 
the truest and greatest reality, and the answer to man's 
deepest need. 

Again, I am not prepared to condemn as worthless 
the inference from man's interest in the existence of 
God. If it be true that Atheism extinguishes all hope 
for the world to come, annihilates the basal principles 
of morality and all the blessedness of religion in this 
life, thus leading down to the Avernus of pessimism, 
and if Theism be the only means of enlivening humanity 
with love, and joy, and hope, it is impossible that 
honest men should not ardently long for Theism to be 
true. But we may conclude that as the appetites of 
the body have their complements in nature, so this 
deepest mental appetency — this equally natural hunger 
of the soul — must have its counterpart in a Divine 
reality. When we betray a predilection for Theism 
because, from the very constitution of man, his noblest 
ends and interests are bound up with it, who has a 
right to condemn this predilection as irrational, or as 
not a just presumption in favour of Theism ? 

So to encourage faith is not to assume that " what- 
ever is desirable is true." But the need of a God, being 



INTRODUCTION. 5 



constitutively universally and often intensely felt, that 
is to say, being of our very nature, analogy favours 
the presumption that this natural need has somewhere 
its complement in a Divine Being. 

Taken in this order, prior to other reasons, the fact 
just mentioned affords a presumptive ground for belief 
in God; taken after those reasons, it amounts to a 
strong confirmation. 

It is objected that to trace this longing for God to 
any but physical causes violates the law of parsimony, 
which requires as few causes as possible. But physical 
causes alone do not account for it, and the law of the 
fewest possible allows of our seeking an immaterial 
and Divine cause. 

Man's emotional nature and his instinctive desire for 
happiness, in proportion as they are enlightened and 
pure, declare for the existence of God. Nor need we 
stultify their voice. 

But I hold that reason, our special faculty for dis- 
tinguishing truth from falsehood, when rightly ques- 
tioned, pronounces quite as emphatically as feeling and 
interest on the same side. Atheism appeals from the 
court of feeling to that of intellect. Theism accepts 
the challenge, confident that the issue will be a decisive 
verdict in its favour. 

Apologists have sometimes appeared too ready to 
surrender the sanction and prestige of reason to 
infidelity, and to retreat behind the bulwarks of 
conscious advantage and sacred emotion. Being firmly 
of opinion that the approval of reason belongs to 
Theism, and not to anti-Theism, and that the more 
thoroughly the question is investigated, the more 
reasonable will belief in God appear, I propose to show, 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



by the Atheist's acknowledged standard, that Natural 
Theology and intelligence are not enemies, but in- 
separable allies, or rather that Theism is essentially 
founded in reason. 

That reason is fallible, and liable to be prejudiced by 
sinister influences in both believers and unbelievers, 
goes without saying. Nevertheless, within the sphere 
of nature, it is the best faculty we possess for the 
pursuit of truth. Abandon it, and we become the 
victims of superstition and ignorant passion, exposing 
us defenceless on all sides to every wind of doctrine. 

It cannot be denied that in the present age anti- 
Theism is especially bold and aggressive. Much of our 
literature is tinctured by it. Its stock objections and 
contemptuous sneers have found their way into both 
higher and lower grades of society. Prominent men in. 
science and politics are said to be destitute of religious 
faith. The same state of mind is attributed to many of 
the working classes, and to many, especially on the 
continent of Europe, who retain a formal connection 
with the profession of religion, Christian or Jewish. 
The avowed and organized forms of infidelity, with its 
champions on the platform and in the press, are in 
contact with the masses. Widespread indifference 
to religion is to some extent spiced with a sceptical 
spirit. How far the air of infidelity is merely assumed 
to be cast off as soon as the king of terrors approaches,. 
or how far the evil has rooted itself in men's convictions ;. 
how far the estimate of its victories is exaggerated as 
to individuals or communities ; and how far the wish is 
father of the unbelief, it is impossible to say. But that 
it is abroad, and spreads its blighting influence through 
the nations, to the injury of many minds and the hin- 



INTRODUCTION. 



drance of Christianity, must be patent to all who study 
the signs of the times. Prebendary Row spoke with 
insight when in his Bampton Lecture of 1877 he re- 
marked that " in the higher regions of thought we are 
undoubtedly approaching a great crisis between the 
principles of Atheism and Pantheism on the one side 
and those of Theism on the other." 

Opinions differ as to the best way of treating the evil. 
Some would ignore its presence. But that would not 
check, much less stop, its progress, nor would it meet 
the case of those who are entangled in its meshes, or 
in danger of becoming so. Nor can it be met by mere 
denunciation. Others would devote all the energies of 
the Christian Church to its overthrow, which would be 
neglect of the Church's edification. Different methods, 
must be employed in due proportion. And prominent 
amongst these must be the use of the press, exposing 
the fallacy of all anti-Theistic teaching, and presenting 
the broad firm bases on which faith in God rests. 
History tells of the powerful service rendered to the 
cause of truth by means of Christian literature against 
pagan and mediaeval opposition to Christianity, against. 
English Deism, and latterly against German Rationalism. 

Apologists have need not only to continue the defence 
of the truth, but to face about from time to time in 
order to confront new aspects of unbelief as they arise. 
Whatever may be the exact magnitude of present-day 
anti-Theism, to leave it to work its way unopposed were 
ecreant to the cause of truth and righteousness, and an 
injury to practical religion. To the war which Chris- 
tianity is waging against unbelief the following chapters 
are intended as a contribution, however small its relative 
value. 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



The progress of the controversy has necessarily 
involved many complex and metaphysical questions, 
raised either in attack or defence. Moreover, the field 
is deemed remote from the enjoyment and practice of 
godliness. Consequently the subject may not greatly 
attract, or even appear of great importance to some 
Christian believers, whose faith was never perturbed 
by the assaults of infidelity. But those who are thus 
happily exempt, and delight in the security of the 
citadel of Christian faith far away from the strokes of 
the enemy, ought not to be unconcerned about brethren 
more exposed, or forget that unless the outposts are 
well defended, the citadel itself will not be long unas- 
sailed. Abandon apologetics, and the saving doctrines 
of Christian experience must soon share a similar fate. 

Whatever other means may be employed for the 
same end, the author is one of those who hold it in- 
cumbent on the adherents of the Christian cause to 
defend it against the incessant attacks nowadays made 
on the fundamental principles of faith in God, and to 
set forth its paramount claim on the credence of man- 
kind. For their own safety many may stand in no 
need of such help as this treatise seeks to afford ; but 
probably there is a considerable class to whom it might 
be of service did the writer's performance equal, or 
even approximate to his ideal. If religious verity is to 
make headway against all attempts to bring it into dis- 
credit, it will not be by indolently repeating the proverb, 
" Truth is great, and will prevail," but, at any rate in 
part, by earnest vindication of its claims, and exposure 
of the teaching which misrepresents it to the view of 
public opinion. 



PART I. 
VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 



PART I. 

VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 

NATURAL THEOLOGY is rich in the variety, as 
well as in the strength of its supports. As men's 
minds differ in their susceptibility of impression by 
different kinds of evidence, the supply corresponds to 
the demand. A system of proof which compels the 
entire assent of one class of thinkers hardly makes an 
impression on another. Some are more familiar with 
one groove of ratiocination than another. One im- 
plicitly accepts what is handed down to him by his 
trustworthy predecessors ; another scrutinizes every 
tier of proof, and cannot be content until he has laid 
bare the very foundations. One takes the unquestion- 
ing firmness of his own conviction as indigenous and 
constitutive, without caring to pursue any psychological 
analysis of its origin ; while another insists on resolving 
the conviction into its ultimate elements. One is 
charmed with the idea of deducing Theism a priori, 
after the style of irresistible mathematics ; while another 
prefers the solid a posteriori steps so familiar in daily 
life, by which he ascends from the known to the un- 
known, from the effect to the First Cause. One rests 
mainly on the accuracy of his own reasoning, while 
another seeks support in the common consent of man- 
kind. And yet another builds up his faith on most or 



12 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



all of these foundations, securely confiding in their 
united strength. 

It does not follow, however, that the several grounds 
of Theistic belief are of equal cogency and value. One 
may be available only to the few who have the taste, 
ability, and opportunity to soar into the loftiest regions 
of metaphysics; while another may be adapted to 
produce the deepest and most widespread conviction 
among the many. It is an interesting exercise, and a 
fitting preparation for our sequel, to glance at the 
nature and worth of the principal lines of argument 
comprehended in Theistic evidence. 

I. The Intuitive. Respecting the intuitive certainty 
of Theism, which with many good and able men is the 
chief evidence, I am obliged to confess my scepticism, 
and to agree with Dr. E. R. Conder that if the know- 
ledge of God were intuitive, it would leave neither need 
nor room for any other ground in the shape of Theistic 
proof. 1 Belief in God would then be necessary from 
the laws of thought, nay, would be itself a law of thought, 
and would preclude the moral character of belief now 
based on the voluntariness of honestly seeking, weigh- 
ing, and using evidence. As there is no moral quality 
in believing two and two are equal to four, neither 
could there be in believing in the existence and attributes 
of God if that, like the other, were a necessity of 
thought. We should also have to conclude that all 
who avow their disbelief in God belie their immediate 
consciousness of His existence. Moreover, many of us 
who firmly believe in God on other grounds, after the 
closest analysis of consciousness are unable to detect 



1 The Basis of Faith, p. too. 



VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 1 3 

such intuitive belief. We are not content to be merely 
accredited with honesty in this fruitless search : we 
claim credit for as much accuracy in the process as 
we yield to our friends who arrive at an opposite 
conclusion. But the fact that each side has a con- 
siderable number of honest and careful adherents tells 
against the position that belief in God is intuitive, for 
if intuitive, it would be necessary, and consequently 
universal. 

Again, intuitive truth is ultimate, and therefore admits 
not of further proof or evidential support from still 
more ultimate truth. It would not be ultimate were 
there any truth beyond it to which we could appeal in 
its support ; that is to s-*y, we can assign no reason for 
a necessary judgment. It is self-evident. But it some- 
times happens that the advocates of intuitive Theism 
seek to back it up by reasons and arguments, as if they 
were not altogether sure of the self-evidencing force of 
the intuition. 

Further, God is a complex, not a simple idea. Do we 
intuitively perceive all we know of Him ? or His exist- 
ence only, and not His attributes? or some of His attri- 
butes, and not others? and if so, which of them? and why 
those and not others ? Should it be affirmed, in reply, 
that all are intuitively known, that would mean that His 
being, self-existence, omnipotence, omnipresence, omni- 
science, eternity, righteousness, and benevolence are all 
necessary and universal beliefs, which would be very 
hard to reconcile with fact. 

Professor Calderwood's mode of vindicating Theism 
boldly asserts that the belief in the existence of " one 
Infinite Being " " is a necessary part of our own 
nature." and " belongs essentially to the nature of 



I4 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



man ; " that " our natural belief arises to bear testimony 
to the existence of the Unchangeable Originator of all 
finite being ; " that " we rest exclusively on the authority 
of faith for the simple testimony of the Divine exist- 
ence." He speaks of " that fundamental conviction on 
which we rest for the assurance of the being and glory 
of the Deity." 1 Dr. Calderwood's intuitionalism, though 
a good argumentum ad hominem in reply to Sir W. 
HamiTton and Dean Mansel, is not necessary to a 
refutation of their agnosticism. The infinity of God, 
ascertained in any other way than by intuition, is 
sufficient for the purpose. The force of his reply is 
not in the alleged intuition of the Divine existence, but 
in our certainty of that truth, by whatever means 

attained. 

If we were bound, as we are not, to account for the 
affirmation of those who say they know God by 
intuition, we should not need to impugn their sincerity. 
There is such a state as " unconscious reasoning ; " that 
is, reasoning without perceiving that we are doing so. 
The facility and rapidity of drawing an inference may 
lead to the mistake that the thought inferred is not 
inferred at all, but is the starting point of the mental 
process. Thus an honest and able man may infer the 
existence of God so naturally, quickly, and confidently 
as to suppose he has made no inference. In others the 
impression may be vivid and habitual, dating back from 
the dawn of reason, and confirmed by the experience 
of years, so that by the "inveteracy of our experience" 
it becomes easy to conceive of it as if it were con- 
stitutive and ineradicable. The manifold reasons on 



Philosophy of the Infinite, pp. 42, 313, 315, 317. 



VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 15 



which it is based come to be regarded as supplementary, 
rather than fundamental to the belief. The mistake 
may be encouraged by the readiness with which the 
enlightened and devout mind responds to the welcome 
idea of God, so perfect in might and goodness. The 
quick, firm, satisfied grasp of the idea may easily be 
mistaken for a first and necessary principle of the mind. 

It is a very different thing to say Theistic belief is 
based upon intuitive truth. That is more or less true 
of all reasoned truth. To say Theism is inferred under 
the guidance of the intuitive principle of causality 
makes intuition the starting point and rational ground 
of Theism. To say Theism itself is intuitive is to 
make the idea of God an object of immediate vision, 
and, by letting go the safeguard of rational evidence, 
incurs the danger of a most objectionable form of 
mysticism. 

2. The traditive argument is that which regards the 
knowledge of God as an inheritance vouchsafed to 
mankind in its early days by special revelation, and 
handed down by successive generations to the present 
day, though often beclouded by ignorance, or mutilated 
by erroneous doctrine. On this kind of testimony 
Christians of the apostolic age connected the world with 
its Creator. They declared, " Through faith we under- 
stand that the worlds were framed by the word of God, 
so that things which are seen were not made of things 
which do appear." 

It must be admitted to be historically true that as 
a rule the peoples of the earth have descended into 
ignorance in proportion as they have been removed 
from the light of those heavenly communications which 
eventually found their embodiment in the Holy 



1.6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



Scriptures. It is also certain, so far as history informs 
us, that apart from such help men never on any large 
scale attained to worthy conceptions of God by the 
light of nature. A probability is thus created that 
heathen as well as Christian nations owe their ideas 
of God more or less to tradition. 

It is difficult, however, to estimate the extent of this 
obligation ; and it would be rash to affirm that all Theistic 
ideas have been thus derived ; nor have we any warrant 
for saying it is impossible to reason from nature to 
nature's God. To whatever extent tradition may have 
contributed to our Theistic conceptions, it cannot be 
justly accepted as the sole pillar of Theism. 

3. The ethnological argument is from the general 
consent of mankind (consensu gentium). It cannot be 
denied that individuals, surrounded by the highest 
forms of Theism, have come to renounce all faith in 
God's existence, though they could not by any effort 
obliterate the idea of God from their minds. But the 
assertion that whole nations or tribes have been found 
utterly destitute of all ideas of a Divine Being has 
never yet been proved, nor is it likely to be. In 
many the ideas are crude and abject enough, not rising 
above the conception of invisible finite powers lurking 
or roaming among the objects of nature, or a being 
passing into dormancy or nothingness like Gotama. 
Still ideas of Divinity have obtained always among all 
nations so far as we know. Here, if anywhere, the 
maxim holds, What is always everywhere and by all 
believed must be true. 

If there be no God, the universal and perpetual idea 
of God is utterly unaccountable. The extent to which 
it holds possession of men's minds renders Atheism 



VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE. \J 



incredible. But while the fact of general consent creates 
a probability in favour of Theism, it also sets our 
thoughts on seeking the basis of the fact in reason. 
For unless the idea be intuitive, it must rest on evidence, 
which it behoves the investigator to trace in order to 
fortify his belief in the truth of the idea. Nothing 
could be more scientific than to ascertain how an idea 
so pervasive of human nature, so influential, and so 
closely identified with man's well-being, is founded in 
evidence. I cannot but think that evidence consists 
largely of tradition, and the manifestation of Divine 
workmanship in nature. 

4. The ontological proof argues from the fact of our 
possessing ideas of infinity, eternity, and perfection, 
that there must be a reality of which they are the 
attributes. Those who, like Kant, reject this argument 
are nevertheless obliged to admit the presence of the 
ideas. Denying their implication of a corresponding 
reality, they regard the ideas as only " regulative" 
conceptions necessary to our explaining the universe. 
Kant concedes that such a Being may and must be 
admitted in order to explain the universe, but only as 

an idea} 

We are to assume the ideas in order to account for 
the facts of the actual world. But why assume them 
if they be not true as attributes of something ? How 
can ideas having no counterpart in reality be necessary 
to explain reality ? It is more reasonable to say that as 
we can neither rid ourselves of the ideas, nor account 
for the universe without them, there must be a reality 
to which they correspond. This argument, however, 



1 Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 426-7. 



1 8 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

though felt to have considerable force by those who 
can appreciate its exposition in the hands of such 
metaphysical writers as Dr. Samuel Clarke, does not 
seem well fitted to play a great part in convincing 
ordinary minds. 

To this class belongs The Argument A Priori for the 
Being and the Attributes of the Lord God, the Absolute 
One and First Cause, by Mr. W. H. Gillespie, which 
claims to be an irrefragable demonstration. It is 
argued that infinite space and infinite duration exist 
because we cannot but conceive of them ; that as they 
exist, they must be substances, or else modes of sub- 
stance ; that as they cannot be the former, they are the 
latter ; that there can be only one infinite substance ; 
that it must be Intelligent, Free, Happy, True, Faithful, 
Good, Just, All-loving, Ineffably Pure, Holy, and Perfect. 

This chain of reasoning is of limited application, 
inasmuch as, after the first, each proposition is entirely 
dependent on its predecessor ; and to perceive and re- 
member the soundness of every stage in the process is a 
task not likely to be performed by the majority of minds. 

Then again, the whole weight of the argument rests 
on a particular theory of duration and space, namely, 
that they are attributes or modes of a substance. 
But with all who hold, as Kant and Sir' William 
Hamilton did, that space is nothing but " an a priori or 
native form of thought," or adopt any view of time and 
space other than that of the ontologists, the "argument" 
falls to pieces from want of a sure foundation. 

" The argument " is not strictly a priori. A posteriori 
reasoning enters into its very substance, especially the 
inference of a cause from its known effect. For instance, 
in demonstrating the intelligence of the Infinite Being, 



VARIOUS KINDS OF THE I STIC EVIDENCE. 1 9 

Mr. Gillespie reasons : "That it (intelligence), absolutely 
speaking, never began to be, is evident in this, that if 
it began to be, in the sense of there never having been 
any Intelligence whatever before, it must have had a 
cause ; for, Whatever begins to be must have a cause. 
And the cause of Intelligence must be of Intelligence ; 
for, there having been no Intelligence whatever before, 
What is not of Intelligence cannot make Intelligence begin 
to be. Therefore, if Intelligence began to be, there was 
Intelligence before there was Intelligence. Now, Intelli- 
gence being before Intelligence began to be, is a contradic- 
tion. And this absurdity following from the supposition, 
that Intelligence began to be, it is proved, that Intelligence 
never began to be : to wit, is of Infinity of Duration." * 
Similar a posteriori reliance on the law of causality is 
apparent at successive stages of " the argument." 

These considerations might well have checked the 
overweening confidence of Mr. Gillespie in his own 
position and the disdain with which he attempts to dis- 
parage the a posteriori argument from nature, as when 
he represents it as fast losing favour with theologians, 
who are coming over to " the dialectical domain, where 
the a priori method is regnant," and that alone by 
which the Atheist can be successfully encountered. 2 So 
far as one can read the signs of the times, Theism 
owes, and is likely to owe much more of its stability 
with theologians, and against the assaults of Atheists, 
to the a posteriori method of reasoning from effect 
to cause than to the a prion argument from first prin- 
ciples to their results. 

5. The moral or anthropological argument infers 

1 P. 36. 2 P xlvi. 



20 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

that God is, and what He is, from the known nature 
of man. Man has not only body and animal life, but 
intellect and moral qualities. Since he is a dependent 
contingent being, there must be some greater being on 
whom he depends and who possesses a nature corre- 
sponding to man's intellectual and moral nature. It is 
also inferred from our consciousness of obligation and 
responsibility that there must be a Moral Being who 
imposes the obligation, and to whom we are responsible. 

6. The cosmological method argues from the exist- 
ence of finite to that of an infinite being. Because 
being exists, some being is absolutely necessary and 
eternal. The a posteriori principle of this argument 
will be recognized in the line of evidence pursued in 
the following pages. 

7. The teleological argument infers an intelligent 
Author of the world from the manifold evidences of 
means adapted to ends, especially to wise and good 
ends. The materials out of which this argument is 
constructed are %o plentiful, and so ready to hand, and 
the process of inferring design from special adaptation, 
and a designer from design, is so easy, that this proof 
of Theism holds wide, and resistless sway over human 
minds. It is, in fact, a special branch of the argument 
from causation, but covers so vast a field that it is 
generally treated as a subject complete in itself. It 
will, however, be incorporated in what is to follow. 

8. The course of argument I am about to present 
will appropriate more or less of the foregoing, but its 
chief characteristic will be its inferences according to the 
doctrine of causality. It may therefore be called the 
etiological, at any rate, up to a certain point ; it is more 
that than anything else. 



VARIOUS KINDS OF THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 21 



This, like other Theistic arguments, though based 
on our knowledge of nature, is best appreciated in the 
light of revealed truth, not because we mistake the 
latter for the former, but among other reasons, as will 
be shown in Part V., because revelation presents the 
ideal, and thus greatly aids our efforts in reasoning up 
to it. 

The Scriptures of revelation do not affect to set 
aside our inferences from nature. They actually in- 
corporate them in their own system, and place a Divine 
imprimatur on their use. The inspiration of a Psalmist 
did not prevent his seeing God through His works. 
"The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firma- 
ment showeth His handiwork. Day unto day uttereth 
speech, and night unto night showeth knowledge." 
" The works of the Lord are great, sought out of them 
that have pleasure therein." In the view of the apostle 
Paul, the obviousness of the argument, in every part of 
the world, aggravated the sin of those who "refused 
to have God in their knowledge " : " Because that 
which may be known of God is manifest in them, for 
God manifested it unto them. For the invisible things 
of Him, since the creation of the world, are clearly 
seen, being perceived through the things that are made, 
even His everlasting power and Divinity, that they may 
be without excuse." Dr. Paley's illustrated reasoning 
was anticipated by the author of the Epistle to the 
Hebrews : " Every house is builded by some man, but 
He that built all things is God." 



PART II. 

THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 



PART II. 
THE DOCTRINE OF CA USALITY. 

I. PRIMARY TRUTHS. — 

The operations of mind, like those of matter, are 
subject to law. True, there is a moral power in man 
which differentiates him from passive substance, and 
differentiates moral from natural law ; yet the laws of 
thought are as binding upon him as the law of gravi- 
tation. There are certain principles to which the 
processes of intelligence must conform, and to which 
all our knowledge must correspond. These necessary 
dicta are laws of thought, according to which every 
sane mind must work, nolens volens. They are first 
principles, or primary ideas to which we have to appeal 
in all matters affecting our beliefs. They are constitu- 
tive, as they belong to the very nature of the mind. 

They are intuitive cognitions, not dependent on 
proof external to themselves, but self-evident. Indeed, 
were they deduced from other truths, they would not 
be intuitive. They are their own warrant, producing 
certainty by their own intrinsic force. 

They are ultimate truths, having none beyond them- 
selves accessible to us : not innate knowledge, not 
knowledge at all until materials to work upon are 
supplied by intercourse with the world ; but as occa- 
sion arises, we have no power to think the opposite 



26 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



of these truths, though we may come to misinterpret 
their logical consequences. 

Sir William Hamilton aptly calls them " necessary 
judgments," because thought, working naturally, can- 
not but concur in their teaching. They "constrain" 
us to believe or accept them in proportion to the 
perspicacity with which we look at them. Acceptance 
is not a matter of option, but of necessity. Being 
first and universal principles, Reid comprised them 
in the phrase " common-sense." 

The recognized criteria of such primary judgments 
are self -evidence, necessity, and universality. 

To the query, How then can different minds yield 
different answers to the same question when these 
laws are appealed to ? the reply is that a mind may 
misinterpret to itself, or to others, the dicta ^ of these 
laws; may mistake something else for intuition. A 
man, for instance, may say he can think five and four 
equal to, not nine, but ten. Yet assuming his mental 
constitution to be the same as ours, we are sure he 
cannot. Or he may affirm that he is unavoidably 
conscious of having changed his identity since yester- 
day, and become entirely another person ; but assum- 
ing his sanity and his correct understanding of the 
meaning of the words, the constitution of our own- 
minds compels us to think he misrepresents his own 
consciousness. Or again, he may so far pervert his 
moral faculties as to deny all moral qualities, or to 
declare that right and wrong are essentially the same ; 
but our moral intuitions will testify that he is abusing 

his own mind. 

Examples.— Primary truths may be mathematical, 
as that two and two are equal to four ; the whole is 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 2J 



greater than its part ; a straight line between two 
points is the shortest ; two straight lines cannot en- 
close a space ; things equal to the same thing are equal 
to one another. They may be metaphysical, as that 
a thing cannot be and not be at the same time in the 
same sense ; what is true cannot be false at the same 
time in the same sense. They may be logical, as that 
two contradictory propositions cannot both be true ; 
or in the way of inference, thus, if all men are mortal, 
this particular man is mortal, where the inference, if 
understood, is inevitable. Again, all mammals are 
vertebrate ; the cow is a mammal ; therefore the cow 
is vertebrate. The major granted, the conclusion is 
compelled by the laws of thought. 

Again, a primary truth may be used in the way of 
generalization or synthetic deduction, as when from 
the order of nature within view, we infer the same 
order in parts beyond our view. Or it may relate to 
power, as when we are unable to shun the notion of 
power or efficiency in connection with an event or 
result. It may have reference to the trustworthiness 
of our faculties, as when we are incapable of distrusting 
our senses or our memories. It may be moral, as 
when we are compelled to think right is not wrong, 
or that some actions ought to be approved, and others 
disapproved. 

Some would also say these laws of thought make it 
impossible for us to rid ourselves of the consciousness 
of our personal identity, and so each one think himself 
some one else. Others also maintain that we cannot 
think except in relation to space and time. A body 
must be somewhere ; an event must be at some time. 
Dr. M'Cosh arranges all intuitive perceptions into three 



2 8 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH, 



kinds : Primitive Cognitions, Primitive Beliefs, and 

Primitive Judgments. 1 

Reasonableness of taking these truths for granted.— \i 
these first principles are not to be trusted as true, we 
can have no certitude of anything. If sensation is not 
to be relied on, we are not sure of external phenomena. 
If the laws by which we cannot but think are not true, 
we can have no more confidence in what is an irre- 
sistible inference than in one which is manifestly 
inconsequential. All existence is then for aught we 
know a delusion. But it is not at our option to 
distrust these primary truths. To say we will not 
trust them is to say we will act insanely. 

If any one of these intuitions may be denied, so 
may all. They have all the same foundation in the 
constitution of the mind. We have the same kind of 
warrant for one as for another, though some may 
impress themselves on our consciousness with more 
distinctness and force than others. Of course, these 
remarks apply only to true, and not mistaken intuitions. 
Intuitive truths, though not derived from, are often 
confirmed by experience. When trusted for practical 
purposes, they turn out to be right in the result. The 
most complex and advanced mathematical calculations 
in practical matters are based on such principles as two 
and two are equal to four. Proceeding on the principle 
that the whole is greater than its part, we always find 
it to be so in objects of sensation. Our primary belief 
that an event implies power behind it is confirmed, in- 
asmuch as we often actually trace out the power. 

Any attempt to disprove or discredit these laws of 

1 Exam. ofMilVs Philosophy, p. 262. 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 29 



thinking must be made by means of them. It would 
be an attempt to prove the non-existence of reason by 
the use of reason. How could any one seek to make 
good his denial of the laws of thought but by means 
of those very laws? He would have to assume the 
trustworthiness of his senses, his memory, and his 
logical faculties, in order to prove that none of these 
faculties are trustworthy. In attempting to show that 
there was no such thing as intuitive or ultimate truth, 
he would have to rely on one or more such truths as 
the basis of his argument. There may be different 
opinions as to which of our judgments are necessary 
and ultimate; but to affirm that none are so, involves 
the absurdity of disbelieving what we trust, or the 
insanity of making ourselves incapable of all rationality. 
To the category of first principles, or necessary judg- 
ments, belongs the principle of causality, which I now 
proceed to expound. 

2. ESSENTIAL PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY. — 
The essence of the doctrine of causality is that nothing 
can take place or become without a cause. To say 
" every effect has a cause " is tautological, or at any 
rate ambiguous, seeing " effect " means something 
caused. It is better to say every event, or every 
change, has a cause, or whatever happens has a 
cause. This includes any commencement or termina- 
tion of existence, and any change in the state or 
condition of an existing thing. Negatively stated, it 
means, Ex nihilo nihil fit : from nothing nothing can 
come ; that is, of itself. Something from nothing with- 
out a pre-existing agent is not the same as creation of 
one thing, by another, out of nothing. In the latter 
case the cause is the agent ; in the former there is no 



30 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



cause. The former means that some reality began to 
be without any cause but itself; but to be self-caused 
means that, in producing, it acted on itself before it 
existed, which implies the contradiction that it existed 
before it existed. To seek escape by saying it was 
originated neither by itself, nor by another, implies 
that the thing which began to be did not originate at 
all. The mind instinctively rejects the proposition of 
self-creation as unthinkable and self-contradictory. We 
could not believe it if we would. Its untruth is proved 
by the necessary dictum of the mind that every event 
must have a cause, and not by any more internal and 
ultimate truth. That dictum is itself ultimate, and 
therefore does not admit of being proved by some truth 
beyond it. 

Criteria. — Our axiom has the criteria of intuition, 
namely, self-evidence, necessity, and universality. It is uni- 
versal because it is necessary. Self-evidence is an essen- 
tial characteristic. If challenged to prove by evidence 
external to itself that every event must have a cause, we 
find it as impossible thus to prove the dictum as to disbe- 
lieve it. It will neither be dislodged from our minds, nor 
produce any authority for abiding there except its own 
irresistible force. If asked why I am sure no change 
can take place without a cause, my answer is, I cannot 
tell, except that the conviction forces itself upon me. 

As to necessity, it is what Kant calls a synthetic 
or apodictic judgment; that is, a conception united 
with the consciousness of its necessity. There is, as 
Sir W. Hamilton says, an " inability to think the 
opposite." It is an "irresistible conviction," not an 
empirical judgment. It is not backed by a distinct 
principle of the mind ; it is that principle. 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 3 1 

The most perverse thinker could not, by any volition 
of his own, think two and two equal to five. Neither 
could he think anything began to be absolutely of 
itself, if he understood the meaning of the words. He 
may think it the result of a cause, occult, or inconceiv- 
able, or foreign, but not of nothing. He may think 
of a phenomenon or change in material objects ab- 
stractedly, or in relation to co-existent or subsequent 
phenomena ; he may concentrate attention on the thing 
as commencing, .or continuing to exist, ignoring the 
question of aught anterior in time. But let his mind 
turn to the question of its origin, and he is unavoid- 
ably driven to think of it as caused, whether by some 
antecedent phenomena, or substance, or other producer. 
Suggest to him mere antecedence of some other thing 
or event, and his mind remains unsatisfied. What 
it insists on as necessary is not merely something of 
earlier date, but something fitted to produce the phe- 
nomenon : not necessarily that it shall know what 
is the true cause, but that there must be a caused 
whether found out or not. It insists on this, not after 
a process of reasoning from experience or analogy, but 
immediately as the intuitive demand of its own nature, 
before logic has the opportunity of applying its 
criticism. 

The notion of causality is not an inference drawn by 
ratiocination, but a first principle from which ratio- 
cination may commence. If I predicate that man is 
mortal, or the earth revolves, or the universe is finite, 
I affirm what may be quite true ; yet I can only know 
it to be so by a process of reasoning in which I infer 
one truth from another. I can easily conceive the 
contrary. But when I predicate that every event must 



32 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

have a cause, I affirm it with unhesitating confidence, 
without inferring or reasoning it from some other 
more primary truth. In fact, I am unable to think the 
contrary. 

From difference in the degree of our familiarity with 
the two propositions, it may seem more easy to affirm 
that a thing begins to be, or an event happens without 
cause, than that two and two are five ; but the former 
is as repugnant to our intuitive judgment as the latter. 
This demand of intelligence is not met by Dr. Thomas 
Brown's suggestion of the mind's expectancy, or pre- 
sumption of constancy in nature, for there is a necessity 
of thinking a cause, which is much more than the result 
of expectancy. 

As to universality of the causal judgment, or " capa- 
bility of being universalized," it is not ascertained by 
our direct acquaintance with the consciousness of all 
men. By that means nothing could be proved uni- 
versal, seeing we cannot have immediate knowledge of 
all human minds. Assuming that all sane intellects 
are constituted alike (and if that may not be done, no 
one mind can have rational intercourse with fellow- 
men, or be certain they are rational beings), the uni- 
versality follows from the necessity of thinking causality. 
Consequently what is necessary to one human mind as 
such is necessary to all. Then if it be universal, we 
shall find it in human nature in proportion to our 
knowledge of the intuitions of that nature. We shall 
never reach a point where the law of causality does 
not hold. 

It is, nevertheless, possible for an individual to deny 
sincerely, though mistakenly, that every event has a 
cause ; but in practical matters he proceeds on that 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 33 

principle, and thus proclaims the inaccuracy of his 
denial, and of his psychological analysis. 

Although, however, the doctrine that every event 
must have a cause is intuitive, it is confirmed by ex- 
perience, to which it is a practical guide. 

The earliest openings of the mental faculties display 
their spontaneous outlook for causes. Phenomena are 
no sooner observed than the infant mind casts about 
for their causes, and, where they are not apparent, 
often betrays a restless disposition to search them out. 
Hence the numberless "whys" of young children as 
they make their acquaintance with the external world. 
Why does the sun rise every morning in the east, and 
set every evening in the west? why does the tide 
ebb and flow, and why twice every day? why does 
the locomotive draw the long train ? what makes the 
kite and the balloon remain up in the air ? what 
makes the water become ice? what makes the watch 
tick, and its hands move ? what makes wood swim, 
and iron sink ? what makes the beautiful rainbow ? are 
among the many questions springing up spontaneously 
in the young mind according to different degrees of 
development. What prompts these questions but the 
mental law which declares that every event must 
have a cause? — what but the same law as is just 
now prompting me to ask for the cause of these 
"whys"? 

In its higher developments the mind never throws oft 
this law. Rather, the law asserts its authority more and 
more as the mental powers grow stronger. The groping 
for causes in childhood becomes the motive power of 
philosophical speculation. The pursuits of science 
proceed under its influence. Hence it has been said 

3 



34 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

philosophy is that which investigates the causes of things. 
But for this law many of the most brilliant pursuits of 
knowledge might not have been made. Certain facts 
are observed, and the philosopher starts in search of 
their causes, never doubting they are caused. What 
olse prompted Sir Isaac Newton to follow up his inves- 
tigation to the point of demonstrating the principles 
of gravitation? He pushed his inquiries because he 
was confident the phenomena of the heavens and the 
earth had their causes. Kant reminds us of the same 
motive in Copernicus, who was sure there was a cause 
of his relative position to the celestial orbs. He was 
not aware what the cause might be. He first conjec- 
tured that the sun moved round his standpoint, but 
investigation failed to confirm the theory. Then he 
conjectured that his standpoint might move round the 
sun, and investigation proved it to be the fact. But 
the basis of the investigation was his certainty that 
there must be a cause. On the same principle men 
seek diligently to solve the problems of other depart- 
ments of physics. The facts must have a cause 
anterior to themselves, and to find out their causes 
is to bring them within the range of philosophy. Thus 
empirical science is dependent for much of its success 
on the intuition of causality. 

But at the opposite extreme the same law reigns in 
the uncultured mind. The barbarian, as naturally as the 
philosopher, attributes the events around him to causes. 
No matter that he often assigns wrong causes. That 
only shows the persistency of the mind's demand for 
a cause. The point to be noted is that he always takes 
for granted there is a cause sufficient to produce 
what happens. So invincible is this tendency, that, 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 35 

when he cannot conceive of adequate natural causes, 
he at once, like his more civilized fellow, assigns the 
events to the supernatural. Drought, famine, storm, 
earthquake, eclipse, plenty, victory, life, are with him no 
more uncaused or self-caused than with the scientific 
savant. 

The same law may be traced in the ordinary thoughts 
of the average thinker. What is more common or 
natural on the occurrence of a new event than to ask 
how it can be accounted for ? Much of men's thinking 
is taken up with trying to " account for " things. What 
is this but searching for causes ? And even where a 
thing cannot be accounted for, the failure is always, as 
a matter of course, ascribed to our ignorance, never to 
the lack of causation. 

Theory of Hume and Brown. — According to the theory 
of which David Hume, the sceptic, and Dr. Thomas 
Brown, the reverent Theist, were prominent advocates, 
causation is nothing but orderly succession, or one event 
following another in a uniform method, which we call 
laws of nature. We observe that under similar circum- 
stances similar events happen, but between the events 
called cause and effect there is nothing more known to 
us than antecedence and sequence. The " effect " is not 
due to any inherent efficiency in the " cause," but 
merely follows it. We, it is said, only fall into the 
mistake of supposing the one event derives its exist- 
ence from the other because it always follows it in 
the same conditions. The habit of associating them 
together leads to the error of supposing there was 
some force or quality in the one we name " cause " to 
produce the other which we name "effect." 

Not as an argument, but in illustration of the differ- 



36 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



ence, the theory of causation may be likened to a chain 
in which each lower link is upheld by the one above 
it, and the whole by the beam from which it is sus- 
pended. The other theory may be likened to the 
same links in the same order, and in contact, but 
each one not hooked into or dependent on the next 
above. Of course, we have no experience of the 
latter ; but according to the theory of mere antece- 
dence, there is no more efficiency in the cause to 
produce the effect than there would be in one of these 
links to support the next below it. 1 

On this theory, which can still boast of adherents, 
I wish to remark, 

(i) That it is argued on the basis of our ignorance. 
It is said there is nothing in the succession of events to 
prove efficiency in the antecedent. All that appears is 



1 It is said Hume was misunderstood, and that he taught 
the reality of efficient causation, but, following Locke's em- 
piricism, held that our notion of it is derived from custom. 
Some of his language, taken alone, would seem capable of 
that construction. On the other hand, his language often 
plainly reduces causation to mere invariableness of ante- 
cedence, e.g. , ' ' We may define a cause to be an object folloived 
by another, and where all the objects similar to the first 
are followed by objects similar to the second, or, in other 
words, where, if the first had not been, the second never had 
existed." Again, "A cause is different from a sign, as it 
implies Precedency, and Contiguity in Time and Place, as well 
as constant Conjunction." If this be all, there is no actual 
efficiency. Again, " Had it been said that a cause is that 
after which anything constantly exists, we should have 
understood the terms. For that is indeed all we know of 
the matter. And this constancy forms the very essence of 
necessity, nor have we any other idea of it " {Essays). If both 
opponents and defenders have misunderstood Hume as deny- 
ing real efficiency, the fault was not entirely with them. It is, 
however, immaterial to my argument whether he did or not. 
My object is to refute the theory generally ascribed to him. 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 37 

that they happen in a certain order ; therefore we have 
no right to infer therefrom any efficiency in the cause 
producing the effect. But all that is proved by this 
argument is that causal efficiency is not evinced by the 
external phenomena ; that is, we have no empirical 
proof from our experience of the phenomena. 

Two things are to be noted here. First, nothing in 
the phenomena proves the contrary of real causation. 
The ignorance favours one side as much as the other ; 
that is, it favours neither. For aught it implies, there 
may be efficiency in the antecedent. 

Secondly, it is still more important to observe that 
our knowledge of causation is not empirical, but intui- 
tive. It is not derived from what is apparent in the 
succession of events, but from a necessary dictum of 
our minds. The objection, therefore, is irrelevant. 
V. Cousin, refuting Locke's teaching that our idea of 
cause is derived from sensation or observation of sen- 
sible vicissitudes in external objects, remarks, " Because 
a phenomenon succeeds another, and succeeds it con- 
stantly, is it the cause of that phenomenon ? Is 
that all the idea that you form of cause ? When you 
say, when you think that the fire is the cause of the 
fluid state of the wax, I ask you whether you simply 
understand that the phenomenon of fluidity succeeds 
the phenomenon of the approach of fire ; I ask you 
whether you do not believe, whether the entire 
human race does not believe, that there is in the fire 
a something, an unknown property, an explanation of 
which is not here required, to which you refer the pro- 
duction of the phenomenon of the fluidity of the wax." x 

1 History of Modern Philosophy, vol. ii., p. 20b. 



38 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

(2) If an event has no relation to what we call its 
cause, except that of sequence, it is not dependent on its 
cause. For (ex hypothesi) mere antecedence does nothing- 
whatever for the effect but go before. Consequently, 
if what is called the cause did not go before, what we 
call the effect might still take place all the same, seeing 
it is not dependent on the cause ; that is, the effect 
might happen of itself without the antecedent, which 
involves all the absurdities of self-origination. From 
the conclusion of self-origination we cannot remove a 
single step by bringing in a mere antecedent, since that 
would still leave the sequent to be absolutely its own 
cause, or source of being, unless we suppose every 
effect to be produced solely by the direct energy of 
God, in which case Theism is plainly taken for 
granted, and so is efficient causation, though it be all 
Divine. 

(3) Our consciousness of causal power and efficiency 
proves that besides succession there is such a thing as 
efficient cause. Between my volition to move my arm 
and the motion of my arm I know there is, not only ante- 
cedence and sequence, but causation — that the one event 
not only precedes, but gives being to the other. It is but 
the application of the same principle to external events 
when, observing the explosion sequent to the contact 
of a spark with gunpowder, I say the contact not only 
precedes, but effects the explosion. Day follows night 
invariably, but is not caused by it. This alone does 
not prove the principle of causation, but it shows that 
the two ideas of succession and causation are quite 

distinct. 

(4) If there be no such quality as efficient causation 
within the wide range of nature, it is pertinent to ask, 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 39. 

not simply how the idea became so general, but how it 
could ever arise at all, what analogy could suggest 
it. It is a conception so distinct and original that, if 
there be no corresponding reality, it is impossible to 
imagine how the human mind could ever first attain it. 
It were easier now to conceive the nature of a sixth 
or seventh sense than for our minds first to conceive 
the idea of efficient causation if there were no such 
thing. 

It will not serve the theory under review to 
reply that the notion is derived according to our last 
section from our consciousness of exercising voluntary 
efficiency on our limbs, for that would admit the reality 
of efficient causation. Whether the idea is so derived 
is a question between those philosophers who agree in 
the reality of causal efficiency, some maintaining that 
the derivation of the idea is empirical, the rest that it 
is intuitive. The truth of the latter position appears 
in the fact that before it is likely to be reasoned out 
from consciousness of exerting power, children evince 
recognition of the truth that everything they see is 
caused. And this view is confirmed by analysis of 
consciousness, which associates a cause with every 
event. 

Nor can the idea have originated from our knowledge 
of law as learned from the course of nature. The 
supposition of J. S. Mill, that in some distant world, 
events may succeed one another at random without 
any fixed law, if true, might have a bearing against 
the necessity and universality of order or rule ; it could 
have none against causation itself. So far as we know,, 
causation takes place according to fixed and uniform 
rule ; but the two things, causation and rule, or law, 



4-0 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



are distinct, both in their nature, and in their wa}' 
of becoming known to us. Causation is the action ; 
rule is the standard or line according to which the 
action proceeds. The idea of causation is forced upon 
us by necessary laws of mind ; our knowledge of law 
or rule is gathered by the processes of observation and 
experience. The one is intuitive, the other empirical. 

(5) It not unfrequently happens that opponents of 
real efficiency unconsciously betray their intuitive idea 
of causation by assuming the presence of efficiency, 
as when they seek to account for the prevailing idea 
of causation itself, tracing it to "habit" or to the laws 
of nature, or association. They evidently seek in 
these explanations, not merely some antecedent of the 
idea, but some efficient cause producing it. It is not 
uncommon for adherents of their view to resort to it 
in explaining the ordinary events of nature and society, 
though they demur to its use in support of Theism. 

(6) The explanation of the order of events is Jar 
less satisfactory on the theory in question than on its 
opposite. The former confounds causation with the 
laws of nature. Its explanation is that there is a 
certain manifest order of nature according to which 
events take place — a uniform antecedence and sequence, 
e.g., the falling of an apple, set free from the tree, 
take place because there is a law of gravitation per- 
vading nature. It falls according to that rule. 

Then it is obvious to ask, What causes the law? 
Why should bodies thus gravitate ? Again, the laws 
of nature, as we have just seen, are not causation or 
efficiency, but only its established order of operation. 
The thing to be first accounted for is not that 
events are similar in similar conditions (= law), but 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 41 

that there is any change at all (= active power), not 
the regulation, but the productiveness, and after that, 
it remains to ask how the regulation itself is to be 
accounted for. 1 

The empirical school, which derives all our know- 
ledge from experience, is opposed to all intuitive truth. 
To be consistent it is driven to assert that in some 
other part of the universe or at some future date two 
and two may not be four. But our thinking 2 -\- 
2 — 4 is a matter of constitution, not of gathered 
experience. Not by innumerable repetitions of the 
same thing under our own eye or the eyes of others, 
but before there is time for such experience, the mind 
even of a child, on perceiving the meaning of the 
signs, declares immediately the truth of the proposition. 
Although he may never before have associated the 
subject (two and two) with its predicate (are equal 
to four), he is certain the proposition is true. Tell 
him there are persons who think two and two are 
equal to five, yet his judgment remains the same. It 
is not so with empirical judgments — e.g., in all the 
experience with which he is acquainted, denser bodies 
tend to fall, that is, are more powerfully attracted than 
rarer ones towards the globe to which they belong. 
But that it is so in every distant sphere, or will be 



1 Brown lays stress on " invariableness of antecedence " ; 
but that is only the order or law of change, not its cause. 
While in opposition to Hume he regarded our notion of in- 
variability as intuitively certain, he regarded himself as at 
one with Hume in denying all real efficiency, e.g., " It is this 
mere relation of antecedence, so important and so universally 
believed, which appears to me to constitute all that can be 
philosophically meant in the words flower or causation " 
{Cause and Effect, 11, 12, 266). 
4 



42 FIRST PRINCIPIES OF FAITH. 



so on earth at every future period, he is by no 
means so certain as he is that always and every- 
where 2 + 2 = 4. 

Again, I just now know from memory that I yester- 
day suffered pain. But why should I depend on that 
declaration of memory? I find no reason beyond 
itself for trusting my memory. Yet I am infallibly 
sure it now testifies truly of my past experience. I 
am utterly impotent to reject its avouchment, even 
though there be no collateral or circumstantial con- 
firmation. Clearly this dictum of memory is intuitive. 
To reply that my mind associates its present conscious- 
ness with the sensation of pain at a past time will 
not help the empiricist, for the association is still 
a present dictum of memory by which alone I know 
of my past pain. Yet to me this irresistible dictum 
rests on no evidence but itself. 1 

The theory of " association " put forward by the 
school of J. S. Mill resolves all objects of knowledge 
into phenomena, and all connection of phenomena with 
each other into our mental association of them as- 
the result of experience. Substantially identical with 
that of Hume, Mill's theory seeks to account for our 
notion of causality as a mere inference from experi- 
ence. We, and all others so far as we know, having 
observed that a certain event (antecedent) in the same 
conditions was always followed by another certain 
event (sequent), are thus led to expect, it will always, 
be so in the future. But we have already seen that 



1 This argument is most ably elaborated by Dr. Ward, 
The Philosophy of Theism. In reply to Dr. Ward, Mr. Mill 
was obliged to acknowledge that at least memoiy is in- 
tuitive. 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 43 



there are primary truths. Consequently there need be 
no difficulty in explaining causality as one of them. 
Mere association does not amount to an explanation. 
It fails to give a satisfactory account of the principle 
of causality which pervades all minds and cannot be 
dislodged. The intuitional explanation is real and 
complete. The explanation by mere " association " is 
a tacit resort to efficient causation, which is the thing 
it affects to disprove. In accounting for the idea of 
causality, our expectation of a certain order of events 
is treated as the effect, and our knowledge of past 
experience as the efficient cause of the expectation. 
The one produces the other. So natural is the principle 
of causality that its enemies unwittingly act upon it, 
even when aiming at disproving its existence. 

The suggestion, favoured by Professor Huxley, that 
God's veracity is no guarantee of the truthfulness of 
our necessary judgments, but that God or some power- 
ful and malicious being may find pleasure in deluding 
mankind, is refuted at a stroke by Dr. Ward : "To say 
that mendacious faculties can be infallibly known as 
trustworthy is a contradiction in terms. No possible 
Creator could any more achieve such a result than he 
could form a crooked straight line." 1 Even if He 
could, we should be still bound by our nature. The 
suggestion of delusion cannot make us think the oppo- 
site of what we are now compelled to think. After 
the suggestion is made that we are constituted to feel 
certain that 2 +2 = 4, while in truth it is not so, we are 
as much compelled to feel certain of the truth of the 
proposition as before. Moreover, the veracity of the 



1 Philosophy of Theism, ii., p. 16. 



44 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



Creator is not necessary at this stage of our inquiry. 
Before we say whether there be a Creator, we are 
authorized to affirm that the human mind is so consti- 
tuted that, as occasions arise, there are some ideas of 
the truth of which it cannot but be certain, though they 
be attested by no evidence except their own light. 

3. POWER. 

The idea of causation is that of active power or 
force in what we call the cause. When the mind 
asks for the cause of a thing, it means the potency 
out of which the effect comes. To suggest any- 
thing as the cause which has no quality or power 
to produce the effect is to disappoint the demand of 
a cause. The answer no more satisfies than none at 
all. It is the offer of ignorance instead of knowledge. 
So far not a single step is made towards accounting 
for the effect, nor ever until a productive or causal 
power is found ; or if not found, the inquiring mind 
is confident that unless such power had existed, the 
event to be accounted for could not have occurred. 
The necessary judgment that the event was caused 
is only another way of saying there must have been 
some pre-existing power. A ship, for example, glides 
over the waves of the sea. In saying something causes 
the motion of the ship, we mean nothing less than 
that its motion is the result of some power brought to 
bear on the ship, whether it be the wind in the sails, 
or the steam in the engine. 

If there be no power, there can be no effect. Mere 
antecedence is not power, efficiency, or cause. Cause 
without power is meaningless. 

Reverting to the causal action of our own will, of 
which we have a better knowledge than of any other 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 45 



case, we are conscious that in willing to move the 
arm, or to speak, our will exerts a power over the 
arm or the vocal organs without which there would 
be no causation. Exclude the idea of active power, 
and the idea of causation vanishes. 1 The mind in 
quest of causes is not, as Dr. Brown affirms, satisfied 
with antecedents as such. When in this pursuit a 
child is content to be told the moon causes the tide, 
it is not with the idea of the moon as in its motion 
merely anteceding the tide, but as exerting an influence 
upon it. The search is for power, not for a mere 
antecedent. Mere antecedents, whether invariable or 
not, may silence, but cannot satisfy the demand. 

4. SUBSTANCE. 

The true notion of causation involves a substance, 
entity, or real being, to which the power belongs. 
An event is nothing in itself but the state or con- 
dition of some real being or beings. Phenomena are 
the objects of our perception, but they are not 
substances. All the changes we call phenomena are 
underlaid by, that is, they are the manifestations 
of something having real being. They without it 
could not appear, or happen, or be. Even on the 
most idealistic theory, they imply a substance in the 
subject perceiving them. 

Thus power cannot subsist of itself. It is an abstrac- 



1 Sir W. Hamilton successfully controverts Reid's view that 
our notion of causality is derived from our experience of 
causing by volition, and shows that it is not empirical, but a 
primary truth. We have it apart from and prior to experience, 
which is but a confirmation and elucidation of the idea. 
Hamilton's erroneous theory of the idea as merely the result 
of mental "impotence" is ably refuted by Calderwood {On 
the Infinite, p. 346). 



4.6 FJRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

tion, and, apart from substance, it is nothing. It is the 
power, not of nothing, but of something. It must 
inhere in substance. It could no more exist alone than 
could thought or weight. As in thought there must 
be something which thinks, and in weight something 
which weighs, so in power there must be something to 
which it belongs. 

To say the power to produce an effect belongs to a 
substance is the same as to say the substance has the 
property, attribute, or quality to produce such effect. 
Power, being an attribute, must be attributable to 
something. It cannot be simply the attribute of an 
attribute, the quality of a quality, the property of a 
property. It must be the attribute of a substance. 

As attribute it may be quiescent or active. It is not 
a cause, except potentially, until it comes into action, 
for unless it act, no effect can ensue. We know sub- 
stances by their attributes only. But we do know them 
nevertheless. It is equally true that we cannot know 
attributes except as belonging to a substratum, or real 
being. Thus causation is the energy or operation of 
the power of some substance or being. Hence it is 
fitting to speak of the substance or real being as the 
cause of the effect produced by its power in action. 
The backward order of these ideas as set down by 
Kant is effect, cause, action, force, substance. 1 



1 Pure Reason, p. 151. 

It is said that heat is not matter nor material, and yet it 
has " objective reality'' and "objective existence 1 ' as truly 
as matter, meaning " not it is something which exists alto- 
gether independently of the senses and brain processes by 
which alone we are informed of its presence." Along with 
this view it is held that heat is motion. If the word " exist- 
ence " in this definition may be taken in its popular sense, and 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 47 



5. ADEQUACY. 

The intuitive principle of causality demands pro- 
ductive power proportionate to the effect. The force 
which lifts one hundred pounds from the ground must 
be at least the force of one hundred pounds. The 
weight in the one scale, which tilts up the one pound 
weight in the opposite, must be more than one pound. 
The force of the breeze, which propels the barque, 
must be greater than the forces that resist it. The 
-cause cannot give more than it possesses. The effect 
may be different from its cause, whether that be simple 



not confined to an entity or substance, heat may be allowed to 
have " objective existence," but not in the same sense as 
matter. Motion is action, and if heat be that, it is not a real 
thing, but the motion or action of something. Matter is an 
-entity; heat is a property or state of an entity. Heat or 
motion is a material property, because it is congruous with 
matter, and no other substance. That which is extended, and 
-changes from one portion of space to another, is material, for 
these are characteristics of matter. Not only is heat found in 
matter, but apart from matter it is inconceivable. 

It is true we can think of matter as without heat, but not of 
heat as without matter, showing that while heat may not be a 
necessary property of matter, it is at least a property with 
which matter is endowed. Heat has an objective existence 
much in the same sense as the thinking of other people has to 
me. Neither the heat nor the thinking is a substance or 
entity ; but both are states of substances, namely, of matter 
and mind respectively. 

Professor Tait argues that as we know matter to have 
""objective existence" because we can neither create nor 
annihilate it, in like manner heat has objective reality for the 
same reason. The argument may prove that the totality of 
heat in the universe is always the same, and must be taken 
into account, as in the case of matter. It does not prove that 
heat, like matter, is a substance, or more than a property or 
state of a substance, any more than extension is a substance 
because it is coeval with the substance in which it inheres. 
See Tait' s Recent Adva?ices in Physical Science, pp. 44, 45, 

47> 4§> 55- 



48 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

or complex ; but it cannot be greater. All it is or has 
is derived from its cause. Oxygen and hydrogen 
united in certain proportions produce water, which has 
characteristics not possessed by these gases as such; 
but there is nothing in the water which was not in the 
oxygen, hydrogen, the uniting power, and all other 
powers that contributed to the result. 

If a substance begin to exist, there must be a cause 
adequate to its origination. Or if it be the subject of 
change of state, the cause must be sufficient to effect 
the change. If thought, feeling, or conscience arise, 
the efficiency of the cause must be adequate to the 
result produced. 

In the material world this truth is illustrated by the 
conservation of energy. Any amount of energy ex- 
pended on a particular thing is exactly so much 
abstracted from another part of nature. The energy 
which turns the water-wheel was all pre-existent, in 
some other form, and has been imparted by what we call 
the causes of the wheel's revolution. Had less force 
been derived, a less effect would have been produced. 

The less cannot produce the greater, the inferior the 
superior. Where it may seem otherwise, as where by 
evolution the combinations of matter are developed into 
higher forms of existence, we overlook some of the 
causes contributing to the result. For example, the 
void surface of the globe becomes clothed with vegeta- 
tion. But, apart from the question of the supernatural 
origination of life, in seeking for causes, we must take 
in all the possibilities previously in the seed, the 
particles of the soil, moisture, light and warmth of the 
sun. The improvement comes as the consequence 
of all the causes affecting the result. While (still on 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 49 



the assumption of no supernatural interference) their 
powers in confluence produce the grand effect, such 
potencies were previously stored within the bounds of 
material nature. The result is only the development 
of potencies which were already in nature, as was also 
their capability of development. Thus, on the hypo- 
thesis of materialism, nature, with its potentialities, was 
never less than it is to-day; while on the hypothesis 
of an almighty Ruler, any accessions of power or 
excellence derived to the universe can be ascribed to 
His energy, so avoiding the conclusion that the less has 
produced the greater. 

In one sense the cause is always precisely equal to 
the effect ; that is, the amount of power actually engaged 
in producing the effect must be the same as the effect. 
The energy is tantamount to the effect. In this sense 
the cause is not the amount of power possessed, but 
the amount put forth in action. 

In another sense, the power in the cause, that is, in 
the being which causes, may be greater, though never 
less, than that required to produce the effect. A steam 
engine of only one thousand horse power can never 
drive machinery requiring a higher motive power ; but 
it may drive machinery requiring only eight hundred, 
though in that case the force actually imparted to the 
machinery is not a thousand, but eight hundred. The 
amount expended on the effect is just the amount re- 
quired, whatever may be the amount in reserve. I may 
be able to lift two hundred pounds, but may actually lift 
only one hundred. Strictly speaking, the effect is equal 
to the energy or active power which produced it, though 
it may be much less than the total power of the agent 
which caused it. Thus, on the assumption of a finite 



50 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

creation by an infinite Creator, the degree of actual 
causation is the same as that put forth in the act of 
creation, while the amount possessed by Him who 
creates is infinite. 

To speak accurately, a cause inadequate to the effect 
is no cause of that effect at all, though it may have a 
tendency towards it. The force only just sufficient to 
move a body of one ton cannot itself be the cause of 
moving one of two tons. Its one ton pressure no more 
moves the heavier body than nothing moves it. So far 
as there is no effect there is no causation. Adequacy is 
essential to the very idea of causation. To say every 
event must have a cause is the same as to say it must 
have an adequate cause. It could not be a cause 
without adequacy. 

6. MORE THAN SECOND CAUSES. 

The principle of causality cannot be satisfied with 
merely " second causes" These are simply the inter- 
vening links between the last effect and the real or 
original cause. Each one in the succession, however 
extended, depends upon its predecessor for all its causal 
productiveness, and only gives what it has received. 
The last carriage of the longest train is not moved by 
the next before it, except intermediately and instru- 
mentally, but really by the engine at the front. When 
pointed to a second cause as such, the mind in quest of 
a cause is no more satisfied than before. It still demands 
the cause of the intermediate cause; and whatever 
number of such causes be retraced, the demand of a 
cause sufficient of itself to account for the effect remains. 
Never till that demand is met is the real cause reached. 

Say frost is caused by a reduced temperature ; the 
mind still requires a cause of the lowered temperature. 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 51 

Ascribe that to the greater distance of the sun, or 
its more oblique angle to our earth : it still asks, 
why the greater distance, or more oblique angle ? 
Ascribe that to the position of the earth in its orbit, 
and that again to the influence of gravitation, and it 
yet again asks, why those influences ? And if undi- 
verted by other questions, so on through any number 
of second causes, finding its goal and satisfaction only 
in an original and sufficient cause. Of course the 
mind may cease its formal inquiries long before attain- 
ing the remoter stages in the train ; but the principle 
of causality is not thereby satisfied. 1 

7. NO INFINITE REGRESSION. 

Consequently the mind is not satisfied with "an 
infinite regress" of causes — an endless series stretching 
backward from the present, and without beginning. 
For then, however many steps backward the search 
travels, it never gets nearer what it requires. Tell the 
mind acting under the influence of this necessary judg- 
ment the chain of second causes traced backwards is 
endless, and that there is no cause sufficient of itself, 
and its peremptory answer is, there must be a sufficient 
cause. Any number of merely second causes cannot 
altogether make up a sufficient cause. They only give 
what they receive. There must be one beyond them 
all, which gave what it did not receive. 

Nothing less is implied in the axiom that every 
event has a cause. A second cause, which has none 

1 In reply to Kant's contention that causation requires an 
infinite regress (which, however, he considers impossible), 
Dr. M'Cosh pertinently observes that the intuitive demand 
of a sufficient cause rests satisfied when it reaches the idea 
of a substance adequate of itself to produce the effect. Nor 
can it be satisfied with less {Divine Governme?it y p. 350) 



52 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

but borrowed efficiency, is not a cause in the sense 
intended. The causal principle seeks a resting place 
in something really efficient, which accounts for the 
effect, yet needs not to be itself accounted for ; that is, 
a cause which is not itself an effect. To point it to 
anything less is to attempt to quench its thirst by 
the mirage. The mind may be unable to find any 
but second causes, yet it remains certain of a really 
efficient cause somewhere. 

An eternal regression of causes, which is the same as 
an eternal succession from the past to the present, is 
self-contradictory. "The law of contradictions" is 
that a subject cannot have a predicate which contradicts 
it, such as, An existing thing is non-existent. So in the 
proposition, A series is infinite, it is predicated that a 
number (the subject) is numberless, in other words 
that a finite thing (a series or succession, which must 
be finite) is infinite. Further attention will be given to 
this point in Part III. 

8. PRECEDENCE OF CAUSE. 

In point of time the cause must precede its effect. 
It has been said, the causal energy no sooner exists 
than its effect exists. But that is more than question- 
able. If it were true that no appreciable time elapsed 
between the exertion of power and its effect, the effect 
would still be subsequent. 

To show how the effect may be simultaneous with 
its cause, Kant illustrates by the warmth of a room 
caused by the fire in the grate, asserting that the effect — 
the warmth — is simultaneous with its cause — the fire 
in the grate. The example fails. The warmth I now 
feel in the room is due to the heat radiated from the 
fire some time ago. The heat radiating at this instant 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 53 

from the grate can only be felt in the room at a future 
instant. 

If the effect be simultaneous with its cause, so is that 
effect, as a cause of another effect (for each effect in its 
turn becomes a cause of something else) ; and the second 
effect is simultaneous with the first, the third with the 
second, and so on to the thousandth, thus making the last 
effect in the longest series simultaneous with the first 
cause in it ; that is, the effect resulting to-day from a 
series of causes stretching back ten thousand years is 
simultaneous with the first cause in the series, which 
our intuition of time forbids us to believe, and it equally 
forbids us to believe the proposition which involves the 
absurdity, namely, that a cause does not precede its effect. 

But even if it were granted that the actual efficiency 
or exercise of power was simultaneous with its effect, 
it would remain true that the substance or being which 
causes must precede the effect. That of which the 
power is a property must exist before it affects some- 
thing else by that power. Whether or not the radia- 
tion from the fire precede the warmth in the room, the 
fire itself must exist before the warmth it produces. To 
refer to another of Kant's examples, the leaden ball 
placed on a soft cushion, and thereby causing a hollow, 
must certainly exist before its effect — the hollow. That 
in which the causal power inheres must exist before 
the effect which the activity of its power produces. 

It is surprising that one of our foremost physicists, 
Professor Tait, should on this subject indulge in a 
strange piece of denunciation. These are his words : 
" The only other fallacy which I shall mention for the 
present is that of basing physical results upon the old 
dog-Latin dogma, Causa cequat effectum. It is difficult 



54 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

to decide whether the Latinity or the (semi-obscure) 
sense is in this dogma the more incorrect. The fact 
is that we have not yet quite cast off that tendency of 
so-called metaphysics which has often completely 
blasted the already promising career of a physical 
inquirer. I say, 'so-called' metaphysics, because there 
is a science of metaphysics ; but from the very nature 
of the case, the professed metaphysicians will never 
attain to it. In fact, if we once begin to argue upon 
such a dogma as the above, the next step may very 
naturally be to inquire whether cause and effect are 
simultaneous or successive." 1 

It were to be wished this paragraph were merely 
intended to guard the inductive method, and to restrain 
the employment of metaphysical principles in solving 
physical problems ; but the condemnation is directed 
against the " dogma " itself, not merely its application to 
physics. I am not concerned about "the Latinity," but 
the correctness of what has hitherto been accepted as an 
axiom. As expounded by Sir W. Hamilton and other 
philosophers, there need be no "semi-obscurity" about it. 

Professor Tait makes no attempt to show its fallacy, 
his reprehensive words notwithstanding. So far from 
his doing this by intimating that it might lead to the 
question of precedence, I regard both questions as 
intelligible and important. How, " from the nature of 
the case, the professed metaphysicians will never attain " 
to the " science of metaphysics," is "obscure." As to 
being " mystified " by asking if the cause be adequate, 
and antecedent to the effect, mystification is much more 
likely to arise from not asking these questions. 

1 Recent AdvciJices, pp. n, 12, 35. 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY, 5$ 

If the paragraph was intended simply to keep physical 
and metaphysical sciences to their own provinces, 
respectively, very different language might have been 
used. If the object was to warn metaphysicians not to 
investigate metaphysical questions, and not to rely on 
any but empirical guidance, it was an attempted 
monopoly in behalf.of empirical investigation- to which 
reason cannot submit. 

That every effect must have an adequate cause is so 
imperatively demanded by the necessary laws of thought, 
that no principle has greater right to a place in the true 
" science of metaphysics." Professor Tait's paragraph 
might have been written by Lamarck, who refused to 
inquire into the cause of laws. But surely his refusal 
need not induce other people to ignore a question so 
profoundly interesting. 

Causa cequat effectum may be no a priori guide to 
effects, as it affirms nothing respecting the quality of 
an effect. All it affirms is adequacy or proportion. It 
does not profess to " discover anything " in physics, 
but it insists that what is discovered shall not be ascribed 
to an incompetent cause. 

The denial of this principle involves the denial of 
another, Ex nihilo nihil fit, which accordingly Professor 
Tait denies with equal positiveness, 1 a denial which 
is tantamount to asserting that a thing may arise of 
itself without any other cause. Principles so mani- 
festly rooted in our primary beliefs are not to be thus. 
easily set aside. 

Professor Tait seems to assume that these two 
principles are contrary to the experimental methods by 

1 Pp. 54> 57- 



$6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

which Colding and Joule ascertained the conservation 
of energy. 1 But there is no contrariety whatever. 
In no such case is the effect greater than the cause, or 
without a cause. Tait's rejection of these two require- 
ments seems to imply the possibility of something 
arising of itself from nothing, or partially from nothing ; 
that is, so far as the cause is inadequate. 

The idea of proportion in the cause betrays its 
presence in Professor Tait's own reasoning on physical 
nature, e.g., giving Newton's second law, he says, 
" Change of motion is proportional to the moving 
force, and takes place in the direction of the straight 
line in which the force acts." 2 

" Nothing," says Professor Tait, " can be learned 
as to the physical world save by observation and ex- 
periment, or by mathematical deductions from data so 
obtained." 3 This "all-important principle" interdicts 
the use of psychological " principles," which are as 
much a part of nature as " the physical world," and 
which may, as legitimately as mathematics, be applied 
to physics, not instead of induction, but along with it. 
If, by the laws of thought, the mathematical principle 
that the whole is greater than its part must be observed 
in reasoning about the physical world, by the same 
laws the metaphysical principle that a thing cannot both 
be and not be at the same time ought to command equal 
respect. Just so, too, in physical or spiritual nature, 
the principles that nothing can begin to be without a 
cause, nor without an adequate cause, are equally true. 
If, for instance, the experiments of the physicist pointed 
towards the conclusion that an event happened without 

•Pp. 57, 58. 'P. 35i". 3 P-342- 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY, 57 



an adequate cause, he would have reason to pause, 
and reconsider his facts or his reasoning, with the 
object of finding some flaw ; for his primary beliefs 
would tell him there must be an adequate cause, 
whatever became of his experiments or his induction. 
It is true, as Professor Tait says, " reason unaided by the 
senses is totally helpless in such matters " as physics. 
But the converse is also true — the senses are equally 
helpless unaided by reason and primary beliefs. 1 

9. PARSIMONY. 

The law of parsimony of causes requires that the 
number shall be as few as possible. While insisting 
that every event is caused, the laws of thought are 
averse to the assumption of more causes than are 
necessary. Sir W. Hamilton calls this a "primary 
presumption of philosophy." When an event can be 
explained by a few causes the mind prefers them to 
many, and is still better satisfied if it can reduce them 
to one. Hence in accounting for things, it naturally 
seeks to reduce the number of causes. " Entia prceter 
necessitatem non esse multiplicanda." It is this logical 
law which prompts men of science to reduce the facts 
of nature to classes, species, and genera, according to 
some one characteristic under which many individuals 
may be united. Great, therefore, was the relief afforded 
by the discovery that all the manifold and complex 



1 " It is clear to my mind that there is such a thing as 
adequacy. Not, of course, that one can always know a priori 
what the effects of any change will be ; but we can sooner 
or later know a posteriori, not only that certain effects 
have followed from certain causes, but how it is these causes 
have been able to produce such effects. ... In short, 
1 Nemo quoddat non habet' " (nothing can give what it has 
not) (Mivart, Nature and Thought, p. 201). 
5 



58 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



motions of the earth and the heavenly bodies were due 
to the one simple force of gravitation. 

It has often been argued in Natural Theology that 
the display of the Creator's wisdom in nature is en- 
hanced by the fact that many results may be traced 
up to few and simple causes. It is deemed greater to 
produce many results by means of a few streams of 
energy, and according to a few simple laws, than by 
many. This preference for economy of means is 
repugnant to the putting forth of more power than is 
necessary to the accomplishment of the end, which 
would derogate from the wisdom of the proceeding. 

In the foregoing observations it has been convenient 
to speak of each effect as having a cause, not, however, 
forgetting the fact that ordinarily it is the result of 
several second causes. If we inquire for the natural 
causes of the apple on the tree, we refer to the twig, 
leaves, branch, trunk, root, and sap of the tree, the sun, 
atmosphere, chemical ingredients of the soil, and the seed 
or graft, all of which, with many remoter influences, 
contributed to the simple effect of the mature apple. 
In analyzing the causes of an oral speech, we have 
to think of the vocal organs and many physical and 
mental processes, and so with most of the effects of 
daily experience. A higher sense of cause excludes 
all but such as are real and original— the action of a 
producing agent. But at present our reference is more 
particularly to second causes. 

Nevertheless our mental constitution impels us to 
seek for unity of causation. If at first our pursuit 
widens in all directions, it afterwards converges towards 
a single point. At the phenomenal stage the causes may 
seem to multiply like the many feeders of a river 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 59 



On reaching the substance or basis of phenomena, the 
materialist sometimes fondly fancies the multiplicity 
is resolved into unity. His idea of causality seeks 
rest and satisfaction by tracing all the countless events 
of the world up into the one substance matter, with its 
very few essential properties; but on reflecting that 
matter is not one simple being, but as many as 
its parts or atoms, he finds reason to push his quest 
still further back beyond matter ere his mind can rest 
in the discovery of the one simple cause. Under the 
same intellectual tendency, the still more subtle and 
inscrutable operations of mind are traced back by the 
psychologist to the one substance spirit, with its few 
necessary properties. 1 

When one or a few causes will sufficiently account 
for an effect the mind rejects any other as excess. Its 
maxim is, The fewer the better if adequate. The 
influence of this tendency is observable among all 
classes of thinkers, the irreligious and sceptical equally 
with the devoutly believing, as when the former seek to 
resolve all the operations of nature into physical energy, 
or all forms of life into protoplasm, or all animal species 
into a common origin, or all matter and spirit into one 
substance. On the same principle, philosophers seek 
to exclude all causes which can be dispensed with. 



'Dr. Calderwood contends that the cause of a thing, e.g., 
a statue, is not the pre-existing materials, but the agency 
which changes their mode of existence. In a looser sense, it 
is not uncommon to speak of all that was necessary to the 
result, or made tributary to it, as causing it. This corresponds 
to Hamilton's definition of cause, as "everything without 
which the effect would not result." The latter is not far 
from the truth as to second causes, the former as to real and 
original. 



60 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



From the same tendency the mind seeks a simple 
cause beyond the complex. Thus when so many 
causes combine harmoniously to produce the apple, 
our idea of causality leads us to look beyond them for 
some one simple cause of this harmonious combination 
and fitness of so many diverse things for the production 
of the one effect. It sees that their mutual congruity 
and concordant action cannot be merely the result of 
as many sources of power, but must have a common 
origin. 

10. FINAL CAUSES. 

The ends or reasons for which things exist, or 
events happen, are named final causes. They are 
closely related to efficient causes, but connect them- 
selves more intimately with creative or designing mind. 

In final causes we observe, not only the effect of 
efficient power, but also the reason for such exercise 
of power. A final cause is the end in order to 
accomplish which power is seen to work. We call 
it final because there is an end for which causation, 
as a means, works. We call it a cause inasmuch as it 
is supposed to be the motive, or ground in the mind 
of the author of the event, causing it to act as it does. 
A reason for doing a thing is an intellectual cause of 
its being done. A peculiarity of a final cause is the 
intended fitness or adaptation of one thing to produce 
another, more especially a good or desirable end. 

But the principle of causation is the same here as 
elsewhere. The eye is the effect of efficient causation, 
and its action is the cause of seeing, and again seeing 
is the cause of knowing external objects, and again 
knowing them is the cause of enjoying them. These 
are successive stages of causation. But because seeing, 



THE DOCTRINE OF CAUSALITY. 6 1 



knowing, and enjoying are manifestly desirable ends, 
we superadd the idea of causation acting according to 
design, or in the way of adapting one thing as a means 
to effect another as its end. 

This accompaniment of causation constrains us 
with the greater confidence than is inspired by the 
mere exercise of power to seek an intelligent cause ; 
for it is seen at once that nothing less is proportionate 
to the effect. 

The general conclusion is that every event is caused 
by the exercise of the sufficient power of some ante- 
cedent being or beings, and that more causes than are 
necessary to produce the effect are inadmissible. 

I now propose to apply the particulars of this con- 
clusion, as a lemma, in proof of the existence and 
attributes of God, at the same time supplementing the 
inferences they warrant by any other that may logically 
dovetail with them, and tend to augment the total 
strength of the Theistic position. My chief object is, 
not to develop fully the doctrine of causality, but to 
use it in subservience to the doctrine of God revealed 
in nature, and thus indirectly to the truth of Chris- 
tianity. 

To a great extent the Theistic conclusion is virtually 
secured in the propositions already established. So 
surely do they involve the certainty of Theism that 
some Atheists have admitted that if the principle of 
causation were known to us, the existence of God 
must be admitted as a consequence. Hence their 
antagonism to the doctrine of causality. Comte could 
only avoid the evidence of a First Cause by asserting 
that we know phenomena, but nothing of causes. 



62 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

This assumption is not only without proof, but con- 
demned by proof to the contrary derived from our 
consciousness of voluntary causation, and from our 
intuition of causality. As Professor Flint remarks, 
Comte could not but know he was himself a cause of 
Positivism. 



PART III. 

THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 



PART III. 
THE I STIC EVIDENCE. 

PANTHEISM and Atheism are alike incapable of 
proof. They can never be more than assump- 
tions. Hence they sometimes disparage the method 
of ratiocination and evidence. If Theism rested on 
no better ground than they, it would be equally 
worthless. As Dr. Conder remarks, " Theism ... is 
nothing if it be not capable of proof." x It asks no 
credence to which it is not entitled, but claims accept- 
ance on the solid basis of clear and positive evidence. 

Proposition I. The Present Universe is the Effect of a 

First Cause. 

By the universe, or the world, is intended the whole 
system of things known to us by means of our natural 
faculties, including ourselves and external nature, not 
merely the facts which we immediately cognize, but also 
those we infer by generalization. It includes matter 
and mind, with all their laws, operations, and ever- 
changing relations — the heavens and the earth, with all 
things contained therein, as apprehended under the idea 
of nature. 



1 Basis of Faith, p. 59. 



66 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



Every part of the universe is characterized by change. 
" The everlasting hills," as truly as the restless atmo- 
sphere, are in perpetual action and reaction. Whether 
it be by silent and gradual process, or sudden upheaval 
and rupture, " the foundations of the earth " are subject 
to the law of incessant mutation as completely as the 
ascending and descending waters. The correlations of 
the parts of which the world consists are every moment 
changing. The ceaseless functions of the human body 
from birth to death may be taken as typical of the 
changefulness which pervades all nature. All human 
intelligence and feeling are a succession of changes. 
Nowhere within or without ourselves can we find a 
point of the universe exempt from this law. 

But every change, whether it be the commencement 
of being or a new state of being, is an event, a 
becoming, an effect. By the constitution of our minds 
we are unable to contemplate such a world without 
inquiring for a cause to account for it ; and failing to 
find it, we are none the less certain there must be one. 
Were 'the world ever so insignificant, or our knowledge 
of it ever so scanty, our intuitions would still insist 
that it must have a cause. 

This demand becomes still more imperative as we 
think of the exquisite beauty, the manifold adaptations, 
harmonies and utilities, the sublime magnitudes and 
microscopic wonders, the vast yet mathematically 
regulated forces, the precision, invariability, and 
universality of law, the unity of plan and marvellous 
order pervading the whole. Our grateful admiration, 
increasing with our increase of knowledge, adds force 
to the question, What or who produced it all ? Whence 
this magnificent world ? What or where is the cause ? 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 6/ 

So necessary is the idea of a cause that the wondering 
mind stops not to ask whether there be a cause. That 
admits of no dispute. The immediate question is, What 
is the cause ? 

If there must be a cause proportionate or sufficient, 
it must be anterior to, and greater than all second 
causes ; it must be the First. The argument may be 
thrown into the form of a few syllogisms, thus : — 

1. Every event is the effect of a cause sufficient to 
produce it. The state of the present world consists of 
many events. Therefore the state of the present world 
is the effect of a cause sufficient to produce it. 

2. Every sufficient cause of an effect must have had 
sufficient power of itself to produce the effect. The 
cause of the present world is a sufficient cause. There- 
fore the cause of the present world must have had 
sufficient power of itself to produce the present world. 

3. An effect could not be produced by merely 
second causes. The present world is an effect. There- 
fore the present world could not be produced by merely 
second causes. 

4. What is not produced by second causes only 
must be the effect of a First Cause. The present world 
is not produced by second causes only. Therefore the 
present world is the effect of a First Cause. 

What other than the Theistic solution will account 
for the world as we know it ? 

(1) Chance? The theory that the world is the effect 
of chance has hardly any serious defenders, and need 
not occupy our attention. If chance could be a cause 
at all, the probability that such a world as ours could 
result from it is less than infinitesimally small. It were 
more probable that bits of metal should by chance take 



68 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



the shapes, sizes, and places necessary to produce, not 
one, but millions of watches, without the application of 
human skill or design. 

Chance is the absence from causation of plan or 
intelligent control. It supposes efficiency at work 
without law or order, producing that which efficiency 
can only produce when working under law and order. 
Chance is the negation of intelligence in causation. 
The negation is no cause at all. The mere efficiency it 
leaves is a most inadequate cause, not for effects, but 
for such effects as the world displays— such as force 
devoid of intelligent regulation cannot cause. Chance 
does not find a cause for the world ; it simply abstracts 
intelligent guidance from force. But how such blind 
disorderly force should produce universal order, or 
why it should produce any one result rather than 
another, is inconceivable. The theory of chance utterly 
fails to assign an adequate cause of the world. 

(2) Necessity ? The same holds good of necessity, or 
fate. To attribute the production of the world to 
necessity is to attribute it to an abstraction. The only 
intelligible meaning we can attach to it is that something 
operated necessarily in producing the world. It affords 
us no light as to what the " something" was. Chance 
and necessity are not substances, nor powers, nor 
energies, nor efficients. They are merely alleged 
modes in which power is supposed to act. They leave 
us perfectly ignorant of what the causal power is. 
Necessity, instead of telling us what caused the world, 
simply tells us it could not but be caused. It is thus 
irrelevant to our question. 

( 3 ) Self-caused? Nor is any solution found in the 
idea that the universe is self-caused. That idea does 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 69 



violence to .the necessary judgment that every effect 
must have a sufficient cause ; for it really assigns no 
cause. An effect may, in its turn, become the cause of 
another effect, but not of its own existence. To 
affirm that a thing is self-caused is to imply that it 
acts before it exists, which is absurd, seeing the cause 
must precede its effect. Self-origination can only 
mean that a thing begins to be of itself, that is, with- 
out cause, which is unthinkable, and contrary to the 
necessary intuition of causality. It is forbidden by the 
axiom, Ex nihilo nihil fit. 

Some choose to speak of God as self-caused, meaning 
self-existent, not that He began to be of Himself, 
or without cause. The phrase is unnecessary, and 
may mislead. 

(4) Infinite regress of causes ? Shall we adopt the 
theory that the present universe is the effect of a 
universe preceding it by a moment, or a cycle, and 
its predecessor the effect of the next earlier, and so 
on backward eternally, without any cause more real 
and sufficient than the present universe ? That would 
be an infinite regress of merely second causes — a chain 
of causes stretching from the present into the past 
eternally. 

(i.) That cannot be ; for a second cause has no real 
efficiency, and so is not a proper cause. It is but the 
medium through which efficiency passes. Of itself it 
has no power, and could produce nothing. And 
nothing multiplied to any extent is still nothing. 
Any number of second causes are of themselves as 
inadequate as any one of them. An endless series 
alone could not effect anything, because there would be 
proper cause neither in any part of it nor in the whole. 



'O FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



A second cause presupposes a First, not merely from 
the use of the words second and first, but from the 
nature of the things represented by the words ; that is, 
a First, or one properly sufficient of itself. A second 
can only become such by deriving efficiency from an 
original and true efficient. Every second cause is 
dependent ; and therefore so is any number or series 
of second causes, which would be impossible if there 
were not something else for the whole series to depend 

upon. 

(ii.) Again, an eternal series of causes backward is, 
as we have seen, absurd, according to the " law of 
contradictions," which forbids a subject to be contra- 
dicted by its predicate, e.g., a living thing is without 
life. To say a series is infinite is to say a number is 
numberless, or a combination of individuals is more 
than a combination of individuals. A series or suc- 
cession, however long, is finite, and consists of so 
many units or parts. To call it infinite is to affirm 
that a limited thing is unlimited. No increase or 
multiplication of the conception of individual portions 
can give the conception of infinity, which is absolute, 
and cannot consist of parts. Indefinite a series may 
be, but not infinite. 

(iii.) A series infinite is absurd because it is unthink- 
able, not in the sense of our being unable to com- 
prehend it all, as we are with infinite space and 
duration, though we may have a clear conception of 
both, but in the sense that it is unintelligible. The 
proposition bids us think of a chain consisting of 
different links, having only one end, namely, the 
present. This is a very different conception from that 
of a series beginning in time and continued always in 



THE I STIC EVIDENCE. J I 

the future, adding link to link without ceasing. Look- 
ing to the future, we can think of a succession 
commencing now, and always extending, yet never 
actually become eternal. It is always limited, though 
always increasing. But the proposition of an infinite 
past series asks us to conceive of it as actually, not 
extending, but already extended without limit, a 
thing, moreover, completely infinite, yet every moment 
increasing. We can think of duration without limit, 
but not of an infinite series. We may conceive of a 
portion of duration or time, and divide that into parts, 
such as moments or years ; but we cannot conceive 
of eternity as consisting of parts. But (ex hypothesi) 
the series in question must consist of parts ; therefore 
it cannot be conceived of as eternal. 

(5) Cause of all in substratum of matter? Shall we, 
as Mr. J. S. Mill suggests, find the cause of the present 
world in the permanent, immutable, and eternal sub- 
stratum of the universe, that is, the substance of 
matter ? According to this theory, all the changes or 
effects which happen are in the state or condition of 
the substance, while the substance itself is always the 
same, all the changes being produced by the substance 
as first cause. The theory is untenable for the 
following reasons : — 

(i.) It is merely an assumption unsupported by a tittle 
of evidence, and is only invented in order to evade 
the proof of God in nature. 

(ii.) Its fallacy appears if we duly bear in mind that 
it assumes all matter to be one being, with a simple 
indivisible entity and substratum, of which all pheno- 
mena and events are manifestations. But, in fact, 
matter consists of units or atoms too many to be 



72 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



imagined, each atom conceivably divisible without end, 
and each smallest part having its own dimensions, 
substratum, and entity. 

Hence there are in matter as many entities and 
substrata as there are ultimate atoms. Every molecule 
is at least one distinct and real substance. Con- 
sequently the permanent base and First Cause of all 
effects cannot be a simple material substratum, seeing the 
material world is a combination of innumerable beings. 

The law of parsimony, which requires the fewest 
possible causes, and tends to resolve all into one, is 
grossly violated by this theory, although the boast of 
Materialism is that it accounts for all things by the 
fewest causes. Dispensing with all but matter, it 
promises to lead us to unity of causation in the one 
material substance. In the end it turns out that its 
unity is an incalculable multiplicity. 

Further, the phenomena are the effects of the mutual 
correlations of the ultimate atoms. But what causes 
the correlations ? Should it be answered, The intrinsic 
properties of the several atoms, it remains to ask, 
Whence their properties ? How came so many different 
atoms to be all constituted to suit each other, so as to 
unite into a consistent, homogeneous whole, and to act 
in harmony ? What caused their reciprocal relations, 
extending throughout the universe ? This theory leaves 
the mind still in search of a First Cause, which is evi- 
dently something beyond the substratum of matter. 

(iii.) In the events of the world it is not something 
other than matter which changes, but matter itself, so 
far as it is known to us. // is constantly changing- 
The essence or substratum does not cease to be the 
essence ; but it exists now in this state, then in that, 



Til El STIC EVIDENCE. 73 



now here, then there, now in this posture, then that, 
now at rest, then in motion, now compressed, then 
expanded. The subject of change is the matter, not 
something else. If God changed in any such wise as 
this, we could not say He was immutable. Neither is 
it true to say the substance of matter is unchangeable, 
so long as it is the subject of change. Again, there- 
fore, there must be some cause of changeful matter 
besides itself. 

(iv.) Looking at matter as such, there is nothing in it 
sufficient to account for the events of the universe. 
Permanence would not be enough ; there must be 
adequate efficiency. If the substratum of matter be the 
first cause of all, it must be sufficient of itself to pro- 
duce all; that is, all effects must be potentially in 
matter. In other words, all are to be accounted for 
by the essential properties of matter. 

Among these are extension (it must occupy space), 
impenetrability (two bodies cannot occupy the same 
space at the same time), divisibility (in thought, whether 
in deed or not, the smallest portion has sides and 
dimensions, and is conceivably divisible). These are 
necessary properties because we cannot conceive of 
matter without them. But are they, with all of their class, 
sufficient to account for all the facts of the Universe ? 
Are they proportionate to such a result ? Are all 
changes but modifications of these properties ? Are 
they adequate causes of gravitation, energy, motion, 
organization, life, intelligence, conscience, sensitivity, 
morality, religion ? 

Their utter inadequacy is clear from their incongruity 

as causes with most of these effects. No degree of 

extension, resistance, or other essential property of 
4* 



74 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



matter, has the slightest fitness to produce thought, con- 
science, or will. If all effects be but modifications of 
those essential properties, an effect can contain nothing 
but some forms of those properties. But manifestly 
it is not so in fact. Consciousness, life, happiness, 
righteousness, are not forms of such properties as exten- 
sion and impenetrability. Consequently, the attempt 
to make the essence, or essential qualities of matter 
the first cause of all things breaks down. 

Moreover, if it were granted that all effects are mere 
modifications of the essential properties of matter, we 
should still have to account for the modifications. Why 
are they modified at all ? Why in the present parti- 
cular way ? By what cause ? The properties take 
different modes as they are acted upon, not simply by 
their essence, but from without. This shifts the cause 
of the changes from the substratum and essential pro- 
perties to something else. Therefore, again, the sub- 
stratum is not the First Cause. 

(v.) Further, inertia, or absence of self-action, is a 
property of matter as known to physical science. It 
can neither start nor stop itself. It is always passive. 
It may be acted upon in ten thousand ways, with as 
many different results, but cannot originate its own 
action. How then can it be the original cause of its 
own changes ? Evidently a cause distinct from itself 
is necessary. It may be answered that there is an 
internal motion of the ultimate particles of matter, of 
which many phenomena are the result. But that is 
superadded to inert matter, and cannot be claimed as 
produced by the substratum. Nay, it raises for the 
Materialist another unanswerable question, how is this 
superadded force to be accounted for ? 



TH El STIC EVIDENCE. 75 

(vi.) Not the least assumption of this theory is the 
eternity of matter, without which the theory cannot hold 
for a moment. For if matter be not eternal, it demands 
a prior cause to account for its beginning. But its 
eternity has never been proved. It is a mere hypo- 
thesis brought in for the purpose of avoiding the evi- 
dence of a Creator. 1 

Mr. H. Spencer's attempt to disprove creation need 
not give Theists much concern. u The creation of 
matter," he writes, " is inconceivable, implies the esta- 
blishment of a relation in thought between nothing and 
something — a relation of which one term is absent — an 
impossible relation." 2 What is the meaning here of 
" relation " ? Were it a causal relation between no- 



1 Professor Mivart {Natitre and Thought, pp. 18 1-2-4) 
doubts whether reason alone can disprove the eternity of 
matter, but forcefully contends that, if eternal, the universe 
must have been always as now a " multifold " universe, made 
up of many parts, forces, capacities, and laws. But such a 
universe could not be uncaused, it must be eternally depen- 
dent on some absolute cause. The innumerable elements, 
•each eternal and independent, could never correlate them- 
selves into the one harmonious whole which it now is, and 
must always have been, either actually or potentially. After 
referring to Dr. Mivart as "holding with St. Thomas, that 
reason cannot by itself disprove with certitude the eternity 
of matter," and to Liberatore, who held the same view, as 
admitting " that some scholastics and ' almost all modern 
philosophers' are against" St. Thomas, Dr. Ward adds, 
"With sincere deference then to those eminent Catholics, 
who on this matter follow St. Thomas, we cannot do so our- 
selves. Nay, we regard the thesis, that ' all contingent things 
have a commencement,' as more obtrusively (if we may so 
speak) axiomatic than the thesis that ' all contingent things 
have a cause ' " {Philos. of 'I heism, ii., p. 3 to,). The burden 
of proof lies with him who affirms matter to be eternal. But 
the contingency and mutability of matter furnish conclusive 
arguments against its proper eternity. 

* The Principles of Biology, vol. i., p. 336. 



y6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



thing and something, it would be absurd ; so it would 
if the " relation" were one of likeness, or equality. 
But it is merely a relation of opposition or antithesis, 
between nothing and something — not strictly a relation 
between the two, but between our ideas of them, a 
thing possible enough. The objective things related 
directly to each other in the creative theory, are not 
nothing and something, but the Creator and the thing 

created. 

Granted, the modus operandi of creation is inconceiv- 
able ; the fact is not. How the Almighty created is 
inconceivable, yet there is no difficulty in conceiving 
that He did create. It is inconceivable how any cause 
acts in producing its immediate effect ; but that it does 
produce it is as conceivable as it is certain. Why then 
should the inconceivability of the nexus between Creator 
and creation be deemed an objection to the fact ? Mr. 
Spencer reminds us that "no one ever saw a special 
creation." True ; but no one, known to us, ever saw 
the generation of life from inorganic matter, or a 
transmutation of species, or the eternal evolution of 
the world ; or, to come to indisputable ground, no one 
ever saw the farther side of the moon ; and no one ever 
deemed that a reason for denying that there was one. 

It is too often forgotten that the question of creation 
or no creation is altogether outside the province of 
inductive science. While it is the office of the scientist 
to observe facts, and thence to make such generaliza- 
tions as they warrant, taking special care to avoid a 
too narrow induction, he can only apply this process 
to facts within the range of experience. But assuming 
a creation of the world, that is clearly beyond all 
human experience. To it, his apparatus of induction 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. J 7 

is quite inapplicable. When, therefore, he says we 
have no experience of creation of substance, he speaks 
truly ; but when he thence infers that there never was 
a creation, he falls into the double error of drawing 
a baseless conclusion, and attempting to settle the 
question by a method which has no sort of fitness for 
the purpose. The physicist, as such, is no more quali- 
fied to decide the question of an original creation, than 
a Christian theologian, as such, to decide whether space 
has more than three dimensions, or a poet to determine 
the distance of Sirius. The question of a creation is 
one for the metaphysician and the theologian much more 
than for the empirical investigator of nature. Conse- 
quently the objection that we have never seen an instance 
of creation contributes nothing whatever to the intelli- 
gent discussion of the subject. 

The eternity of matter is more plainly, though not 
more really, begged in the words of Burmeister, 
endorsed by Biichner * : " The earth and the world 
are eternal, for this quality belongs to the essence of 
matter." How is the essence of matter known at all, 
except by its changeful states and properties ? Where 
is the proof, or even its shadow, that eternity belongs 
to its essence ? The assertion is a baseless atheistic 
assumption. 

Besides metaphysical arguments to show the non- 
eternity of matter, such as the necessary dependence 
and plurality of matter, physical arguments have been 
adduced, e.g., that of Sir W. Thompson from Thermo- 
dynamics, based on the ground that there must have 
been a time of absence of heat, and therefore of crea- 

1 Force and Matter, p. 62. 



78 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



tioru * However valid may be this argument to some 
men of science, it is not yet sufficiently established to be 
of general use in Theology. Nor is Theism dependent 
on such evidence. 

It is not essential to Theism that the non-eternity 
of matter be demonstrated at the outset. Some of the 
considerations already adduced go far to show its high 
probability. But it is enough for Theism that we have 
proof of an intelligent First Cause, and thence infer the 
creation of matter: or it would be a logically sound 
proceeding to prove the existence of God, and after- 
wards discover the fact of creation from supernatural 
Revelation. 

It has been argued that the world never had a 
beginning because it will never have an end 2 ; which 
involves two gross assumptions. First, that it will 
never have an end; for which there is no proof 
whatever in nature. Secondly, that its continuance in 
the future implies that it never began; which is a 
flagrant non-sequitur. It is easy enough to conceive 
that a created thing may never cease to be. To say 
its past existence is eternal as, or in the same way as, 
its future, is strictly, not to assert that it never had a 
beginning. Its future existence will never have become 
infinite in duration,— that is, eternal. Eternity will 
always be to it future and unrealized. The duration 
of its actual existence will always be limited, though 



1 " Heat is ftar excellence the communist of our universe, 
and it will no doubt ultimately bring the system to an end." 
" The present visible universe " " began in time, and will in 
time come to an end" {The Unseen Universe, pp. 91-93)- 
This does not assert that matter was created. 

- See Prof. Flint's Anti-Theism, p. 154,— alluding to Hol- 
bach's System of Nature. 



THE1ST1C EVIDENCE. yg, 



always lengthening. Consequently, if the duration of 
its past existence be like that of its future, it cannot 
be actually eternal. 

(6) All resolved into change ? Mr. Mill attempts by 
an entirely different method to avoid the Theistic in- 
ference, contending that effects and their causes are all 
in the changes which happen ; that in a given case the 
effect is some change, and its cause is a preceding 
change, and not in any substance. By this theory 
substance is left out of consideration, and the succes- 
sion of causes and effects becomes merely one of 
change producing change, without beginning and 
without end. There is nothing but phenomena. 

(i.) This and the other theory advocated by Mill 
cannot both be true, for they stand in opposition to 
each other. One accounts for the effects by the sub- 
stance of matter as their permanent First Cause ; the 
other ignores the substance, and accounts for the 
effects by antecedent changes only. Whoever adopts 
the one as true is logically bound to reject the other 
as false. 

(ii.) The latter is as false as the former. 

This latter is obliged to assume an infinite regress 
of changes, inasmuch as any mere change, or any 
number of them, can contain no sufficient cause of 
present effects. And it is equally true that if the series 
could be extended eternally back, it alone would be as 
destitute of efficiency as any one in the series. No 
increase of the number of second causes can increase 
their total efficiency, or endow them with the virtue of 
a primary and sufficient cause. The assumption, how- 
ever, of the adequacy of merely second causes, if ad- 
missible, would not avail to rescue the theory from. 



80 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



absurdity; for it would still be confronted by the 
objections which proved fatal to an infinite series of 
worlds. 

The theory misinterprets the language by which 
causation is represented. When we speak of one 
change as the effect of a previous change, the meaning 
(obvious enough, one would suppose) is, that one change 
in the state or condition of substances is the effect of 
preceding change in the state or condition of sub- 
stances. Substance as the base of all events is always 
understood. Speaking with rigid accuracy, the cause 
is not in the preceding change apart from the substance. 

Change without substance is impossible. Change is 
action or movement ; but it must be action or move- 
ment of some real thing. In all changes something is 
the changer, and something is changed. The action in 
the cause, and the change in the effect, must have a 
substantial subject ; e.g., the momentum of a cannon- 
ball striking an armour plate, fractures it. The con- 
tact of the moving ball (the cause) is the antecedent 
change ; the fracture is the sequent change (the effect). 
But there could be no such contact apart from the 
ball (substance), nor any fracture apart from the 
plate (substance). The cause is not merely in the 
motion and contact, but in the propelled ball, in con- 
tact with the plate — substance acting on substance. 
Certain conditions of the one substance are the cause ; 
certain conditions of the other substance are the effect. 
Leave out all idea of substance, such as ball and plate, 
and the change is inconceivable. 

Mill's theory, if true, would resolve all changes into 
nothing, — an eternal succession of changes without 
anything changing or changed; incessant actions 



THE1STIC EVIDENCE. 8 I 



without an actor, or things acted upon, action having 
neither subject nor object. 

The theory utterly fails to satisfy the intuitive de- 
mand of a cause. We have already seen that all 
effects must have their origin in power, and substance ; 
this theory attempts to account for them without either. 
All Mill's reasoning against Theism from causation 
is empirical, and therefore, necessarily defective. He 
argues merely from " experience" This method is 
unreliable when it infers the non-existence of a thing- 
from our inexperience of it ; and still more so when 
the inference contradicts any of our necessary judg- 
ments ; e.g., if any one attempted to prove from ex- 
perience that the three angles of a triangle are not 
equal to two right angles, he would be refuted by the 
intuitive evidence which renders mathematical demon- 
stration irresistible. So our intuitive principle of 
causality necessitates our thinking the present world 
must be the effect of a Being having of itself adequate 
power to produce it. This negatives all speculations 
to the contrary. Nor does the whole range of human 
experience afford any basis from which the contrary 
can be justly inferred. 

Again, Mill argues that " within the sphere of our 
experience " " the causes as well as the effects had a 
beginning in time, and were themselves caused." 1 
Of course, " within the sphere of our experience " ; 
but our necessary judgments compel us to look beyond 
that sphere. That " our experience " furnishes no First 
Cause is the very reason why we have to seek one 
outside our experience, one without "a beginning in 



* Essays on Religion, pp. 144, 145. 

e* 



82 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



time." The argument of Mill and " Physicus " is the 
well-known fallacy of inferring the universal from the 
particular, namely, that as all causes of which we 
have experience (second causes) are in time, and were 
preceded by other causes, the same must be true of all 
causes whatsoever. This conclusion, besides being a 
non-sequitur, is the opposite of what reason demands, 
namely, that as all causes known in our experience are 
insufficient to account for all existing phenomena, there 
must be a cause more efficient than they. Force, says 
Mill, cannot be traced " by our experience to anything 
beyond itself." True, it cannot " by our experience " ; 
but it can, and must, by our reason, and laws of 

thought. 

Whatever evils may accrue from Mill's assaults on 
the Theistic argument from causation, we gain at least 
the advantage of perceiving how little one of the 
acutest champions of unbelief can adduce against it. 
He had the ability and the will to put the case against 
Theism in its full strength. The feebleness and 
failure of the attempt furnish undesigned testimony to 
the impregnability of the Theistic position. 

(7) Force? Matter being found inadequate, it is 
asserted that all may be accounted for by the force 
contained in nature. Mill, followed by " Physicus," and 
reasoning again from experience alone, affects to find 
the First Cause in the fixed quantity of force, " com- 
bined with certain collocations." 1 

If force be taken, as with Faraday, to mean the power 
of God in nature, Theism is thereby implied. If it 
mean a property essential to the conception of matter, 

1 Essays on Religion, pp. 144, H5- 



THE I STIC EVIDENCE. S$ 



like extension, it is not true ; for we have no difficulty 
in conceiving of matter without force. If it mean a 
quality or attribute with which matter is endowed, or 
which it has acquired, as the endowment or acquisition 
was an event, it must have had a cause. To say force 
is the cause of all mutations only carries the demand 
for a cause a stage further back, to ask, what and 
whence the force ? 

As it is never found but in connection with matter, 
there is reason for thinking it belongs to matter. Then 
how came the forces of countless millions of atoms to 
agree so exactly with each other in the constitution 
and order of the universe ? To believe so many 
centres of force are mutually adapted, and co-work 
with the precision and unison which are everywhere 
characteristic of nature, without any cause besides 
themselves, requires an amount of credulity far sur- 
passing any required by the most implicit faith in God. 

If, on the other hand, force is distinct from and 
adventitious to matter, it must have a substratum in 
something else than matter. Not being itself an 
entity, it must be the property of some entity. Energy 
cannot but be the energy of something. But if it does 
not inhere in matter it must inhere in something else ; 
which implies a cause of the world other than matter 
and force. Moreover, if force be something distinct 
from matter and its properties, it is clear that matter 
can and does exist independently of force ; in which 
case force is not the cause of all things, nor of all 
changes ; for the latter are due, in part at least, to 
matter and its properties. In that case too it would 
be possible for force to exist without matter, seeing it 
would not depend upon matter. 



84 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

So far from force being the ultimate immutable base 
of all things, with those who identify it with motion, 
its radical notion implies change ; while with others it 
is the cause of motion. But the sensationalist school 
should remember that we have no acquaintance with 
force, except as seen in motion. The same energy may 
by turns appear in the form of heat, light, weight, 
electricity, nerve, and muscle. It is now united, then 
disparted ; now active, then apparently quiescent. If 
force be the cause of all, its changefulness shows there 
is nothing immutable and necessary ; but everything is 
contingent. But as something exists, we know that 
something must be eternal and necessary, which proves 
the theory unsound. 

Assuming that force could account for all physical 
phenomena, what congruity has it to produce the facts 
of life, consciousness, volition, sorrow, joy, and hope ? 
The mind is quite baffled in its attempts to conceive of 
these states as mere modes of force. 

(8) Matter and Force ? Another of Mill's alternatives, 
which must be false if either of the others be true, is 
that the basis and cause of all phenomena is in matter 
and force taken together as non-causes. Then what 
becomes of the simple unity of the cause, which 
Materialism allows to be required by the law of 
parsimony ? If to make matter alone the ultimate 
cause of all is to assign a cause consisting of as many 
distinct causes as there are atoms and properties of 
atoms, and to resolve all causation into force is to 
assign a changeful, divisible, multiform cause of all, 
then to join these together as the primary cause is to 
multiply the diversity, complexity, mutability, and 
contingency of that cause, and thus to saddle the 



TH El STIC EVIDENCE. 85 



attempted solution with a double weight of fatal ob- 
jections. 

(9) Theistic solution. The only satisfactory solution 
of the present universe as an effect is that which 
ascribes it to an antecedent First Cause. This agrees 
with all the essential requirements of causality. It 
avoids the absurdities of self-origination, as well as 
those of an infinite series, by tracing all to a Being 
possessing sufficient power of itself to produce the 
effect. Instead of attributing the world to inadequate 
second or instrumental causes, it finds one every way 
sufficient. 

The principle of causality is never satisfied until, 
passing beyond all intermediate links, it attains to the 
original cause — an uncaused cause of all besides itself. 

Our conclusion also harmonizes with every known 
fact of nature. All the wonders of the heavens above 
and the earth beneath, the immeasurably great and the 
immeasurably minute, the intricate operations, the all- 
pervasive laws, and the complete unity of universal 
nature, otherwise defying all attempts to explain their 
origin, are sufficiently and plainly accounted for as 
soon as we trace them to a great First Cause. The 
argument may be founded on any point in nature. 
But when we recollect that the number of such points 
far exceeds all computation, or imagination, and that 
nowhere in all the millions of events can exception to 
evidence of causation be found, the aggregate strength 
of the etiological argument appears overwhelming. 

Proposition 2. The Fir^t Cause is Eternal. 

Some being is ; therefore some being always was. 
For otherwise some being must have originated itself. 



86 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

which is impossible. Ex nihilo nihil fit. Had there 
ever been a moment when nothing whatever existed, 
there must have been thenceforward for ever nothing 
existent, seeing not anything could start its own exist- 
ence, or be the ^cause of itself. To be the cause of its 
own being would be to act as cause before it existed ; 
and as it must exist in order to act, it would imply that 
it existed before it existed, which is a contradiction. 

Thinking upwards from present effects to their past 
causes, the causal principle, as we have seen, cannot 
rest satisfied short of a First Cause. If there was none 
before it, and if something always existed, it follows 
clearly and inevitably that the First Cause never began 
to be, but is eternal. 

Proposition 3. The First Cause is Self-existent 

and Necessary. 

The First Cause could not be self-originated or self- 
caused. For as already shown, that would be absurd 
and self-contradictory. Nor could it be caused by any 
other being. For no other existed before it, nor as early. 
It was therefore uncaused, and independent of all others 
for existence. But an eternal uncaused being indepen- 
dent of all others, must be self-existent, that is, must 
have existence only in and of itself. 

Such a being could not but exist ; in other words, its 
existence is necessary. It could not cause the cessa- 
tion of its own being any more than it could originate 
itself, for that would imply that it acted after it ceased 
to exist, because its act of annihilation could not ter- 
minate until extinction was complete ; which means that 
it was impossible for it to exist and not exist at the 
same time. Neither could it be annihilated by any 



THE1STIC EVIDENCE. 8? 

created being,, for all created beings not only depend 
on it for existence and power to act, but are inferior 
to it, and being the less they cannot annihilate the 
greater. Consequently, it exists necessarily. 

Thus it is proved that there is a necessary self- 
existent being, the First Cause of all things. 

Proposition 4. The First Cause is Intelligent. 

" Who teacheth us more than the beasts of the field, 
and maketh us wiser than the fowls of heaven ? " 

I. Mind can be caused by mind only. Contingent 
mind exists, and nothing less than mind can have pro- 
duced it. Mind such as we possess is an effect, and 
not the First Cause. The mind of a man, being a 
simple and not compound thing, cannot be a scintilla- 
tion, fragment, or part, derived from the mind of his 
parent. It is a distinct entity of itself. As an ego t 
I am conscious of being the whole of a mind. My 
consciousness of individuality separates me from all 
others, as my consciousness of identity assures me I 
am the same ego as I was in past moments or years. 
My mind, and the myriads like mine, had a beginning, 
and could not be the First Cause. Consequently, as 
an eternal regress of minds is just as untenable as an 
eternal regress of material things, our minds must 
have been produced, directly or indirectly, by the First 
Cause. 

But the First Cause of finite minds must itself be 
mind. If not, our minds must either be modes of 
matter, or else they have a proper entity essentially 
different from matter, yet created by it. 

As to the first of these two suppositions, if mind be 
but a mode, state, or property of matter, it cannot be 



88 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

a necessary property, for then it would be co-extensive 
with all matter, which, in point of fact, we know it is 
not. If it be an accidental or non-essential property 
(which is the more general notion of Materialism), 
it must be some mode of one or more necessary pro- 
perties. 1 But between the necessary properties, say 
extension, impenetrability, and divisibility, with the 
addition, for argument's sake, of gravitation, mobility, 



1 The doctrine that all non-essential properties of a sub- 
stance are modes of its essential properties, as propounded by 
Locke, has been extensively accepted. It has, however, its 
opponents. The Rev. W.'Lyall {J he Intellect, the Emotions, 
and the Moral Nature, p. 50) thus refers to it: "His" 
(Locke's) " supposition that the secondary maybe but modifi- 
cations of the primary qualities, is a mere gratuitous assump- 
tion." The view thus challenged is not only confirmed by 
the discoveries of material science, but < is favoured by 
metaphysics. Lyall supposes that motion is not a property 
of matter, but superadded, which agrees with his view of 
secondary qualities. But the law of parsimony requires that 
motion, if possible, shall be attributed to matter. At any rate, 
on the hypothesis that all the forces and laws of matter arise 
from its essential properties, it follows that there is nothing 
to produce secondary qualities but the primary. They can- 
not be produced by nothing. And if the primary are the cause 
of the secondary, the latter, as the effect, must have been 
potentially in the former, and must bear some correspondence 

to them. 

Colour might seem to have no kinship with extension or 
resistance, but science inclines to conclude that each colour is 
the effect, on nerves and mind, of some peculiar internal 
motion of the object, e.g., red of one form of motion, 
yellow of another. And motion is plainly related to the essen- 
tial property of resistance. Scientists are also tending to 
regard all chemical change as but finer invisible forms of 

motion. ^ 

If, however, secondary qualities be regarded as adventi- 
tious, those which are appropriate to matter, as colour, motion, 
and chemical affinity, bear no correspondence, separately or 
combined, to thought ; and no more account for mind than do 
the primary qualities. 



7HEISTIC EVIDENCE. 89 



and physical force, there is no conceivable identity or 
cognation — no sameness of nature, no fitness in the one 
kind to generate the other, any more than there is 
in thought to take the mode of superficial or cubic 
dimensions, or of sentiment to be balanced in the one 
scale by lead in the opposite. 1 

Mind and matter have not a single property in 
common. It is impossible to think of any property 
of matter (e.g., extension) as inherent in mind. The 
two are so essentially dissimilar in every particular, 
that neither can be conceived as a contingent or 
accidental state of the other. 2 

To this view " Physicus " replies, " To the country 
boor it appears self-evident that wood is annihilated 
by combustion ; and even to the minds of the greatest 
philosophers of antiquity it seemed impossible to doubt 
that the sun moved over a stationary earth." 3 The 
irrelevancy of these illustrations scarcely needs indi- 
cating. " The country boor " and the " philosophers " 
simply wanted the true idea to be presented to them, 
and the impossibility of conceiving it vanished, whether 
they adopted it as true or not. But however carefully 
the attempt be made to present the idea of matter 
performing an act of thought, or creating a thinking 
being, the impossibility of conceiving it remains. In 



" There is a numerous group, not in the slightest degree 
entitled to rank as Physicists (though in general they assume 
the proud title of Philosophers), who assert that not merely 
Life, but even Volition and Consciousness, are merely physical 
manifestations " (Tait, Recent Advances, pp. 25-70). 

2 For the^ same reason "monism," which resolves matter 
and spirit into one essence, cannot be true. Properties so 
essentially opposite in their conception cannot inhere in the 
same essence. 

3 p P- H> 15- 

7 



9 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



the former case the difficulty is simply one of ignor- 
ance ; in the latter, it is utter incompetency to identify 

mind with matter. 

Our imbecility is not lessened by the suggestion of the 
most complex " collocations " of matter, as in the human 
nerves and brain. For change of place, shape, size, or 
mutual relation of the parts of matter, brings us no 
nearer to conceiving of thought as a property of matter. 
The insuperable bar is not in the bulk, or simplicity 
of matter ; but in its alien nature. Consequently the 
endeavour to identify it with thought is in no measure 
helped by supposing it changed from a simple into a. 
complex state, or " collocated " in any special combina- 
tions. Between brain, because it is matter, and mind, 
there is a gulf which material philosophy has never 
been able to bridge, as Professor Tyndall distinctly 
acknowledged in his well-known Birmingham address. 
Again "Physicus" endorses the words of Mr. H. 
Spencer, that mind is "secured by the one simple 
principle that experience of the outer relations produces 
inner cohesions, and makes the inner cohesions strong 
in proportion as the outer relations are persistent." A 
fallacy lurks in this jumbling together of physical and 
mental qualities, as if physical -cohesions" produced 
within, by outer or inner relations, were mental The 
absurdity, put plainly, is that outward material things- 
cause mental or spiritual qualities within us; which, 
moreover, is simply a begging of the whole question. 
Scientific explanation, in its broader sense, finds a 
sufficient cause for the effect. In its narrower sense, 
it affects to find it in classification, that is, it assigns a 
thing to its own class, with whose contents it is 
identical. " Every act of explanation," says Professor 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 



91 



Jevons, "consists in pointing out a resemblance 
between facts." 1 But the Materialistic explanation of 
mind does neither of the two. In the narrower sense 
thought and will can only be explained by showing 
that they belong to a certain class, because they 
resemble the other members of that class. But to 
place them among the properties of matter is to class 
them with things to which they bear no resemblance 
whatever — things which cannot be assigned to the 
same class, species, genus, or nature. With no facts 
of matter can thought and will be classified, therefore 
no explanation of mind is scientific which resolves it 
into the act or state of matter. 

Consequently, if mind is not a mode of matter, the 
only remaining alternative to my thesis is, that mind 
is a distinct entity created by matter. 

But this is altogether inadmissible, because matter is 
utterly inadequate to such effect. Matter cannot create its 
own kind ; how much less a kind of substance essentially 
different and far superior ! If matter cannot develop 
mind out of itself as a mode of its own existence, how 
can it perform the immensely greater feat of creating 
mind from nothing? Matter is inert, and only acts 
as it is acted upon ; and if there were not something 
else to set it in motion, it would remain motionless. 
To speak precisely, action, or agency, is not predicable 
of matter ; but motion only, as that may be set a-going 
by something other than matter. Should it be contended 
that motion is not a property of matter, but distinct 
and independent, and that thought is a mode of motion, 
the same fatal objection again arises. Thought bears no 



1 Principles of Science, p. 533. 



92 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAI7H. 



more correspondence to the motion we see in matter, 
than it does to extension or impenetrability. The idea 
of motion — that is, change from one place to another— is 
foreign to that of thinking. The two ideas are incapable 
of identification. Hence the one cannot give birth to 
the other. It were much easier to ccnceive of space 
as a mode of duration, or blackness as a mode of 
whiteness, than of thought and volition as modes of 
motion. Let motion be complicated or changed to 
any extent, it comes no nearer to identification with 
thinking, because the dissimilarity is one of nature. 

Should the Materialist choose the alternative that 
thought is a quality or thing essentially different from 
matter, though superadded to it, his position would be 
undone ; for then matter would not be everything. He 
has to account for a quality which is not matter, but 
vastly superior to it. Whence this non-material quality ? 
who, or what endowed matter with it? He has to 
answer these questions on the assumption that nothing 

but matter exists. 

Inasmuch as every cause must be proportionate to 
its effect, the less cannot produce the greater— the in- 
ferior the superior. " He that planted the ear, shall 
He not hear? He that formed the eye, shall He not 
see ?" This position is disputed by Mr. J. S. Mill, 
who contends that it is " at variance with the known 
analogies of Nature. How vastly nobler and more 
precious, for instance, are the higher vegetables and 
animals than the soil and manure out of which, and 
by the properties of which, they are raised up ! The 
tendency of all recent speculation is towards the 
opinion that the development of inferior orders of 
existence into superior, the substitution of greater 



TH El STIC EVIDENCE. 93 

elaboration and higher organization for lower, is the 
general rule of Nature. Whether it is so or not, there 
are at least in Nature a multitude of facts bearing that 
character, and this is sufficient for the argument." * 
So far from " sufficient," the argument is quite incon- 
clusive. 

In the first place, supposing the " facts," so far as 
experience goes, to disclose in nature no cause as great 
as the effect, the rational course would then be, not to 
conclude there is none, but to inquire whether there be 
any such cause either in or out of nature, ascertainable 
by other evidence than the " facts" — a question leading 
directly to the idea of an Intelligent First Cause of all 
nature. 

We ought not to consent to ignore the demands of 
the laws of thought, including the necessary intuition 
of causality, in order to stake the conclusion on the 
observed " facts " alone. Assuming the " facts " to be 
as Mr. Mill takes them, the case stands thus : On the 
one hand our necessary judgment certifies that every 
event must have a sufficient cause. But no cause can 
be sufficient which is inferior to the effect. On the 
other hand, there are cases where the whole of the 
natural cause is inferior. The inference then should 
be, that there must be some supernatural cause, since 
nothing less can satisfy the mind's constitutive demand 
of a sufficient cause. Instead of inferring that the 
less can of itself produce the greater, it should have 
been inferred that there must be a higher cause anterior 
to the less. 

Materialism lands us in a dilemma in which our 



Essays on Religion, pp. 152, 153. 



94 



PIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



experience of a thing causing something greater than 
itself is contradicted by our intuitive requirement ot an 
adequate cause. Theism saves us from the dilemma 
by finding the adequate cause in God. 

In the second place, this empirical proof of an effect 
greater than its cause is by no means made out. 
Certainly not by what Mr. Mill adduces as to "the 
development of inferior orders of existence into 
superior." He sufficiently deprives it of an evidential 
character when he calls it an " opinion," or " specu- 
lation " "towards" an "opinion," or rather, the 
" tendency " of speculation towards an opinion. This 
falls far short of the evidence of " experience." 

As to the "multitude of facts," a single specimen will 
serve to test the soundness of " the argument." Among 
" the higher vegetables " is the vine with its " precious '' 
clusters. This is the effect of a cause less than itself, 
namely, "soil and manure." But are the soil and 
manure with the seed or plant the whole of the cause ? 
The vine may be also in part due to the atmosphere, 
the temperature, the sun, moisture, deposit of ammonia, 
and many anterior causes of these causes, not to 
mention the refuse of animal life, and the cultivation 
bestowed by man. Is the vine greater than all the 
causes combined, to which it owes its existence ? In 
attempting this argument, Mill must have forgotten 
his own maxim, "The statement of the cause is in- 
complete unless in some shape or other we introduce 
all the conditions." 

Again, the ultimate molecules of the vine may be 
decomposed and dissipated in nature, and after many 
changes may come round to form another vine, in 
which case the first vine is a cause of the second, and 




THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 95 



the intervening changes are only part of the cause of 
the second vine. 

Clearly the facts of nature afford no proof of an 
effect greater than its entire cause ; and if they did, we 
should be obliged to seek an adequate cause above 
nature. 

It might be asked, if matter cannot create mind, how 
is it possible for mind to create matter ? We know 
not how ; yet we easily conceive that it can. For true 
action and power belong to mind, and not to matter. 
Mind in ourselves can originate motion or the operation 
of causal force, and can do this in inert matter. The 
impotence of matter to create mind is not merely 
difference of kind, or nature ; but impotence to do any- 
thing of itself; and especially to create a being far 
greater than itself. If creative power exist at all, it 
must be in mind ; it cannot be in passive matter. 

The effect is previously in the cause ; not so fully 
and literally as the words of Sir W. Hamilton seem 
to imply, but at least potentially. A savage tribe, for 
instance, may become civilized, and thus become a 
greater people. But the natural capabilities in the 
savage, and the influences of knowledge, example, and 
all that contributed to the result, are in their totality as 
great as the civilization they produce, and potentially 
contained it. 

On the principle of ex nihilo nihil fit, a part of a thing 
cannot come from something, and the rest from nothing. 
If the less produces the greater, part of the effect comes 
from its cause, and the other part (all in excess of the 
cause) comes from nothing, — which is impossible. 

The association of some mind with every particle of 
matter (Hylozoism), which has been assumed in order 



g6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

to account for the intelligent ways of matter, if true, 
would not be matter causing mind ; nor would it prove 
mind material. The natures of the two would still be 
as different as ever. This is pointed out by " Physicus," 
in reply to Professor Clifford. 

2. Intelligent cause proved by the co-ordination of 
nature. 

The constitution and operations of nature on every 
side display an exercise of power, the vastness of 
which may well impress us with admiring awe. Nature 
is pervaded by what we call its forces, to account for 
which we have had to refer to a First Cause. 

The characteristic now to be considered is that all 
this active power is directed according to a plan or 
scheme, so accurate, well-balanced, and universal, as 
to necessitate intelligence in its author. All the parts 
are reciprocally adjusted, and the forces harmoniously 
combine ; e.g., the carbon of coal with the oxygen of the 
atmosphere in flame ; or the various directions of 
gravitation in ruling the seats and courses of the 
celestial orbs. One chemical element has an affinity 
for another ; the quantities and qualities of bodies are 
all correlated. On the observed uniformity of these 
correlations, science founds its conclusions, and formu- 
lates the laws of nature. 

" The reign of law " is everywhere continuous and 
complete. Crystallization, death, reproduction of living 
organisms, electric lightning, germination, the func- 
tions of the human body, and the Operations of 
mental faculties, are always and everywhere subject to 
rule. Co-ordination prevails from the smallest particles 
up to the massive globes sweeping through the wide 
reaches of space. The position and features of Sirius, 



THE /STIC EVIDENCE. 97 





the revolution of our moon, the solar system, the trans- 
mutations of a drop of water, the formation of the 
earth's crust and its covering of vegetation, the action 
of the human heart, and interactions of body and mind, 
the explosion of dynamite, the action of fire and water, 
the invisible motion of atoms, all conform to the same 
plan, and are governed by the same system of laws. 

The principle of causality asks, how can this uni- 
versal order, this co-adaptation of the innumerable 
parts, be accounted for ? To ascribe it to chance is no 
answer ; that merely alters the shape of the question into, 
what chanced to cause the order to be as it is ? Or if 
chance mean that the actual effect had no more ante- 
cedent probability than any other into which undirected 
events might fortuitously fall, then the chances against 
their falling into the present order were virtually 
infinite. For the possible alternatives to the present 
order would be as many as the possible combinations 
of the ultimate elements of existence. If the few 
letters of an alphabet can be placed in a great many 
different relations to each other, how vastly more the 
innumerable constituents of the world. Were it 
possible to symbolize by figures, say nothing of con- 
ceiving, all the modes besides the actual, in which the 
atoms and forces of the universe might have been 
jelated to each other, the antecedent chances against 
the present actual order would be the number of 
those modes. The odds against the present order, 
and in favour of some state of complete or partial 
disorder, defies our attempt to believe the order 
emerged by mere accident. 

Or if chance mean that the effect was unfore- 
seen by its cause, as an accident is unforeseen by us, 
5* 



98 FIRST PRINCIPLES .OF FAITH. 



the ascription of the effect to chance is a petitio principii. 
For the foresight of the First Cause is part of the 
question in dispute. Besides, to say an event takes 
place unexpectedly is no answer to the demand for its 
First Cause. Chance, in that sense, assigns no cause. 
The unexpectedness is no part of the cause. 

To assign necessity as the cause, so far as the terms 
are intelligible, merely shifts back the question, leaving 
us to ask why necessary? and how came blind necessity 
to introduce such wonderfully wise arrangements 
throughout the immense range of being? why was 
order necessary rather than disorder ? Not because 
disorder is unthinkable ; for we can easily conceive of 
the forces of nature acting in dire confusion. Apart 
from mind, we can conceive of nothing to necessitate 
order, and especially this order in particular. 

To attribute it to mere force is no solution. For 
that too is blind. The actual co-ordination requires 
prescience, and omniscience to account for it. It is 
power acting according to rule. The methods as well 
as the strength of force have to be accounted for. 
Force alone may account for motion of some sort ; 
mind alone can account for such motion as we see 
everywhere and always precisely adjusted on intelli- 
gent principles. Take, for example, crystallization, 
with its exact geometrical calculations. A five-sided 
crystal is built up of minute five-sided figures, and a 
ten-sided one of ten-sided figures. However frequently 
a crystal be dissolved and re-formed, it always resumes 
the same shape in its units and its whole. The lines 
and angles of the small bodies always fit each other 
more accurately than the bricks of a wall ; the same 
lines and angles are repeated. But excluding calcula- 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 99 



tion from the Author of nature, all this is utterly unac- 
countable. But calculation is the opposite of blindness, 
whether of chance, necessity, or force, and is a distinc- 
tive quality of mind. 

Hence the all-pervasive force of Pantheism is as 
incompetent as that of Materialism to account for the 
intelligent arrangements and control of the world. 

The order of nature is the reflection of a mind suffi- 
cient to produce it, as the forces of nature are the 
reflection of a sufficient power. Nothing less than 
intelligence can account for a universe every point of 
which bears the impress of intelligent control, and 
harmonious correlation. 

The constant recurrence of similar events under 
similar conditions requires intelligence for its cause. 
"A -given cause always produces the same effect" 
is a maxim so broadly based on experience that it is 
accepted on all hands as a law of nature. But could 
anything less than intelligence have imposed such a 
law on unconscious matter ? 

Unreasonable attempts have been made to bar all 
inference of intelligence in the First Cause, on the 
ground that to draw such inference is to pass beyond 
the bounds of natural science. 1 Inquiry will not be 
thus suppressed. If natural science does not conduct 
our thoughts from nature to its God, reason does. 
Define science, if you will, in such terms as limit it to 
nature. The contracted meaning of the word cannot 
contract the range of our mental faculties to the same 
limit. Reason has a much wider realm than nature ; 

1 Lewes' s attempt to dismiss all idea of a plan is well met 
by the Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, p. S3. See also Janet's 
Final Causes, p. 116. 






100 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAI7H. 

and will not hesitate to rise, by legitimate inference, 
from the abounding manifestations of intelligent order, 
to an intelligent First Cause. 1 

By the same process of inference we gain our 
knowledge of physical science. Forbid rational in- 
ference, and science and philosophy are at an end. 
Why then is this noble faculty to be debarred from 
increasing our knowledge on the more important 
subject of the supernatural ? The attempt is in vain. 
Our intellectual constitution compels us to make the 
inference of intelligence in the cause, from signs of 
intelligent work in the effect; just because it compels 
us to think every effect must have an adequate cause. 

In the broader and worthier sense of " science," all 
legitimate pursuit of truth and extension of human 
knowledge is scientific. Its field is the whole range of 
truth, whether physical or spiritual, human or divine. 
Whether the knowledge of God shall be called scientific, 
or one particular section of truth seekers shall monopo- 
lize the use of the word, is a secondary question. 
The right and duty of our reason to connect nature 
with its Author must be maintained. 

3. Intelligent Cause proved by Final Causes. 

(i.) Explanations of the argument. 

Probably the most influential proof of intelligence in 



1 Dr. Calderwood's caveat is as just as it is pertinent. 
" If however, any one be inclined to maintain that ' where 
the material substratum is deficient,' all inquiry must ter- 
minate, and human thought must refuse to go further, or to 
attempt to rise higher, this certainly is not science, but an 
illogical attempt to make the science of nature commen- 
surate with the boundaries of thought,— an arbitrary de- 
claration that ■ the causal series ' within the material universe 
is the sum total of causality " {Science and Religion, p. 145). 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 101 

the Author of nature is that of Final Causes, the dissent 
of some great thinkers notwithstanding. Its cogency 
was felt by Cicero and Aristotle ; it swayed the convic- 
tions of Rousseau, and many another unbeliever; Mr. 
J. S. Mill on a general survey, despite his scepticism, 
confessed there was a large balance of probability in 
favour of the argument. Being easily understood, and 
its materials being always at hand, it appeals with 
great success to the minds of men in general. In 
modern times such works as those of Paley, Janet, and 
the Bridgewater Treatises have done much to render 
the argument familiar to the age ; while, on the other 
hand, Atheistic writers have felt it needful to direct their 
greatest efforts against it. 

The same world furnishes the facts on which we 
base the proofs of efficient and of final causes ; but the 
two lines of argument are distinct. For example, from 
the laws and forces of crystallization we infer a cause 
capable of mathematical contrivance ; but in the perfect 
crystal resulting from the force and contrivance, we see 
an end, which must have been intended, and for the 
accomplishment of which they were means. In the one 
case we infer a proportionate, that is, an intelligent 
cause ; in the other, we infer design in the cause, 
which of course yields the same conclusion of in- 
telligence. 

By final causes are signified ends previously in- 
tended, and for which means are employed. Intention 
or design differentiates them from mere results, and 
implies that they were thought of by their cause before 
they were accomplished. The gist of the argument is 
not to prove that design implies a designer, or intelligent 
work an intelligent worker, for that is beyond dispute ; 



102 FJRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



but that design is evident in many natural arrangements 
and operations, from which, by generalization, we know 
it is the same throughout the whole. That proved, 
the rest unavoidably follows. 

A final cause is not so named to denote that it is 
the very last effect, actual or possible; but to indicate 
that it is a definite end, to which means are adapted, 
though it may itself become the cause and means of 
some further end, and so on perpetually. Whether 
any such ends exist or not, it is clear from our defini- 
tion of the terms that if there be such, there must be 
intelligence in their First Cause. 

In any such case, the end to be sought is a reason 
for the employment of means to bring it about. Because 
the Author designs the end, He adopts means to 
produce it. The end is thus the cause, in the Author's 
mind, of using the means ; and in that sense the end 
precedes the means, — the final cause thus precedes 
the efficient. The effect exists in conception or idea 
before it exists in fact. In the order of thought, the 
end is before the action which produces its realiza- 
tion, and is the cause of that action. 

This order, so far from being an objection, as some 
have alleged, to the doctrine of final causes, is perfectly 
rational. For example, I conceive the idea of speaking 
a foreign language, and make that an end to be at- 
tained. Then I adopt means, such as studying the 
grammar and lexicon, and placing myself under a 
teacher. That I should think of the end before I use 
the means is the natural course of events ; but in that 
course my conception of the end is the cause of my 
action in effecting it. 

The final cause is quite consistent with, yet distinct 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 103, 

from, the efficient. The efficient cause produces the 
effect ; the final cause is the effect viewed as an end to 
be produced by means of the efficient. In the sense 
just indicated, the purpose of the end causes the use 
of the means ; but the special feature to be noted in 
the final cause is that the effect is conceived before- 
hand. There is nothing in the process to preclude 
foresight and intention of the effect on the part of its 
cause. 

The doctrine of final causes does not mean that every 
event in nature has necessarily a preconceived end to 
accomplish, though Aristotle said, " Nature never 
works in vain." It may be so, or not. 

Still less does it mean that we can trace an end 
for every event. It does not bind us to show the use 
of desert wastes, earthquakes, pestilence, or ravenous 
beasts, the dangerous gases in coal mines, or the con- 
trary directions of revolution in some heavenly bodies ; 
though in all such cases it might not be difficult to 
prove, or suggest utility. Nor does it matter that some 
few things in nature, such as monsters, seem at present 
to be inimical to useful ends. Their uses may yet be 
discovered as knowledge advances, or it may yet appear 
how they are incident to more general laws, fraught 
with good on a wider scale. Enough for the principle 
in question, if any one case of a final cause can be 
shown ; and for the theological use of the doctrine, if 
it be seen that final causes abound in nature. 

Nor need we imitate those who, as Bacon complained, 
neglected the investigation of efficient to dwell on final 
causes, nor those who have exaggerated the application 
of the doctrine, until they have suggested ends for the 
works of nature which were far-fetched, frivolous, or 



104 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

ridiculous. The materials are so copious, that we 
never need draw upon imagination for illustrations 
of the doctrine. 

From the time of Kant a distinction has been made 
between external and internal ends. External finality 
is the utility of a thing for another thing, as vegetation 
for the support of animals. Internal is the reciprocal 
utility of the various parts of the same thing to each 
other, and of all for the whole being. The whole thing 
is then both end and means, e.g., the various organs 
of the same animal. 

The doctrine of finality in causation is not a primary 
truth like the axiom " every event must have a cause." 
It is rather a generalization from facts of nature. It 
is conceivable that a useful result may be accomplished 
by blind undirected force. However improbable, there 
is nothing self-contradictory in the proposition. From 
our experience of nature, we assert that there are ends 
therein. And since every event must have a propor- 
tionate cause, we infer that these ends were conceived 
beforehand. 

The argument from final causes is commonly called 
the physico-theological, because it conducts our thoughts 
from nature up to God. But its base is broader than 
physical, if that mean material nature. Sometimes 
nature denotes the physical universe, but with the 
Anti-Theist it must include all that is known or exists. 
And he is bound to account for mind as a part of 
nature. In this discussion nature must comprehend 
all the facts of intelligence, morals, society, and 
religious instinct, all which vast domain, so far as it 
may be known, is available for the proof of design. 
The argument, as Bacon observed, is metaphysical 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 105 



rather than physical ; which may be a good reason for 
not including it in physical science, but not for its exclu- 
sion from the realm of thought and knowledge. 

The issue has been misapprehended, as if it were 
between Design and " Natural Selection " ; whereas both 
may be true. A corrector of this mistake l falls into 
the error of affirming the issue to be, " Design versus 
Natural Law." Law is not the antithesis of Design, 
but its instrument, and method of attaining its end. 
To demonstrate that results are accomplished by law 
in no way precludes their having been prevised and 
preordained. Law, in fact, is itself evidence of con- 
trolling intelligence, as we have seen in the co- 
ordination of all nature. To affirm that the human 
eye was produced by " natural law " is perfectly con- 
sistent with the idea that its faculty of vision was an 
end in the mind of the Law-giver. It may be readily 
admitted that every physical change within present 
experience "occurs in accordance with law," without 
our surrendering the axiom that " contrivance must 
have had a contriver." 2 It is astonishing that some 
Atheistic evolutionists should fancy that to explain facts 
by reference to law is to exclude design, as if to find 
out the means or the manner were the exclusion of 
the end. 

We are told " self-generation of natural law is a 
necessary corollary from the persistence of matter and 
force." 3 Then is the law self-caused ? Elsewhere the 
same writer tells us it is caused by force and the pro- 
perties of matter, which is probably what is meant by 
the words just quoted. But scrutinized, this means 



Physicus, p. 43. * Rid., pp. 38, 39, 40. z Ib?d., 57. 

8 



106 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



that as mere force is not directive or regulative, but 
the thing to be regulated, the properties of matter are 
such as to determine the course of all material force 
and change. That is to say, the laws by which all 
cosmic harmony is determined are previously contained 
in the properties of matter. But whether inherent or 
superadded, the laws could not cause themselves, but 
must have had a cause, and such as would be adequate 
to secure the system which moulds all the states of 
matter into mutual agreement, and links all events in 
a regular succession. The question is not whether 
this vast continuous order of things is due to law; 
but whether the order is not an end, or multipli- 
city of ends, designed by the Author of law. It avails 
little on this question for Mr. H. Spencer to observe 
that there is a " Universal tendency of force to become 
rhythmical." How long would this tendency have to 
operate before it changed matter into mind ? And what 
is the cause of this tendency ? 

It is no part of the argument from design that the 
great Designer of nature must reach His predeter- 
mination of ends by the same kind of mental process 
as that by which we reach ours. We may attain to 
a purpose by observing facts, and reasoning on them to 
a conclusion. The Omniscient can have no need, nor 
possibility of depending on such processes. The essen- 
tial element is that the Divine Artificer foresees and 
foreordains results to be accomplished in the course of 
nature— sets the end before Him and employs means to 
bring it to pass, 
(ii.) Proofs. 

The world abounds in marks of final causes. Their 
number defies all computation. The return of the 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 



107 



seasons, the tide's ebb and flow, development of 
vegetable and animal life, reproduction of living organ- 
isms, the respective contrivances for flight, swimming, 
running, and self-preservation in various species, the 
functions of the human body, the uses of instinct, the 
correlation of all the parts of a plant, a man, a species, 
a globe, a stellar system, or the universe, for the com- 
pleteness of its whole, are some of the countless facts 
in nature for the accomplishment of which, as ends, 
other facts are evidently intended as means. 

That finality is their true character is the more 
certain inasmuch as in almost every case the result is 
produced, not by a single antecedent fact, but by a 
convergence and co-arrangement of many antecedents, 
diverse, yet uniting to produce some one effect different 
from them all. Like the tiny streams arising far away 
and uniting at various points until they all meet to form 
the great estuary, the causes of an event, such as the 
existence of a particular man, may be traceable back- 
ward into almost every department of nature. In the 
proximate cause may be generation, parturition, air, 
food, moisture, heat, light, society, education, liberty, 
chemical and mechanical processes, all combined in the 
one result — a man of ordinary character. That all 
these several causes thus fell together, and produced 
the man, and that millions are so produced without 
intention or foresight in the Author of nature, far ex- 
ceeds the power of belief. 

Out of multitudes take a single case— man's audible 
speech. Not to mention the intelligence and will in- 
volved in its use, that the physical faculty of speech is 
an end or intended result, is apparent, not merely from 
its great advantage to mankind, but from arrangements 



108 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH, 



of nature for its accomplishment— arrangements mani- 
fold, minute, co-adjusted with the utmost nicety, and 
precisely adapted to result in the speaking of one into 
the ear of another. 

The sound is caused by a blast of air from the lungs 
striking against the vocal cords or elastic membranes 
of the glottis, which in their turn impart their vibrations 
to the air above. The greater or smaller volume of 
sound is caused by a greater or smaller propulsion of 
air from the lungs. But, for speech the sound must 
become by turns more or less sharp, varying between 
high and low notes. This is effected by the varying 
tension, and by the varying openness of the vocal cords ; 
and these variations again by the surrounding muscles 
and cartilages, and the motor nerves connected there- 
with. Further, the strength and agreeableness of the 
voice is increased by the higher portion of the throat, 
and the cavity of the mouth, serving somewhat as the 
interior of a trumpet augments and modifies the sound 
that would otherwise be emitted from the trumpeter's 
lips, thus supplementing the work of the larynx. Again, 
the modifications of the issuing sound into the signs 
represented by vowels and consonants, are caused by 
the positions and movements of tongue, teeth, lips, 
and palate. 

Still all this machinery fails to communicate the 
speech unless there be a conducting medium. That is 
found, however, in the air which intervenes between 
the speaker and the hearer. 

But even yet, the waves of exquisitely modified 
sound would not suffice without the receptive organ 
in the auditor. This is supplied by his delicate auricu- 
lar apparatus. Each ear has its shell and canals, 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 109 



which collect and convey the sound to the drum, which, 
"unlike other stretched membranes, has no marked 
note of its own." " Had it a fundamental tone of its 
own, we should be distracted by the prominence of this 
note in most of the sounds we hear." l Thence the 
message is carried by the auditory ossicles or levers 
of little bones, along the inner end of the labyrinth 
towards the brain, from which in some mysterious way 
it reaches the mind. Damage to the tympanum or 
drum is prevented by a tube (eustachian tube), which 
equalizes the pressure of the air on both sides. 

What a marvellous co-ordination of diverse causes in 
the production of vocal communication from one man to 
another ! Is it to be supposed that the co-ordination of 
the breath, larynx, throat, teeth, palate, lips, and lungs, 
of the air with its adaptation to be the medium, not 
merely of intelligible sounds, but of many significant 
variations, and of the mechanism of the ear, corre- 
sponding to the air and the voice, with all the nerves, 
muscles, membranes, and parts contributing to the 
result, was undesigned and happens fortuitously or with- 
out forethought ? Reason recoils from the supposition 
as contrary to all probability — especially when it is seen 
how the same result, and no other, ensues from similar 
co-ordination, and from no other, in countless millions 
of cases. 

Taking hearing and speaking together, how power- 
fully are we constrained to conclude that the speech 
spoken and heard is an end previously designed, of 
which all these correlated causes are the means. The 



1 Dr. A. M. Foster, Text Book of Physiology, p. 515, which 
see for other provisions in the process. 



110 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH, 



cogency of the argument is increased if we trace the 
contrivance further as a complex and delicate means 
for conveying not only sounds, but intelligence from 
one mind to another. 

Equally convincing marks of contrivance for useful 
ends appear in connection with respiration, nutrition, 
circulation of the blood, osseous mechanism, sensation, 
muscular and nervous systems, generation, growth, and 
various organs and functions of the human frame. 
"The more we learn," says Dr. A. M. Foster, "of 
the working of the body, the more aware we be- 
come of the fact that it is crowded with regulative and 
compensative arrangements, no less striking and exqui- 
site than the two we have just described." 1 

It is strange that, in face of such facts, it should have 
been said, we know nothing at all about final causes. 
The character of finality is manifest on every hand. 
Even where external ends such as that just given are 
not visible, the internal are often plentiful. For ex- 
ample, the completeness of the whole man is the end 
of all the correlated parts, organs, and properties of 
which he is made up. The relation of the latter to the 
former is inexplicable, except as the means intended to 
accomplish it. 

Strong confirmation is afforded by analogy. We 
know from experience as individuals that ends are 
conceived and then means adopted, that is, causes 
brought into operation to effect them. A man, for 
instance, mounts a horse and travels to a distant town 
because he has conceived the intention of reaching the 
place sooner than he could by walking. The possession 



1 Text Book, etc., p. 208. 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. \\\ 



of money, again, he conceives as an end to be attained ; 
therefore he trades, toils, or gambles, in order to attain 
it. He collects materials, and with his own hands, or 
by the employment of others, builds a house, or a ship, 
because he has previously designed to produce it. 
Seeing his fellow-men doing similar things with similar 
results, he infers that they also accomplish them be- 
cause they first designed them ; and thus he becomes 
as certain that his fellow-men act in order to attain ends 
previously intended by them as that he himself does 
so, and that they, like himself, have intelligence. 

The analogy is easily extended to the ends sought 
by brutes. The beavers hut, the bee's honeycomb, the 
bird's nest, the internal adaptation of organs to functions 
in all animals, their tendency to, and aptness for self- 
preservation, their production and protection of their 
young, and innumerable effects of what we call instinct, 
are plainly ends which must have been previously con- 
ceived ; for the same principle of correlated adaptations 
of means to ends, of which we are conscious in our- 
selves, is apparent in them ; and nothing else than in- 
telligence will account for them. The inference is that, 
as in ourselves, so in the sphere of instinct, many 
effects are also ends designed by intelligence before- 
hand. 

Men and animals are related parts of the same system 
of nature. It would be preposterous to think the beau- 
tiful co-operation of heterogeneous facts in the produc- 
tion of needful effects was in man's case carried on by 
intelligence, but similar ways in the rest of the animal 
kingdom were produced without intelligence, either in 
the individuals or their Maker. The hypothesis is a 
pitiful alternative to the inference of a Supreme Mind. 



112 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

It matters not to this argument whether inferior 
animals have intelligence in themselves, or are unthink- 
ing automata. Enough that intelligence in the Cause 
is involved. For that implies intelligence in the First 
Cause, though it may not be in the proximate. If it 
be said the intelligence necessary to instinctive acts, 
is in the animals, our argument still holds good ; for 
that view admits of final causes in organized nature , 
from which the further step is easy, namely, from mind 
in animals to mind in their First Cause. If, however, it 
be held, on the other hand, that animals act for ends, 
but are unconscious machines, the conclusion is the 
same ; for we are then driven to infer intelligence in the 
First Cause. 1 

Having found unmistakable signs of intelligence in 
the phenomena of the world, we are obliged to refer it 
to the world's cause. And as it could not originate 
in any second or intermediate cause, it must belong to 
the First. We need not here stop to point out the 
absurdities resulting from the stoical notion of a species 
of crude intelligence, or " seed of reason " attributable 
to the ultimate atoms of matter, or the Epicurean notion 
of atoms fortuitously jostling together until they all fell, 
accidentally and without design, into the admirable order 
of the present universe. 

When men of the school of David Hume object that 



1 This conclusion would not be invalidated by adopting the 
theory that instinct is the effect of hereditary experience. For 
the accumulated experience of many generations, leading 
man and brute to betake themselves spontaneously without 
example or training to suitable means for self-preservation 
and growth, would equally require intelligence in its First 
Cause. 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 113 



finding a watch, we infer it was made by some man 
because we know from experience that men make 
watches, but that we have no experience of a God 
making a world, and therefore cannot infer that this 
world was made by a God or intelligent Cause, the 
argument from final causes is misrepresented. Our 
inference is that a watch contains such contrivances 
and mutual adjustments for special ends, that if we had 
no previous experience or knowledge of a man-made 
watch, we could not but infer intelligence in the cause 
of the one thus found. Nothing less would be propor- 
tionate. Our experience of men making watches only 
confirms our inevitable inference of mind. 

Spinoza's objection that the idea of an end not yet 
accomplished makes God imperfect so long as He lacks 
the realization of that end, if sound, would hold equally 
against Spinoza's Pantheistic God, which would be 
imperfect so long as any of the results it develops are 
unaccomplished ; and indeed against any theory which 
assumed the co-existence of the infinite and the finite. 
But it is really no imperfection at all in a Free, Almighty 
Being, that some of His ends as yet exist only in 
thought and purpose ; for all the perfection which their 
existence can bring Him is already potentially present 
in Him. 

As little cogency is there in the objection that the 
doctrine of final causes means supernatural interventions 
incessantly engaged in all the processes of nature. 
For aught we know God may endow nature with 
qualities fitting it for its work ; or His energy may be 
directly engaged in every change. But in either case, 
the changes proceed according to law ; whereas super- 
natural interventions would be interference with law.. 
6 



ii4 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH 



While not denying His power to intervene by extra- 
ordinary acts, we may affirm that His ordinary, uniform 
mode of action cannot be properly described as super- 
natural interventions. 

The method of Agnosticism is to apply mind to the 
interpretation of nature, so as to formulate its laws ; 
but to assume that nature and its laws imply no mind 
in their origination and constitution. One wonders 
how a process so glaringly fallacious could ever hope 
to pass for intelligence. The laws thus discovered and 
formulated are discovered in and educed from nature, 
and therefore must have been in nature, or its Author, 
before man discovered them. What is interpretation 
of nature but finding out and presenting its meaning ? 
and what is "meaning" without mind to mean ? The 
interpreting mind succeeds just so far as it is able to 
read the mind exposed, or implied in nature. Properly 
speaking, interpretation is only of the words or 
work of mind — one mind unfolding the meaning of 
another. The necessary counterpart of an explaining 
intelligence is the intelligence to be explained. If 
nature corresponds to the intelligence of the human 
observer, it can only be because it is constituted 
intelligently, that is, by an intelligent being. 

Emmanuel Kant, though constrained to acknowledge 
the persuasiveness of the physico-theological argument 
with men generally, endeavoured to invalidate it by 
contending that it could not do more than prove a very 
great architect of the world's form and order, not an 
infinite Creator. The questions of infinity and creation 
shall have attention in the sequel. At present we need 
only claim what Kant admits, that the order of the 
world implies an intelligent Author. 



TH EI STIC EVIDENCE. 115 



The argument may be summarized in the following 
syllogistic form. Final causes in nature imply intelli- 
gence in its First Cause. Proofs of final causes in 
nature abound. Therefore the First Cause of nature 
is intelligent. Of course, the minor premiss is the 
chief point of controversy. Enough has been adduced 
to establish it on a broad, solid foundation of evidence. 

Proposition 5. The First Cause is a Moral Being. 

This proposition is highly probable from His intelli- 
gence. We have no experience of reflective mind 
entirely destitute of moral quality. Nor is it easy to 
conceive how such excellent intelligence as belongs to 
God can be thus destitute. It certainly must perceive 
that moral qualities are appreciable to inferior minds, 
and on what grounds they are so. But is this possible 
to a mind, which at the same time is incapable of 
approving or disapproving actions, and of preferring 
one as intrinsically better than another ? In our mental 
philosophy, we are in the habit of arranging the 
intellectual powers in one class, and the moral in 
another; and we may often fall into the mistake of 
supposing that what we separate in our categories are 
separate in themselves. But the human spirit is simple 
and indivisible. All its faculties, intellectual and moral, 
have one and the same essence. All its acts of reason, 
or will, are the acts of the same simple entity. 

To suppose a rational being utterly devoid of virtue 
and vice, of free will, of moral character preference 
and perception, requires a power of imagination sur- 
passing any yet known. 

Assuming that conscience is our natural judgment 
applied to a moral question, differing from other acts 



Il6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



of the judgment, not in the nature of the faculty, but 
in the kind of subject to which it is applied, it becomes 
yet harder to think of a rational being capable of 
applying its judging faculty to all but moral subjects. 
As intelligence, so far as we have experience, is in- 
variably associated, or rather identified with moral 
principle, it is unreasonable to suppose it is not so in 
the Divine Mind. 

Two lines of argument from the facts of morality 
must be distinguished. What is often intended by 
the moral argument as distinct from the etiological is, 
like it, an inference of the unknown from the known. 
Finding in ourselves a moral judgment with a sense of 
obligation and responsibility, we infer that we are 
under moral government, and that there must be a 
moral Authority above us as the counterpart of our 
moral nature. The idea of a Moral Ruler corresponds 
to, and explains our moral nature. In the etiological 
argument we say this moral nature must have a cause, 
and to be adequate the cause must be itself moral ; and 
inasmuch as our moral nature contains means adapted 
to ends, e.g., the fitness of conscience to promote virtue 
and happiness, the cause must be intelligent. In the 
merely moral argument we say our moral nature is 
inexplicable except on the assumption of a Moral Ruler; 
ergo it is highly probable such Ruler exists. In the 
one case our inference of God's existence is based on 
our intuition of causality ; in the other on our intuition 
of moral distinctions. 

There is nothing in the latter argument to prevent 
our treating man's moral nature as an important part of 
the events from which we infer a First Cause, which to 
be proportionate must be potent, intelligent, and moral. 



THEISTIC EV1DEXCE. \\J 

Our moral consciousness leads us straight to the idea 
of God, not simply as the idea is responsive to, and 
explanatory of our moral instincts, but also as the 
moral facts necessitate an adequate cause. The one 
inference does not supersede, but powerfully confirms 
the other. Our business at present is with the moral 
system as an effect necessarily involving a sufficient 
moral cause. Profiting by the proof which has already 
certified the reality of an Intelligent First Cause, we 
now proceed to gather from the facts of the moral 
world that He is also a Moral Being. Knowledge of 
His moral character is the highest and most advanced 
position of natural theology, and is fitly preceded and 
underbuilt by evidence of His eternal, almighty, intelli- 
gent being. 

(i) Facts. 

(i.) Moral qualities. The idea of moral qualities is 
ineradicable from human thought. It is familiar to the 
illiterate man who has no power to formulate it in 
words, as well as to the moral philosopher. It would be 
as easy to confound right and wrong, as to confound 
moral with non-moral attributes. The essential differ- 
ence between the ideas represented by such words as 
size, weight, colour, figure, and those represented by 
such as justice, benevolence, love, gratitude, hate, false- 
hood, is patent to every observer. The notion of 
moral qualities is also quite distinct from that of mere 
intelligence. Mental perception, memory, or reason- 
ing, is not in itself morally good or bad. But love, 
righteousness, truthfulness, give the idea of moral 
goodness, as hatred, selfishness, insincerity, do of moral 
badness. 

(ii.) Moral judgments. Whether we will or not some 



Il8 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

actions command our approval as morally good, and 
others our disapproval as morally evil. These moral 
judgments, though sometimes at fault, are sufficiently 
uniform to show "that they are not the capricious acts 
of the will, but proceed according to some law of the 
necessary and immutable opposition between right and 
wrong. 

(iii.) Freedom. Each man is also conscious of moral 
freedom, a liberty such as could not belong to a bar ot 
iron, or piece of rock — a unique self-acting power 01 
originating motion good or ill — a true capability or 
moral action inconceivable of non-moral beings — moral 
agency. 

(iv.) Praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. Con- 
comitant with freedom is the sensitiveness to right and 
wrong — the sense of praiseworthiness or blameworthi- 
ness, in the exercise of freedom. 

(v.) Cognate responsibility. The consciousness of 
good or evil actions naturally associates itself with the 
idea of rendering an account, or of receiving recom- 
pense, according to the moral quality of the action. 
There is an involuntary reference of the case to a 
greater authority. Even where the doctrine of rewards 
and punishments is ignored, it is felt that the actions 
deserve one or the other. Where a personal Governor 
of the world is denied, it is more or less expected that 
blind nature will exercise a retributive justice. When 
after some actions there follow to the agent self-com- 
placency, satisfaction, inward self-approbation, and after 
others remorse, shame, self-disgust, it is felt that the 
consequence has a retributive fitness to the moral quality 
of the action. 

Thus each man finds himself the subject of a mora! 



THE1STIC EVIDENCE. 



119 



system, with its distinctions of right and wrong, its 
laws, its moral judgments, and judicial rewards and 
penalties. 

(vi.) Society. Not only as individuals, but as societies, 
men are conditioned on the basis of a moral nature 
in each person. Hence springs up political government, 
which though not authorized to deal with vice except 
so far as it affects the Commonweal, is assumed to 
have regard to the moral rights of its subjects. If, 
through fault of legislation or administration, it is seen 
that the gross offender escapes punishment, or the inno- 
cent is punished, it is felt to be an injustice. 

(vii.) Moral order of nature. Moreover to man's 
moral constitution, the order of nature corresponds. 
Does he need the prospect of rewards or punishments 
as a motive to influence his moral conduct ? In his 
own body, health or disease, life or death, pleasure or 
pain ensue as he restrains or unbridles his appetites 
and passions. The provisions of the external world 
stand similarly related to him. Poverty, excessive toil, 
social ostracism, or other form of adversity often follows 
as a natural consequence, in the train of negligence, 
improvidence, or vice ; while the fruits of virtue are 
comfort, peace, and enjoyment of circumstances. The 
physical world is to a great extent adapted to man's 
moral constitution. 

It is now for us to inquire how far this moral world 
implies a moral character in its Maker. 

(2) Inferences. 

(i.) None but a moral cause adequate. The facts of 
our moral nature and conditions demand nothing less 
than a moral being for their cause. Any non-moral 
cause would be alien in kind and deficient in degree. 



120 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

Moral qualities are of the highest order known to us. 
In importance they rank above the intellectual, as the 
intellectual do above the material. Moral goodness is 
the paramount order of goodness, and moral nature the 
paramount order of nature. Moral excellence is of 
higher value, and more worthy of admiration, than any 
other. Moral power is immeasurably superior in dignity 
to any other, Man's free w r ill, by which he becomes 
agent on his own account, exalts him vastly above 
everything else in the world, and invests him with 
something of the Divine. Among Divine attributes, the 
moral hold the first rank. 

But can we conceive that this free, agency, this 
highest element of human nature, was produced by a 
being destitute of it ? Nothing less than a free being 
can produce a free being. All the virtue of the effect 
must have been at least adequately present in the 
cause. Hence this supreme quality of moral freedom 
in man must have been in the God who made him. 
Otherwise we must suppose the First Cause produced 
a creature far greater and nobler than Himself, which 
we have seen to be impossible. 

If, as we are told by Pantheism, all moral states and 
operations, like the rest, take place by irresistible 
necessity, then vice is as necessary as virtue, and as 
good ; that is, there is neither good nor evil. Neither 
possesses any moral quality. One act can be no more 
worthy of admiration or approbation than another. 
None are either worthy or unworthy. There can be 
neither moral actions, a moral state, nor a moral nature. 
Our ineradicable notion of moral distinctions has no 
counterpart in reality, at any time or place. 

But as a matter of fact, we know we have a moral 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 12 I 



nature, and that some actions are morally good, and 
others morally evil. Therefore the doctrine of Pan- 
theism, which involves the impossibility of a moral 
nature, must be false. 

(ii.) Moral government implies a Moral Governor. 
Man is evidently subject to moral government, which 
could not be without a moral Governor He who 
caused our existence designed its moral conditions, and 
the moral order under which it is placed. But to do 
this He must Himself have a moral nature. 

(a) For instance, in that system there are moral 
judgments in which conscience is daily approving or 
condemning. Whoever ordained this office of con- 
science as a part of human nature, must have had a 
distinct apprehension of the difference between right 
and wrong, and must have had moral right and autho- 
rity to make the appointment. The judgments of con- 
science proceed according to some rule or principle, 
by which it acquits or condemns, whether it be some 
intuition, or some instruction from without. But how 
can that which has no power to perceive or appreciate 
moral goodness or badness, constitute, or even conceive, 
the idea of a being possessing such power ? How can 
that to which moral qualities are no more than they are 
to a boulder, or a block of timber, endow another with 
the faculty of distinguishing moral qualities, and dis- 
criminating between them as good and evil ? How 
can man have derived authority to pass judgment on 
the moral character of actions, from one who is as 
devoid of moral authority as of moral perception ? 

Moreover the moral system of the present life com- 
prehends rewards and punishments, by no means fully 

adequate to deserts, yet sufficient to show that rewards 
9 



122 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



are intended for well-doing, and punishments for ill- 
doing. In the accusing and excusing of the thoughts, 
as well as in the events which so often bring physical 
or circumstantial retribution, there are distinct traces of 
a judicial system in the appointed order of the world. 
How could one who had no moral judgment or per- 
ception establish} laws of retributive justice, meting out 
recompense according to the moral qualities of our 

actions ? 

Clearly the only satisfactory account of conscience 
is that which ascribes it to a First Cause possessed of 
a moral nature. 

(b) The moral system under which we find ourselves 
reveals a moral purpose in its author. Man's constitu- 
tion displays the preference of the First Cause for 
righteousness. He has so constituted conscience that 
it must bear witness for right, and against wrong. Its 
normal tendency is to side with moral goodness. Its 
rule is to proclaim the excellence of virtue. But that 
it should be so is the choice, not of man, but of the 
Author of his being. The declaration of conscience in 
favour of righteousness is really the declaration of Him 
who created conscience, which would be impossible 
were He destitute of moral character. It is evidently 
the purpose of Him who ordained our moral nature 
and conditions that we should choose between right and 
wrong, should be influenced by moral motives, and 
should acquire a moral character. But so to purpose 
is a moral act, impossible to any but a moral agent. 

(c) Man is more or less conscious of moral relations 
with his Maker. What means his sense of duty, 
obligation, and responsibility? Does it not assure 
him that besides himself and his species, there is 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 12$ 

Another and a Greater to whom he owes right conduct, 
as to the source of his being ? Whatever his per- 
plexity about invisible potentates, he cannot rid himself 
of the feeling that his respect and service are due to 
his Maker. But moral obligation or indebtedness can 
only hold towards a moral being. In that sense we 
can owe nothing to a tree, or clod, or non-moral object. 
The object and subject of duty, that is, of ethical 
obligation, are correlatives, and both necessarily moral. 
If, therefore, we owe anything of gratitude, homage, 
fear, love, trust, allegiance, or obedience, to the Author 
of our existence, He must like ourselves have a moral 
character. 

(d) What is commonly called Providential govern- 
ment abundantly displays moral dispositions on God's 
part towards man. Despite the complaints of modern 
Pessimism, the knowledge of God is apparent in the 
manifold provisions for man's moral, physical, social, 
and external welfare. Were men all wise enough, and 
willing to make the best of the resources of nature, 
their happiness would be far greater than it is ; and 
the beneficent provisions of the Author of nature 
would evoke much more appreciation and gratitude. 
But benevolence is a moral quality, and proves the 
moral character of the Great First Cause. Theism 
alone accounts for the moral nature we possess and 
the moral system under which we are placed by the 
Maker of ourselves and of the world. 

(3) Good Moral Character of God. 

The argument may be carried further to establish 
a broader thesis than that set forth in the preceding 
paragraphs, namely, to prove the goodness of God's 
moral character. 



124 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



(i.) His righteousness appears in the universal and 
perpetual protest He makes against moral evil, and in 
behalf of righteousness, in the human conscience. 
Conscience, condemning wrong, and insisting on right, 
is God's voice, and a reflection of His character. " For 
when Gentiles which have no law do by nature the 
things of the law, these, having no law, are a law unto 
themselves; in that they shew the work of the law 
written in their hearts." 

(ii.) The same lesson may be read in the respective 
results of right and wrong-doing, established by our 
Maker in the moral system of the world. The pleasure 
and advantage accruing from right conduct, and the 
opposite results from wrong conduct, act as powerful 
motives to virtue. The laws of nature, in the conse- 
quences they bring to vice, hedge us round with 
deterrents from evil ways, and incentives to good. 
Those laws, manifestly framed to encourage virtue, and 
deter from vice, declare the Law-giver to be opposed to 
all wrong, and entirely on the side of righteousness. 
"The Lord is known by the judgments which He 
executeth : the wicked is snared by the work of his 
own hands." 

(iii.) The benevolence of God is easily read in His 
natural works. The mutual adaptations of the organs 
of the human body and mind, the provision of food, 
clothing, protection, means of acquiring useful know- 
ledge, and supply of other wants, the subserviency of 
nature, animal, vegetable, and amorphous, to the 
interests of the human species, the benefits of family, 
friendship, society, and political order, and other aspects 
of the teeming bounty of Providence, show that the 
innumerable ends contained in the government of the 



THE I STIC EVIDENCE. 12 5 



world are benevolent, as they are identical with the 
happiness of the creature, and especially man, the 
earth's paramount inhabitant, though his welfare is not 
the only end considered. To the pleasures of emotion, 
knowledge, reason, and imagination, and the felicity of 
his whole being, the vast treasures of nature seem 
intended to minister. Surely He who thus loads our 
race with daily benefits, is a God of sublime loving- 
kindness. " He left not Himself without witness, in 
that He did good, and gave you from heaven rains, and 
fruitful seasons, filling your hearts with food and glad- 
ness." His ways proclaim Him " good to all, and His 
tender mercies are over all His works." 

(4) Objections. 

The principal objections likely to be raised against 
what has been concluded, are the two following. 

(i.) It is urged from the side of Pessimism that man's 
condition in this world is on the whole too miserable 
to be worth having. He is exposed to the pains and 
ravages of disease and mortality. Natural propensities 
render men the enemies and injurers of each other. 
Mental gloom preys upon man's enjoyment. Fears of 
future disaster and imaginary evils haunt his solitude. 
Nature fights against him by famine, plague, pestilence, 
storm, earthquake, flood, fire, savage beasts, noxious 
plants, social corruption, and accidents without number. 
The virtuous are crushed under the heel of cruel 
despotism, or ruthless misfortune. The vile inherit 
power, health, wealth, honour, and long life. Some 
Pessimists have gone so far as to maintain, that the ills 
of our existence are sufficient disproof of Theism. 

In reply, it is to be noted, that so far as this objection 
has force, it can only be against our addendum, that 



126 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

the Author of the world is righteous and benevolent ; 
not at all against our principal proposition, that He is 
a Moral Being, which affirms not whether His moral 
attributes be good or evil. 

Further, the description just given of " the ills that 
flesh is heir to," while true so far as it goes, is a one- 
sided view, and more than counterbalanced by evidences 
of moral goodness. The calamities that happen are 
the exception, and provision for peace and plenty the 
rule. Human experience is not made up chiefly of 
adverse accidents, but largely of the pleasures of hope, 
or possession. Life by the great majority, is deemed 
worth guarding with supreme tenacity. "Skin for 
skin, yea all that a man hath will he give for his life." 

Again, the sum total of human enjoyment might be 
much greater than it is, if all men made the best of 
their resources. Much of our misery is brought on 
ourselves needlessly by neglect, or abuse of natural 
laws. Voluntary intemperance of appetite, passion, 
ambition, selfishness, and indolence deprive mankind of 
immense treasures of enjoyment, and, in their stead, 
entail incalculable suffering. It is to a large extent in 
the power of social communities, as such, to convert 
their privations and miseries into comfort by improved 
internal and external arrangements. 

Again, it must not be forgotten that the operations 
of nature, like a body politic, are carried on by general 
laws, which though well fitted to promote the happi- 
ness of mankind at large, in their incidence frequently 
cross the apparent interests of innocent individuals. 
For instance, the sun whose warm beams revivify the 
face of the earth, loading it with a ripe harvest suffi- 
cient to fill the garners of the nations, also with his 



TH EI STIC EVIDENCE. \2J 

u stroke" lays prostrate a useful member of the human 
family ; yet the influences of the sun are far more 
beneficial than injurious. The atmosphere, which 
purifies the life-blood of- hundreds of millions, is now 
and then agitated to the hurricane pitch, and with 
resistless energy sweeps the beautiful ship and its 
living freight into the jaws of death ; yet mankind on 
the whole is unspeakably indebted to the beneficent 
action of the atmosphere. So if all the natural benefits 
available for man were weighed against all the un- 
avoidable evils, the preponderance of the former would 
probably be as a ton to a feather. 

Incidental evils result from the universal stability 
of law, which is the cause of countless benefits ; a 
stability without which the present evils would be 
many times multiplied, and the present benefits lost. 

Moreover, it is not uncommon for nature to bring 
a greater good out of a smaller evil ; as when the pains 
of travail are forgotten in the "joy that a man child 
is born into the world " ; or when exhausting toil is 
followed by delicious rest and plenty; or bitter ex- 
perience of hardship by consequent wisdom, pleasant, 
and useful, through subsequent years ; or the drudgery 
of youth at school by the power and blessing of 
knowledge, through a long course of life. Probably 
many things which at present seem only hurtful to us 
may, at a more advanced stage of knowledge, appear 
but needful stepping-stones to far greater good. 

And yet again, it must be observed, that the motive 
and end of natural sufferings are directly opposite to 
the selfishness and malevolence which prompt wicked 
men to inflict suffering on their fellows. A burglar 
strikes down an innocent citizen, in order to take 



128 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



possession of his goods; a murderer deprives his 
neighbour of life, in order to gratify a malignant spirit 
of revenge. But in the course of nature, the tem- 
porary disaster is but the rough road to some advan- 
tage of far greater magnitude. Pain is never caused 
per se as an end, but only as the means of greater 
good, or as an incident in the operation of a beneficent 
system. Nowhere is malevolence necessary to account 
for the effects of nature's laws. 

Once more, notwithstanding the above replies, it 
may be frankly confessed, that nature does not fully 
explain itself on this subject. Much of human un- 
happiness and moral failure, viewed in the light of 
nature only, is inexplicable, suggesting that there may 
be causes which cannot be discovered, except by some 
, other means. Given, an intelligent First Cause of 
perfect moral character, the Author of our world ; how 
comes it that the world contains so much moral evil, 
suffering, and death? Nature can but very partially 
answer the question. But assuming the gift of a 
supernatural revelation, unfolding the origin and 
history of the human race in relation to the world 
and God, it might then appear how the evils under 
which men groan had their origin in some great breach 
between man as a free agent, and God as the Moral 
Ruler of the world; and it might also appear how 
the large proportion of good remaining in man's 
possession, or hope, was due to some supernatural 
plan of recovery, now in process of being carried out. 
Certainly, nature suggests no antecedent improbability of 
such an explanation. In the lips of a Christian Theist, 
it is pertinent to the objection under notice to say, 
such a revelation is necessary to complete his theodicy, 



THE I STIC EVIDENCE. IT 9 

though apart from that there is nothing in nature to 
disprove the perfect moral excellence of nature's God. 

(ii.) It has been contended by materialists, that the 
present moral order is the result of evolution. Men 
gradually found out by experience what was useful, 
and therefore desirable ; and in the lapse of ages they 
formed the habit of setting a high value on those actions 
which were useful, and attaching the idea of demerit 
to actions of an opposite tendency. Thus the con- 
science of mankind was formed, and improved from 
generation to generation. According to this theory, a 
moral First Cause was unnecessary. 

It must be borne in mind that this is nothing but a 
theory, and is refuted by the evidence already adduced 
to prove there is an intelligent, moral First Cause of 
the world. 

It is further condemned, as it conflicts with the reality 
of intrinsically moral qualities, and the essential differ- 
ence between right and wrong, as testified by conscious- 
ness. Conscience is different from, and much more 
than, a calculation of utility. It pronounces judgment 
upon the intrinsic quality of actions, independently of 
the agreeableness or disagreeableness of their conse- 
quences. 

Furthermore, if this evolutionist theory were true, 
it would not dispose of the moral argument, but merely 
shift the question of moral causation to an earlier 
stage. If morality be the outcome of man's experience 
of what is useful, and what is not, we have then to ask 
whence the wise and benevolent arrangement enabling 
and disposing men to learn which ends were good, and 
which actions were fitted to effect them ? To what do 
they owe this beneficent endowment for finding out and 



130 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

enforcing morality, but to their Maker? Who but 
He ordained the fitness of certain actions to produce 
happiness, and of others to produce misery ? And 
why should their respective tendencies not have been 
•directly opposite to what they are, so that what we 
now call vice should have produced happiness, and 
virtue misery? or why not sometimes one way, and 
again the opposite ? Why, except that there was an 
inherent fitness in each to produce what it does pro- 
duce, and an inherent unfitness to produce the opposite 
effect ? 

The theory of the origin and growth of morals by 
experience and association, without a Divine Author, 
ignores the true essence of morals, and fails to account 
for moral facts, after dispensing with a benevolent First 
Cause. 

Proposition 6. The First Cause is a Personal Being. 

Under this head we have to do, not with the ety- 
mological, but the modern philosophical meaning of the 
word person. In this sense a person is a self-conscious 
moral agent, distinct, as an individual, from all others, 
and identical with himself at successive periods of 
existence ; one who can speak of himself as I and Me f 
can be spoken to as Thou and Thee, and spoken of as 
He and Him. The essence of personality is self-con- 
scious intelligence, and moral freedom. 

The truth of God's personality is implied in the 
positions already established. The First Cause, being 
intelligent and moral, must be personal. Indeed, it is 
involved in the very idea of causation, which, in its high 
and proper sense, includes the notion of freedom, and 
agency. Hence in seeking a cause of the world, we 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 131 



are never satisfied with second causes, but feel sure 
that somewhere behind them, however far back, there 
was a will at work. The only true and original cause 
must be free; nothing less is worthy of the name. 

This truth is, however, confirmed by the fact, that 
this personality corresponds to, and meets the natural 
craving of the human mind for, a personal God. This 
inveterate religious tendency compelled Comte, after he 
had abandoned God, to invent a religion for his disciples, 
offering them human goodness for the object of worship. 
However puerile the substitute, he was obliged to re- 
cognize the fact, that mankind must have a religion of 
some sort, with something moral as the object of its 
profoundest emotions. 

The human heart, especially in its sincerest and 
most earnest moods, looks instinctively for a being of 
great power, whom it may honour, trust, love, and 
serve. Man finds himself endowed with a religious 
nature, as truly as with a moral ; he is fitted for 
communion with a Divine Governor, as well as with 
individual members of his species. The needs and 
longings of his spiritual nature are not met until he 
thinks of some great Being, who may protect him in 
danger, and relieve him in want ; to whom he may 
appeal against injustice, and from whom he may 
receive kind and merciful treatment — some august 
Being, to whom he may render homage. This tendency 
may be warped by ignorance or perversity, and mis- 
directed to unworthy objects. In some men it may 
be highly developed, and in others barely traceable ; 
but in a higher 01 lower degree, it is characteristic of 
humanity. 

To this natural craving a personal God is the only 



132 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



satisfactory response. A God unconscious and non- 
moral is no more an object of religious affection than 
is a granite mountain. Even, when grovelling in most 
abject superstition, a man makes a fetish of a stick 
or stone, he associates it with personal qualities. Con- 
fidence, love, reverence, must have for their object 
one who can appreciate personal dispositions, which 
requires that he be himself personal. Towards a subtle, 
all-pervasive, impersonal force, or blind necessity, I 
can feel no gratitude or esteem, any more than I can for 
unorganized matter. It cannot command my adoration, 
win my love, or engage me in intelligent communion. 
Hence Pantheism, like Atheism, fails to satisfy man's 
religious instinct. 

Our religious tendencies are an effect of the world's 
First Cause, and cannot be content, or answer their 
natural end, until they centre in a Personal God. 

The bearing of this truth on others is immense. 
On the personality of God depends the possibility of 
supernatural intervention. If Atheism or Pantheism 
be true, there can be no such thing as a miracle, or 
supernatural revelation. All must proceed according 
to stern, unthinking necessity, to which all power is 
entirely subject. But if there be a personal God, His 
power over nature is supreme, and put forth according 
to His sovereign will, counselled by His intelligence. 
To deny this is to deny Him the freedom which per- 
sonality necessarily implies. If He be intelligent and 
free, there can be no law of nature, though established 
by Himself, of which He is not master. To suppose 
otherwise would involve the self-contradiction that, by 
creating the world, He surrendered the freedom which 
is necessary to Him, that is to say, He who cannot 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 133 



but be personal, ceased to be personal. A personal 
God may intervene in nature, may supernaturally 
reveal Himself, and may attest the revelation by 
miracles. 

Proposition 7. The Personal First Cause is one 

AND SIMPLE. 

(1) Parsimony of causes. Under the law of parsi- 
mony, science strives to reduce all chemical substances, 
all mechanical forces, all variety of colours, to the 
smallest possible number, and to refer all the diverse 
phases of intelligence to a few general faculties, such 
as perception, memory, and judgment, or to regard them 
as but different aspects of one mental power. The 
same principle, on a broader scale, prompts desire to 
simplify the causes of the universe, by tracing them 
up from millions of events to a few sources, or better 
still, to a single source. 

This tendency belongs to Materialism, Pantheism, 
and kindred systems, as well as to Theism. Pantheism 
affects to find the ultimate unity in the substance of 
the universe, though it is really a vast multiplicity of 
parts. In its eagerness to trace all to a single source, 
Materialism makes matter the first cause, though again, 
it is in its atoms, and their mutual relations, a manifold 
and immense complexity, incapable of being the First 
Cause. These systems are right, however, in rejecting 
all superfluous causes. When, under the guidance of 
this law, we have passed beyond the sphere of second 
causes, we naturally continue our pursuit of a simple 
cause of all. 

No other system answers to this demand so well as 
Theism, according to which all the myriad lines of 



134 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



causation meet, and unite in the one, simple, eternal, 
self-existent First Cause. 

(2) The original cause not complex. The First Cause 
cannot be complex ; for a complex cause consists of 
parts acting in concert, which instead of discovering 
the original, only prolongs our search by raising the 
question, what is the cause of this harmonious and 
efficient conjunction of parts ? How came they to be 
mutually adjusted ? Thus we never reach the First 
Cause till we get beyond the compound, to that which 
is one, simple, and indivisible. 

(3) Unity of plan. The simplicity of the First Cause 
is confirmed by the unity of plan on which all nature 
is governed. All is subject to a system of law, which 
is uniform always and everywhere within the wide 
range of experience, and by generalization, we know 
it prevails in the much wider region beyond. The 
parts of the universe are mutually adapted, and co- 
ordinated. The order of succession is always the same 
under the same conditions. Typical forms show how 
countless complex developments branch out of fewer 
and simpler. Without adopting what is alleged on 
transmutation of species, or endorsing the statement, 
that " the animal is an unfinished man," it is plain 
one species is a variation of another, not necessarily in 
the actual mode of producing them ; but in the ideals 
on which they were designed. Beginning with the 
simplest forms, extensions and modifications are trace- 
able up to the most complicated structures of the 
animal kingdom. Hence some have fallen into the 
mistake of supposing all organs are but modifications 
of one, which modern science has disproved ; and 
others have jumped to the conclusion, that when two 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 135, 



species are very much alike in structure, one must- 
have actually grown out of the other. This, however, 
is but a section of the plan, which is seen to embrace 
all departments of nature. Every part is ruled in 
relation to the rest. There is evidently one plan, 
which could not have originated in a plurality of 
causes. 

The sun and planets are all fitted to each other so 
that each occupies its own place, and accomplishes its- 
own function in relation to the rest. Consequently, the 
mind which determined the place and action of any 
one, must have had all the rest in view. The same, 
law of gravitation unites all celestial bodies. All animal 
and vegetable life, and innumerable processes in the 
inorganic portions of the earth, are dependent on the 
influence of an orb more than ninety millions of miles, 
distant. Our globe is set in order with worlds, 'far 
beyond the solar system. The admirable way in. 
which plants and animals, matter and mind, chemical 
elements, mechanical forces, and changes of " mass," 
are adapted to each other, and to the harmonious pro- 
cedure of nature, shows that the whole must have 
been schemed, and is now governed by some one 
mind. The correlations are so universally present 
as to render the whole a " system of nature." x 

The same plan may be traced in the moral world. 
Instinctive notions of right and wrong, the sense of 
duty, ethical laws and sanctions, freedom and re- 
sponsibility, adaptation of physical and intellectual ta 
moral conditions, social and political relations, all over 

1 The Duke of Argyll has elaborated this idea of unity, as 
displayed in the universality of gravitation and of pure ether,, 
and other phenomena {Unity of Nature, chap. i.). 



136 FIRST PR1ACIPLES OF FAITH. 



the world are framed after the same ideal, all diversities 
notwithstanding. They are suited to each other, and 
betray a common origin. 

This oneness of plan admits of no explanation, 
except as the scheme or design of a single master 
mind, "who looketh to the ends of the earth, and 
seeth under the whole heaven." The one cause of 
the plan cannot be matter, because that consists of 
many, and is unthinking, and ever changing. The 
particles of colour so arranged as to present the 
beautiful picture, are so arranged, not by themselves, 
but by the mind of the artist. So the light suits the 
eye, the air the lungs, and all things in nature suit 
each other, not by any invention of their own, but by 
some one mind which could perceive and control the 
relation of every portion to the rest. 

Kant calls this natural tendency of the mind to trace 
out the harmony of the universe, and ascribe it to one 
master builder, " the architectonic propensity of reason." 
But the unity of plan is an objective reality, which 
can only be accounted for by a real and adequate 
cause. And no cause can be adequate but a single, 
indivisible, omniscient mind. 

Proposition 8. The First Cause is Infinite. 

(1) Definitions. 

While denying his consequences, we may safely 
accept Sir W. Hamilton's definition of the Infinite as 
" that which is free from all limitation.; that than 
which a greater is inconceivable." The words are 
negative, but the idea to which they are applied is 
pre-eminently positive. The definition assumes the 
reality of being, and only negatives its imperfection. 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 



1 37 



The notion of non-limitation must correspond to the 
nature of the subject. For instance, infinite matter 
would mean matter extended in all infinite space. 
"An infinite spirit/' says Professor Hodge, "is a spirit 
to whose attributes as a spirit no limits can be set." 
Infinite duration is duration without beginning or end. 
Infinite power is that which is limited by no other 
power, or is without restriction. Infinite knowledge is 
that which knows all things, actual or possible. If we 
apply the word to moral qualities, we mean that they 
are without imperfection or defect. Infinite goodness 
means all possible or conceivable goodness, without 
anything contrary thereto. 

With the school of Hamilton, the infinite is closely 
related to the absolute, which he defines as " that 
which exists in and by itself, having no necessary 
relation to any other being." This perfection of the 
First Cause we have already ascertained in His self- 
existence, and need not here refer to it, except so 
far as it affects the question of His infinity. 

(2) Finite effect not sufficient proof of infinite cause. 
It must be freely acknowledged that the finite 
universe, considered merely as an effect, does not 
demonstrate the infinity of its First Cause. And it is 
equally true, that it cannot prove the contrary. While 
it would be impossible for a finite cause to produce an 
infinite effect, it is by no means impossible for an 
infinite cause to produce a finite effect. A cause, or 
more strictly a being which causes, may effect a result 
less than itself, but never greater ; for it cannot give 
what it does not possess at least in equivalence, but it 
may give less. 

If it be objected that we cannot conceive how the in- 
10 



I38 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



finite can produce the finite, it is sufficient to answer, that 
we are equally unable to conceive how the finite can pro- 
duce the finite. There is no absurdity in either case. 

(3) Alleged gulf between the infinite and our thought. 

Kant and his followers have sought to prove a gulf 
between the finite and the infinite, which human know- 
ledge cannot pass. It is contended that the argument 
from causation cannot go beyond experience, and also 
that the absolute and infinite are beyond the possi- 
bilities of our knowledge. 

As to the first objection, we need not be concerned 
whether the lessons of experience can carry us to the 
knowledge of the infinite, so long as reason can. The 
argument has assured us of the existence of an eternal, 
personal First Cause ; and from that position we may 
proceed, though not empirically, to assure ourselves of" 
His infinity. Kant may be right in saying the infinite 
Being "cannot be discovered by means of experience," 
if he mean experience alone, independently of all 
reasoning that may supervene. But using the lights of 
experience we may advance, by means of reason, to- 
further conclusions. To deny our right to carry 
logical inference beyond the bounds of experience, is, 
to beg the question. Legitimate evidence is not to be 
thus ruled out of court. To object that we cannot 
bridge the chasm between the finite effect and the 
infinite cause, by the evidence of causation, is like 
saying we cannot bridge a natural chasm by the 
macadamized road which leads to it. But as by another 
kind of structure of timber, or iron, we may span the 
natural chasm, so when the evidence of causation has 
served us to the extreme verge of the finite, we may 
employ another kind, metaphysical, or psychological,. 



THEISTIC EVIDEXCE. 139 



as more suited to the purpose of connecting our 
thoughts with the infinite and unconditioned. 

When the attempt is made to confine our reasoning 
to experience, it is well to inquire into the extent of 
our experience. Most of our knowledge is ob- 
tained, not from experience alone, but from that and 
generalization. The facts known to us directly are 
comparatively few ; the great bulk are unseen, and in- 
ferred. For example, we observe, in a comparatively 
few times and places, that water solidifies at a certain 
degree of temperature, and infer that it does so always 
and everywhere throughout the globe. We ascertain 
the exact force of gravitation at a comparatively few 
points, and infer that it is so under all similar con- 
ditions. In many cases we find that oxygen and 
hydrogen united in certain proportions form water, 
and conclude it to be the same in all cases. The 
knowledge gained by immediate personal experience 
is infinitesimally small, compared with that acquired 
by synthetic generalization. 

As to causation. Examining the multitudinous fossil 
forms in the earth's crust, we infer they must have 
been caused by great numbers of animals and plants, 
once alive on the face of the globe. Observers of 
the Nile at its delta inferred, that it must have a 
source in the interior of Africa, long before the exact 
locality was known. If it be legitimate thus to infer 
the unknown from the known, to argue from what we 
experience to that of which we have no experience, 
why not also to argue from the known effect to its 
unknown cause, God ? And if further we see reasons 
for concluding, that such cause beyond our finite world 
must be infinite, the process is legitimate. 



140 



FJRST PRINCIPLES OF FAI'lH. 



The word " experience " is ambiguous. Does it mean 
only our sensible contact with material phenomena ? 
Then it is by no means commensurate with our know- 
ledge ; for it does not include our primary beliefs, nor 
our inductive and deductive conclusions. Does it 
comprehend all these elements ? Then it includes all 
our knowledge, physical and metaphysical— even our 
knowledge of God, inferred from His works. We cannot 
allow our knowledge of God to be taken away by the 
arbitrary definition of a word. 

Kant's objection is aimed against not only infinity, 
but the inference from nature of a " Supreme Being," 
including in that phrase unity, absoluteness, and 
infinity. We have seen that an Intelligent First Cause 
may be inferred from the manifestations of efficient and 
final causation. That we have to pass beyond our 
actual experience in finding Him does not destroy the 
cogency of the inference. Nor does it destroy the 
character of the inference, as one based on experience. 
But in this place we have to do with Kant's objection 
only so far as it relates to infinity. 

As to the objection that the finite mind cannot think 
or know the infinite, the statement is ambiguous. We 
cannot comprehend— that is, think or cognize— all that is 
comprehended in the infinite ; but we can easily think 
of a being as infinite. That the idea of infinity is con- 
ceivable, is evident from the readiness with which the 
Hamiltonian school contrast it with the finite. We 
cannot comprehend or imagine all the duration denoted 
by eternity, or all the space denoted by immensity ; but 
we have no difficulty in attaching a rational meaning to 
the words— nay, we cannot but think of infinity, if we 
think of the finite as such. To say we cannot cognize 



THE1STIC EVIDENCE. 



141 



all that is in the infinite, is to say what may be as truly 
predicated of our cognition of the finite. We think of 
the sea, the globe, or the solar system, without being 
able to cognize a millionth part of its contents. 

(4) Reasons for believing God Infinite. 

(i.) The finite universe is so incomputably vast, and 
so marvellously well constituted and ordered, that it 
naturally suggests the infinity of its author. Its magni- 
tude, its innumerable ingredients, its operations and 
resources, are to us practically infinite, that is to say, 
their effect upon us is as if they were infinite. All 
human comprehension fails to enclose more than the 
merest fraction of them. While the mightiest human 
mind understands what is meant by a million objects, 
it can only give direct attention to a few of them at 
once. How much less able is it to expand its thought 
over all the area of creation, or to estimate the power 
expended upon it ! We may continually enlarge our 
view of the universe ; but life is too brief for even 
thought to glance at every part. Under a sense of the 
immeasurable disparity between the greatness of the 
universe as an effect, and our utmost endeavours to 
comprehend it, we find it natural to think, He who 
produced such an effect must Himself be infinite. It 
requires a mental effort not to think Him infinite. 

(ii.) In the interests of ourselves and the world, we 
instinctively cling to the idea of unlimited resources 
in the Maker and Ruler of all things. The notion of 
His being limited inspires fear, and dread of a tre- 
mendous crisis, through some failure of those resources. 
We know not but disorder may at any moment gain 
the mastery, and plunge all into wreck and ruin. To 
have all our experience underlaid with the conscious- 



142 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



ness, that He who is Lord of all cannot be thwarted, 
baffled, or resisted through any limitation on His part, 
inspires confidence in the supreme control for the 
present and the future. On this account it is not easy 
to divest ourselves of the belief that He is under no 
restriction. 

(iii.) In respect of duration God is already proved 
infinite (Prop. 2). If infinite duration may belong to 
Him, why not an infinite presence and power ? Con- 
sidered as the First Cause, the question of infinity is 
chiefly one of power. We cannot conceive of His 
being an almighty, intelligent Being, and at the same 
time unable to accomplish His ends by suitable means. 
So that, in an intelligent being, infinite power may be 
taken to involve infinite wisdom. 1 

But infinite power does not mean that He can do 
that which, when stated in a proposition, is a self- 
contradiction. For instance, that He can make a 
thing be and not be at the same time, in the same 
sense ; or that He can make a square circle. It is no 
derogation from the perfection of His power that He 
cannot do that which our very laws of thought declare 
cannot be. God would be less perfect than He is if 
He could annihilate Himself. The true notion of 
infinity, and the only one worth contending for, is 
that which is an excellence, and not that which would 
be a defect, or fault. 

(iv.) Then if the personal cause of all other existences 



1 " If the First Cause is absolute, it will be so in all its 
attributes : being by hypothesis intelligent, it will be omni- 
scient ; being powerful, it will be omnipotent ; being good, it 
will be perfectly good, and so on " (Janet, Final Causes, 



THEISTIC EVIDENCE. 1 43 



"be a necessary, self-existent, eternal Being, how is it 
possible, or conceivable, that His power should be 
limited ? If limited, it must be from without, or from 
within Himself. 

As to limitation from without, all other beings are 
from Him, at His beck, and entirely dependent upon 
Him. All their power is derived from Him, and 
subject to His recall. There is no power but of God ; 
therefore, none that can set bounds to His. 

As to restriction from within Himself, it is quite 
inadmissible ; for it implies that His power limits 
His power. But that which limits in such case, and 
that which is limited, are all His (ex hypothesi). Con- 
sequently there is no power but His ; therefore none 
to limit it. Seeing then His power can be limited 
neither from within, nor from without, it follows that 
it cannot be limited, but is infinite. 

In order to disprove infinity, limitations are some- 
times alleged which are spurious, as they imply no 
imperfection, which is the only proper test. For 
example, supposing God infinite, it is said the creation 
or co-existence of a finite being conditions or limits 
the Supreme. Indeed it is urged that for God to have 
any relations with a second being is a condition, and 
limitation to Him. But a limitation of what ? Does it 
lessen His power? or knowledge? or wisdom? or 
goodness ? That second being is completely subject 
to His will. Whatever power is put forth in its 
creation, or sustenance, makes no diminution of the 
power in Him ; and even if it did, since its withdrawal 
would be at His option, it would not cease to be His. 
We may boldly deny that to enter into relations with 
another contracts His power. It would indeed be a 



144 FIPST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



limitation, and imperfection, if the Infinite and Absolute 
One could not create without thereby losing His abso- 
luteness and infinity. 

Falling back on Hamilton's definition, we may con- 
fidently affirm that, with relations to the work of His 
hands, as truly as without, God is " free from alt 
limitation," than whom u a greater is inconceivable." 
In either case, He " exists in and by Himself, having 
no necessary relation to any other being." His creation 
or government of an inferior being does not diminish 
His power, nor place Him below our highest con- 
ception of greatness, nor make Him dependent in the 
slightest degree; nor is His relation to that finite 
being "necessary"; for He entered into it of His 
absolutely free choice, and continues it by the 
same. 

To take a second example, Mill's instance is equally 
spurious, and still less plausible, when he argues that 
God cannot be infinite because He does not prevent 
the pains and calamities which the course of nature 
inflicts on man, as in fire, flood, famine, and child- 
birth. Mill's contention assumes that God's infinite 
power must be exercised according to our judgment 
of what is best to be allowed or prevented. A supreme 
Moral Ruler may have the best moral reasons for not 
preventing, perforce, particular instances of human 
suffering, not to mention that they may be the ex- 
ceptional incidence of beneficent general laws. 

(v.) We have a perfect right to appropriate here 
whatever help there may be in the ontological argu- 
ment in support of God's infinity, as additional to the 
foregoing reasons. Kant tried in vain to explain away 
the demand of our minds for the infinite, by maintaining 



THE IS TIC EVIDENCE. 1 45 

that our ideas of a supreme infinite cause are " regulative" 
only, and not " constitutive " ; that is, they are a useful 
and unavoidable hypothesis, or ideal, but may have no 
counterpart in reality. 

The idea of infinity has taken possession of the 
human mind, and affords the fullest and most satis- 
factory explanation of the world. The ontological 
argument asks, whence the idea, if there be not a 
reality corresponding ? Kant replies, such ideas are 
" needful" to enable us to form right conceptions of 
nature. They are, he says, a natural and useful 
tendency of the Reason, but there is no proof of a 
being, of whom these ideas are attributes. But is the 
proof not in the presence and fitness of the ideas 
themselves ? We have to account for the ideas and 
their use in helping us to understand the existing order 
of things. It is not a sufficient account of them to 
say they are " regulative," but have no correspondent 
reality; for that makes them a useful fiction, and 
leaves them still unaccounted for. 

On the other hand, it is a sufficient account of them to 
say, these ideas of which the reason cannot rid itself, 
and which afford the best solution of nature, correspond 
to the attributes of Him who is the infinite source of 
being and life. Or even if the explanation of the 
world, which they afford, be ignored, the idea of 
infinity, so indigenous to the human mind, goes far 
in teaching that something must be infinite. 1 This 
ontological argument is at once independent and cor- 
roborative of those which immediately precede it. 



1 " We have a sense of the infinite, which is vague and void 
until filled with God." — Professor Hodge. 
7* 



146 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



It would not be difficult to extend the general 
argument for proof, or confirmation of other Divine 
perfections. Let it suffice for our purpose that, by the 
light of nature, our reason is convinced of the existence 
of the world's First Cause, self-existent, eternal, infinite, 
intelligent, and holy, the true and only God. 



PART IV. 

HOW THE THEISTIC ARGUMENT IS AFFECTED 
BY THE ADVANCES OF SCIENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY. 



PART IV. 

HOW THE THEISTIC ARGUMENT IS AFFECTED 

BY THE ADVANCES OF SCIENCE AND 
PHILOSOPHY. 

THIS question must not be confounded with an 
inquiry into the spread and prevalence of Theistic 
or anti-Theistic opinion. To assume the wider extension 
of anti-Theistic views would not imply any improvement 
in their evidential grounds. There is a fashion in this 
as in most matters. In some quarters it appears to be 
deemed the proper thing to affect scientific airs, as 
against religion. It may be that Atheism, theoretical or 
practical, is more extensively favoured now than at 
some previous times ; and that too under the pretext 
of preferring science. Our question is not whether, 
side by side with the advances of science, the propor- 
tion of Atheism to Theism has increased ; but whether, 
and how, the logical bases of Theism have been affected 
by those advances. 

None but weak, or ill-informed Theists can be shaken 
by such boasts and terrors as the following : — " Even 
science has now herself thrown down this trusted 
barrier (law) ; the flood-gates of infidelity are open, 
and Atheism overwhelming is upon us." u Inexorable 
logic has forced us to conclude that, reviewing the 
question as to the existence of a God only by the light 



150 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

which modern science has shed upon it, there no longer 
appears to be any semblance of an argument in its 
favour." Suspended judgment as to the being of a 
God " is the attitude which the majority of scientifically 
trained philosophers actually have adopted." " Theism 
in any shape is, scientifically considered, superfluous." 1 
It cannot but be lamented that the faith of him who 
wrote these sentences should have been wrecked, 
especially by such invalid arguments as he offers for 
the world's conversion to Atheism. But the cry that 
true science has taken sides against Theism is a libel on 
science, and a false alarm to faith. The extent to which 
Atheism has spread its influence among the thinking, 
and unthinking classes, is difficult to ascertain with 
precision. It may be admitted, with feelings of deep 
regret, that Atheism was never more bold and aggressive, 
and probably never asserted itself more persistently 
among both educated, and illiterate ; but to affirm that 
it has taken possession of " the majority of scientifically 
trained philosophers" is a great exaggeration. How- 
ever that may be, Theism has nothing to fear, but 
everything to hope, from tlie increase of accurate 
knowledge of nature. If believers yield to the false 
cry that science is antagonistic to religion, one thinks 
it must be from want of acquaintance with the invulner- 
able defences, which they timidly surrender. 

" Physicus " professes to seek " to fix the precise 
standing of the evidence in favour of the theory of 
Theism, when the latter is viewed in all the flood of 
light which the progress of modern science — physical 
and speculative — has shed upon it." 2 I am convinced 



1 Physicus, pp. 51, 52, 64, 70, 72. ! P. 11. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 15 I 



that from a fair application of this test, the cause of 
Theism must emerge a considerable gainer. 

1. Theistic evidence strengthened by advances of science 
and philosophy 

Physical science, by the number and brilliance of its 
triumphs, more especially during the present century, 
has won for itself a marvellous prestige. For the present 
its approving nod is coveted for ideas quite outside its 
circle, and many seem to assume that it is the rightful 
arbiter on all questions on which its disciples may choose 
to pronounce in its name. Its best exponents, however, 
are the readiest to admit that it is as yet very incom- 
plete, its immense successes notwithstanding. They 
tell us, not only that there are, and always will be, 
many mysteries of nature, but that, of the vast field of 
natural knowledge which human research may hope to 
explore, a large proportion remains a terra incognita. 

Nor must we imagine that the creed of science has 
been one of clear infallible truth, distinguished by no 
change but that of healthy growth. I do not wish to 
lay undue stress on Dr. Stallo's Some Concepts of Science y 
in which the leading tenets of the most approved 
physical science are attacked, by a mind of remarkable 
familiarity with the questions discussed. It shows, 
however, that confidence in the most recent advances of 
science has need to be mingled with caution. Science 
has had its controversies in proportion to the amount of 
attention it has commanded. Its disciples, like theo- 
logians, have had to " hark back," and recant their 
errors. Doctrines long accepted as established truths 
have frequently turned out to be alloy, which had to be 
eliminated. As Sir W. Herschel had to unlearn his 



152 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



first theory of the nebulae, 1 so have many later 
scientists, on further inquiry, been obliged to reverse 
or modify their first conclusions. Benjamin Franklin's 
papers on electricity were read in the Royal Society 
of London amid roars of laughter, yet were afterwards 
accepted as sound. Leibnitz controverted Newton's 
Principia. The old doctrine that the planets were kept 
in their orbits by the opposite action of centripetal and 
centrifugal forces, has become obsolete. Count Rum- 
ford's experiments on heat and energy, at the close of 
the last century, were ridiculed, or neglected for forty 
years, and to-day their lessons form part of established 
science. 2 There is no need to blame anybody for such 
mistakes; they are inevitable to fallible men seeking 
truth in nature, even when they do it from the highest 
motives. But they may serve to remind us that error 
may sometimes pass for scientific knowledge. 

It may also happen that a proficient scientist is by 
no means the best qualified to pronounce on theological 
questions. They are outside the special province to 
which his attention may be so exclusively given as to 
unfit him, through want of information, or through 
contracted habits of thought, for judging of matters 
metaphysical, and spiritual. But that scientists of 
ripest knowledge and highest faculties may be, at the 
same time, among the most devout and intelligent 
Theists, is matter of well-known history. We cannot 
forget men of the type of Boyle, Newton, the Herschels 
Hugh Miller, Faraday, Whewell, Lyell, Brewster, and 
Buckland in the past ; and amongst the living or but 
recently gone, Sir William Thompson, Tait, Mivart, 

1 See Proctor's Borderland of Science, p. 10. 

2 See Tait's Recent Advances, pp. 341-350- 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 153 



Parker, and Dallinger — men of the stamp of Clerk 
Maxwell, who in his last illness observed, " I have 
looked into most philosophical systems, and I have 
seen that none will work without a God." A Clifford, 
or a Haeckel, may abandon all religion, but not as the 
logical necessity of true science. Even Professor 
Huxley, free as his lance has sometimes been against 
theology, refuses to be accounted an Atheist. In many 
scientists of foremost rank remains the devout faith of 
Kepler's prayer, " Oh Thou who by the glorious light 
which Thou hast shed over all nature, raisest our de- 
sires up to the sacred light of Thy grace, in order that 
we may be one day transported into the eternal light of 
Thy glory, I give Thee thanks, my Lord and my 
Creator, for all the joys that I have experienced, in the 
ecstacies, into which I have been thrown, by the contem- 
plation of the work of Thy hands ! " 

Sound theology has much more to fear from ignor- 
ance and superstition, than from a true knowledge of 
nature. Increased scientific knowledge is theological 
gain. All truth is one. All individual truths agree 
with each other. Hence, assuming the truth of Theism, 
no other truth inconsistent with it can ever be dis- 
covered. False science, or false inferences from true 
science, may clash with true religion. But true science 
and true religion are homogeneous, as beams from the 
same sun. It is to the interest of Theism that our 
knowledge of nature should increase. The essential 
harmony of the two subjects will appear in proportion 
to the fulness and accuracy of our views. 

Science and art are mutually helpful. Science has 
led to the invention of improved instruments, which in 
return have enabled science to greatly enlarge its stock 



154 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



of knowledge. Thus the telescope and the microscope 
have brought into view immense fields of nature teeming 
with wonders, and all in harmony with the portion of 
nature previously known. Nature has been found a 
much greater thing than our fathers supposed it to be,, 
both in its magnitudes and its minutiae. Notwithstand- 
ing much hasty generalization, which Sir John HerscheL 
called " the bane of Science," the patient, truth-loving 
investigations of scientists have laid civilization and 
theology under obligation, by the rapid accumulation 
of natural knowledge. Since the observations of the 
Herschels increased the number of known nebulae from 
492 to 5,200/ the range of astronomical knowledge has 
been greatly extended. Many new planets, comets, 
and stars have been discovered ; distances have been 
more accurately calculated ; acquaintance with meteors,, 
star-dust, and the composition and condition of celestial 
bodies has advanced apace; spectrum analysis has. 
enabled men to analyze the rays of light, and to find 
out much about the chemical constituents of the lumi- 
naries whence it radiates ; eruptions and earthquakes 
have come to be better understood, and are seen to 
belong to nature's beneficent provisions. 

Geology, despite all it has had to unlearn, has spread 
before us valuable treasures of knowledge, not only 
respecting the history of our earth's crust, but the 
variety, plenitude, and antiquity of mundane life. And 
as Whewell argued, it has shed its light on astronomy, 
affording the analogical inference that as the earth was 
so long unpeopled, so may the celestial orbs be now. 
Natural philosophy, by observation experiment and 

1 Proctor, p. 12. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 155 



induction, has pushed its investigations in mechanics, 
chemistry, and the structure of matter and force, reaping 
a rich harvest of scientific truth. Not until recently 
was it understood that the total amount of energy in the 
universe, like the total amount of matter, can neither 
increase nor diminish, though it may be continually 
transformed, say from light to heat, or from heat to 
motion, and though it may in a sense be " dissipated " 
or pass into less active conditions. 

A drop of water one-eighth of an inch in diameter, 
which to the unscientific eye might seem an ultimate 
simple particle, is computed to consist of about one 
hundred millions of millions of millions of millions of 
particles, to one of which the drop stands in about the 
same proportion as the whole earth to a cricket ball. 
Again, the particles of a gas are computed at about the 
two hundred and fifty millionth part of an inch diameter; 
and the average distance of the spaces between them 
not less than the five hundred millionth part of an 
inch. These particles are in rapid motion, despite 
their impinging against each other. " One of the results 
arrived at," says Professor Tait, " is that in a mass of 
hydrogen at ordinary temperature and pressure, every 
particle has on an average 17,700,000,000 collisions 
per second with other particles, that is to say, 
17,700,000,000 times in every second it has its course 
wholly changed. And yet the particles are moving at 
the rate of something like seventy miles per minute." 1 
The heterogeneity discovered within extremely small 
particles has revealed a world within what was deemed 
a mere uniform speck. 2 Electricity, though still as- 

| See Recent Advances, pp. 4, 315, 324. 

1 Among the many discoveries of Clerk Maxwell we learn 



156 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



sociated with mystery, was never before so familiar to 
us; and the new uses to which it is being adapted 
promise to enrich mankind. 

Equally wonderful are the revelations of Biology, 
both in the minuteness and number of its objects, and 
in its wide range of experiment and observation. 
Myriads of living beings are found where nothing but 
amorphous matter was supposed to exist. Knowledge 
of the flora and fauna of the world has been carefully 
reaped from land and sea, with a marvellous rapidity 
of accumulation. From the advances of physiological 
science in recent times, the gain to human life is 
exceedingly valuable. Side by side with these rapid 
strides in different branches of physics, has been the 
march of science in the regions of mind, ethics, and 
political economy. 

Now the thought -to be particularly noted is, that 
while the knowledge of nature has made such astonish- 
ing progress, it has never brought to light a single 
truth contradictory of Theism. Nay, its bearing on 
that subject has been to multiply the facts which point 
us to the First Cause. What is this immense array of 
additional knowledge but a wider manifestation of the 
wonderful works of God ? 

In every extension of science we find a correspond- 
ing extension of order, law, co-ordination of means to 
ends, and harmonious arrangement. The newly found 



that the colour of light vibrations is determined by their 
rapidity: the sensation of deep red involving some four 
hundred millions of vibrations in a second, and violet seven 
hundred millions of millions, while the wave-lengths of a 
vibration are reckoned at ^hu of an inch for the red and ^jr 
of an inch for the violet. See London Quarterly Review, 
April 1883, p. 22. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 1 57 



is not another nature, but the same as we knew 
before, and worked on the same principles. In the 
fields of fresh discovery, we observe the same Divine 
hand at work, displaying the same plan of govern- 
ment as before. Between the lines of our recently 
acquired science, we read the existence and attributes 
of God. 

Take, for example, the fertilization of flowers, about 
which our knowledge has been much improved of late 
years. The interdependence of plant and animal life 
affords beautiful illustration of forethought, and wise 
provision. It is well known that, for the reproduction 
and perpetuation of flowering plants, it is necessary 
that the pollen in one flower should be brought into 
contact with the ovule or seed of another. This is 
sometimes effected in ways which might seem accidental, 
as by the action of the wind. But more certainly it is 
done by Insects. The bee in quest of honey cannot 
carry off its treasure from one flower to another 
without a portion of the pollen adhering to its pro- 
boscis, to be left on the stigma of another. Thus, 
while the plants supply insects with food, the service 
is returned in assisting the former to propagate their 
species. 

Darwin has given most interesting accounts of this 
method of fertilization, making no scruple at explaining 
it by contrivance, intention, and purpose. But he 
seems to assume that the contrivance, intention, and 
purpose are in nature, not in its supernatural Author. 
But as contrivance is the effect of mind, and intention 
is an act of mind, there must be mind as the cause 
of these ingenious contrivances, and as the subject of 
these intentions. Unless we adopt the notion of mind 



158 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



in molecules, with all its indefensible consequences, 
there is no alternative to the conclusion that the mind 
which intended, purposed, and contrived was the 
Divine Mind, by which all nature was constituted 

and endowed. 

The Duke of Argyll has clearly presented the in- 
evitable inferences from Darwin's facts and reasonings. 
Speaking of Darwin's work on the Fertilization oj 
Orchids, he says, "The structure of these flowers is 
elaborately contrived, so as to secure the certainty and 
effectiveness of this operation " (transport of the pollen 
by insects). " The complication and ingenuity of these 
contrivances almost exceed belief; ' Moth-traps and 
spring-guns set on these grounds,' might be the motto 
of the Orchids. There are baits to tempt the nectar- 
loving Lepidoptera, with rich odours exhaled at night, 
and lustrous colours to shine by day; there are 
channels of approach along which they are surely 
guided, so as to compel them to pass by certain spots ; 
there are adhesive plasters nicely adjusted to fit their 
probosces, or to catch their brows ; there are hair- 
triggers carefully set in their necessary path, com- 
municating with explosive shells, which project the 
pollen-stalks with unerring aim upon their bodies. 
There are, in short, an infinitude of adjustments, . . . 
all contrived so as to secure the accurate conveyance 
of the pollen of the one flower to its precise destina- 
tion in the structure of another. ... It is curious 
to observe the language which this most advanced 
disciple of pure naturalism (Darwin) instinctively uses, 
when he has to describe the complicated structure of 
this curious order of plants; 'caution in ascribing 
intentions to nature' does not seem to occur to him 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 1 59 



as possible. Intention is the one thing which he does 
see ; and which, when he does not see, he seeks for 
diligently until he finds it. ... ' Contrivance ' — ' curious 
contrivance ' — ' beautiful contrivance ' — these are ex- 
pressions which recur over and over again." The use 
of similar language is frequent, e.g., " ' The Labellum 
is developed into a long nectary in order to attract 
Lepidoptera, and we shall presently give reasons for 
suspecting that the nectar is purposely so lodged that 
it can be sucked only slowly, in order to give time for 
the curious chemical quality of the viscid matter setting 
hard and dry.'" They are to be referred, says the 
Duke, to " that function and power of Mind which we 
know as Purpose and Design." 1 

Not one step of progress in the direction of rational 
evidence has Atheistic Materialism made since the days 
of Epicurus and Lucretius, while every new develop- 
ment of genuine science adds to the accumulated proofs 
of an Almighty intelligence. Were Dr. Paley living 
to-day, he might not be able to advance much on the 
principles of his argument for natural theology ; but 
the fresh fields, won by various branches of science, 
would multiply the materials of illustration, and greatly 
enlarge the evidential display of facts. While theology 
has had to modify some of its subordinate positions as 
the result of modern discovery, its defences have been 
strengthened by scientific accessions ; and that in spite 
of the old cry of science versus religion. If with the 
limited stock of knowledge available in his day, King 
David had reason to be astonished at the insignificance 
of man compared with God as seen in His heavens, the 



1 Reign of Law, pp. 36-39. 



l6o FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



work of His fingers, the moon and the stars, which He 
had ordained, how much more may the wider display 
unfolded by science wake up our adoring wonder to 
exclaim, " O Lord our Lord, how excellent is Thy Name 
in all the earth ! " 

2. Evolution. 

The scientific and theological thought of the last few 
decades has been affected by the question of natural 
development. Previously a topic of speculation among 
the few, it was broached before the reading public of 
this country by the publication of The Vestiges of the 
Natural History of Creation; now known to be the 
work of Dr. Robert Chambers. From time to time it 
has acquired fresh interest by the deliverances of the 
British Association, and by many publications and 
public addresses pro et contra. The theory is now 
represented by the well-known name of "Evolution." 
Some have hoped, and others have feared, that its. 
introduction meant the end of all theology ; while others 
have sought to show there was no contradiction between 
the two ; and others, again, have endeavoured to vindi- 
cate theology by controverting Evolution. It is certain 
this much-lauded theory can neither silence, nor subdue 
nature's clear testimony to the existence of its God. 

Briefly stated, the theory is, that commencing with 
matter in some primordial, probably nebular form 
(when "the existing world lay, potentially, in the 
cosmic vapour "), a process of change went on through 
millions of ages, from the simpler to the more complex, 
from the inferior to the superior, from one thing to 
something different (homogeneous to heterogeneous) ; 
the living arose from the non-living, the animal from the 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 



161 



vegetable ; and in the " struggle for existence," through 
long reaches of time, the weaker generally perished, 
and the stronger survived, gradually varying and im- 
proving as a whole, though the individuals of each 
generation had only their turn of existence. By this 
process originated vegetable, and out of that animal 
life, graduated by successive modifications through 
the stages of mollusks, insects, fishes, birds, reptiles, 
mammals, finally to man. The form of development 
resembled that of a tree, branching at successive points,, 
each branch taking its peculiar form, and giving rise to 
kinds more and more diverse from those produced on 
other branches. Accordingly man is not in the direct 
line from the ape, but his cousin of one or more removes, 
being borne on a different branch. 1 The variations 
thus accruing were so many and so great as to effect 
the transmutation of species, new ones growing out of 
the old; if indeed the theory does not do away with 
species altogether, resolving all living things into one 
kind, of which they are mere varieties. 

The modifying influences are chiefly the medium or 
environment in which the living thing is placed, its 
need } and the habits thus formed, and as some say (e.g., 
Bastian) " internal tendency " to differentiation. These 
influences cause adaptation of its organs to its circum- 
stances. The variations thus acquired are transmitted 
hereditarily to its progeny ; and so the accumulated 
improvements of many generations appear in the 
superior organs and attributes of the last of the line 
now living. Similarly the nervous sensibility and con- 
tractility of vegetables grew into the acuter sensations 

1 See Wilson, Chapters on Evolution, pp. 354-360, etc. 



3 62 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

of animals, and through innumerable stages reached the 
intelligence of man, with its seat in the brain. 

By the experience of the agreeable results of one 
kind of action, and the disagreeable results of another, 
there sprang up among men the distinction between 
useful and injurious actions ; and by the habit of 
associating approbation with the former, and disap- 
probation with the latter, there arose the distinction 
between right and wrong ; and thus conscience was 
created. The constitution and growth of communities, 
domestic, social, and national, are accounted for on the 
same principle. According to this theory, one individual, 
or class of living things may advance, while another 
may remain stationary, or become retrograde from want 
of the " need " which provokes effort and adaptation ; 
as in parasites, whose organs are said to diminish or 
disappear through loss of function. But this qualifi- 
cation of the theory has the appearance of limiting the 
Evolutionary process, to an extent too large to be 
described as an exception. 

It is held that the substance, basis, or principle of 
all life is protoplasm, a semi-fluid kind of matter, in 
appearance like the white of an egg, and consisting of 
the simple elements carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and 
nitrogen, with slight traces of sulphur and phos- 
phorus. It is never produced apart from pre-existing 
protoplasm. 

On the principle of Evolution the lungs of air- 
breathing animals, and ultimately man, are supposed to 
have been slowly derived from the swim bladder of the 
fish, human speech from the howling of the brute, the 
human brain from the irritability of amoeba, or other 
lowest form of animalcules. The man, the gorilla, the 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY, 163 

rhinoceros, the snail, and the butterfly may be all cousins 
of different degrees, all having descended from the same 
common stock ; or, as others think, they may have come 
from several primordial protoplasmic specks. 

" Continuity," as a part of this theory means, that 
natural law reigns everywhere and always, without 
possibility of interruption, suspension, or intervention 
by extra-natural, or supernatural agency. 

In accounting for upward modifications, Darwin lays 
stress on " natural selection/' by which the living being 
is apt to choose from its environment what is best for 
itself and its offspring ; on perpetual " variation ; " and 
on " environment," which determines whether a given 
variation will be beneficial or not, the most fitted to 
new environments surviving the best. The result is 
"the survival of the fittest." Mr. H. Spencer points 
especially to what he calls the " transformation of the 
homogeneous into the heterogeneous," "change from 
an incoherent homogeneity to heterogeneity, accom- 
panying the dissipation of motion, and integration of 
matter;" that is, its incorporation into the living 
organism. 

Some of these ideas were foreshadowed by Descartes 
Leibnitz, and Kant. They were largely extended by 
Lamarck, and have been elaborated by Darwin and 
his contemporaries. Many of them, in the hands of 
such men as Spencer, Huxley, Tyndall, H. C. Eastian, 
Haeckel, and Wilson, have been moulded into their 
present shape, and pressed on public attention under 
the fair name of science. There are, however, con- 
siderable shades of difference in the views of Evolu- 
tionists. Wallace, for example, ascribes less than 
Darwin to "natural selection," and supposes super- 



1 64 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

natural agency in the formation of man. Dr. H. C. 
Bastian takes Spencer and Darwin to task for "denying 
that there existed in organisms any internal tendency 
to progressive differentiation," and for holding that it 
is " possible that the descendants of simple and little- 
differentiated organisms could have reproduced their 
like without any considerable alteration during an 
unbroken lineal descent, though millions and millions 
of years must have elapsed since the first Evolution of 
life upon our planet." 1 Nor would it be difficult to 
cull passages from Evolutionist literature, in which a 
writer seems to contradict himself. 

In some of its aspects the theory has met with 
powerful opponents, and received damaging, if not 
fatal treatment at the hands of Janet, Beale, Mivart, 
Pasteur, Maxwell, Virchow, Sir William Thompson, 
and many others. In his Belfast address Professor 
Tyndall lamented that many " older and honoured 
chiefs " were " opposed to Evolution in every form." 

My object is not to travel .over the whole question of 
Evolution, but to consider its bearing on the Theistic 
argument already presented. We have to ask, Does 
the theory, so far as made out by evidence, render a 
First Cause unnecessary ? Does it refute the doctrine 
of causality? Does it disprove the reality of final 
causes, or invalidate the Theistic inference therefrom ? 
Does it do away with efficient causation, or its evidence 
of an Intelligent First Cause? Does it prove matter 
the origin of all things ? Does it prove the order 
of nature eternal ? Does it prove that the First Cause 
is Finite, or Impersonal? Does it render any of our 



1 Beginnings of Life, vol. ii., pp. 587, 588, 599. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 165 



foregoing arguments unsound ? All these questions 
may be confidently answered in the negative. 

I. Assuming the truth of the theory in its main 
features, it does not follow that Theism is false, or its 
evidence from nature unsound. 

(i.) The Universe to be accounted for. The theory 
recognizes the facts of nature, traces out the reciprocal 
adjustment of parts, the correlation of forces, the 
invariability of law, and the necessity of causation. 
It places us in the midst of a system, as admirable in 
its arrangements and operations, as in the vastness 
of its forces. But alone, it does not account for the 
universe. It may reasonably protest that it is not 
its business to look beyond the realm of nature, not 
even for a cause of nature. But reason cannot stop 
there. It insists on a cause for the entirety of the 
universe. So long as man's intuitive propensity is 
what it is, this demand cannot be suppressed. And if 
Evolution cannot meet it, Reason must not be interdicted 
from seeking satisfaction in something above Evolution, 
— if needs be, in an Intelligent First Cause. 1 

Let it be granted that the universe is one immense 
machine, all its movements taking place by virtue of 
the laws and forces within itself, without supernatural 
intervention at any point. What then ? We have 
still to account for the machine, and its forces, 

"The temper of our age is such as to lead a large 
number of thoughtful persons to say, < We decline to believe 
anything which cannot be scientifically proved.' At this 
point argument stops. So much the worse for them. Better 
for a man to know nothing of science than to fall into that 
morbid intellectualism which mistakes science for the whole 
of knowledge. To be consistent such a man should distrust 
his own mt>mory and personal identity, for neither of these can 
be scientifically proved. "—Dr. Conder, Basis of Faith, p. 8 s 



1 66 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



properties, and laws. Epicureans may say the original 
atoms tumbled by chance, and after failing perhaps 
millions of times, at last combined fortuitously into 
a well-ordered universe. But how came the atoms to 
have their moving properties, and reciprocal adapta- 
tions ? And how came they all to fall into such 
harmonious relations as to constitute this wondrous 
fabric? If St. Paul's Cathedral had been built by 
a fortuitous tumbling about of materials, without in- 
telligent design or control, it would have been a very 
small wonder compared with the universe so formed. 
But there would also have been this all-important differ- 
ence, that the accidental construction of the cathedral 
might have been ascribed to the strange operation of 
known natural forces under known laws, whereas the 
hypothesis in question gives no cause of the qualities 
and movements which fortuitously produced the uni- 
verse. If chaos produced order, what produced chaos 
— and chaos with such a capability of falling into order ? 
Too often, in accounting for natural phenomena, 
Law is confounded with Power, and Process with 
Cause. The universe is not accounted for by show- 
ing in what order its parts act upon each other, or 
one event produces another. The whole has to be 
accounted for. The formation of water from oxygen 
and hydrogen may be explained by the affinity of the 
two gases for each other. But the explanation wants 
explaining. What caused the affinity? As Dr. 
Calderwood remarks, "That men should consider the 
discovery of the component parts of certain forms of 
existence, or of the laws of well-known movements, 
as a final disposal of the demands of intelligence, 
only shows how little the intellect of inquirers has 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 1 6/ 



been prepared for appreciation of the full demands of 
reason." * 

By this kind of fallacy Evolution is sometimes 
supposed to supersede the necessity of proper causation. 
We are told, " The theory of Evolution, in its largest 
sense, has shown the theory of Theism to be super- 
fluous in a scientific sense." 2 "Its largest sense" 
seems to be that which postulates, that the law of 
causality shall be excluded from the investigation, 
except within Atheistic limits, and which assumes that 
a remote origin, and gradual development might take 
place without intention, forethought, or any cause 
external to the things evolved — the very question in 
dispute. This is certainly a " sense" which many of 
the most scientific Evolutionists would disown ; and 
this partial exclusion of the psychological principle 
of causality is an arbitrary restriction to which a seeker 
of the highest truth will not submit. Accepting all 
that is ascertained of Evolution, still the universe, with 
its correlations, contrivances, and harmonies, demands 
an adequate cause as peremptorily as it would if its, 
operations proceeded without plan, by the direct, 
immanent energy of its Creator. 3 



1 Science and Religion, p. 85. 

2 Physicus, p. 73. 

5 Comte blames "the childish persistence, so common with, 
our literary men, in the attempt to penetrate to causes when 
laws are known." In his dogmatic style he declares: "The 
knowledge of laws henceforth takes the place of the inquiry 
into causes " {Catechism, pp. 41-50). It cannot be so in the 
working of a free sane mind. To answer the intuitive inquiry 
for causes, by pointing to law, is to offer a stone for bread. 
But though Positivism seeks to appropriate Evolution, the 
latter must not be held responsible for the absurd and futile 
attempt of Comte' s Positivism to extinguish the principle of 
causality. 



1 68 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

(ii.) The parts to be accounted for. If Theism be 
necessary to account for the totality of the universe, 
it is equally so to account for its innumerable parts, 
considered singly. Proceeding on the theory of 
Evolution, we find the world abounds in causes, 
which, not being primary, and having only a derived 
efficiency from an antecedent cause, we call second or 
intermediate causes. Environment, need, and habit, 
produce modifications of organs. The entire order of 
events is made up of causes and their effects. But 
second causes alone account for nothing satisfactorily. 
They have themselves to be accounted for. Hence we 
have to go beyond them to account for the present 
system of nature. All the causes within the process 
of Evolution are second causes, and therefore require 
a cause external to that process. For instance, if so 
much be due to " natural selection " of the best, why do 
living beings so select ? Whence the ability and 
tendency ? To find the answer we have to ascend 
step by step until we reach a cause sufficient to 
originate such a gift, which must be the First Cause. 
M. Janet's question is appropriate, " How came nature 
to be so inventive ? " Something greater than nature 
must have made it so. 

Evolution requires the reign of law. It ascribes all 
events, with their manifold relations, to the laws of 
nature. Quoting Darwin, an enthusiastic' Evolutionist 
says, " The ways of all living beings are ordered in con- 
formity with the great system of natural law." 1 But 
whence the laws ? Who imposed them on passive 
matter ? How came they to be so harmonious and 



1 Wilson, p. 79. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 169 



effectual? A law is not a substance, or force, but a 
rule of action — a form of thought according tc which 
force operates. It must therefore be conceived before 
it can be imposed. The whole network of law implies 
an intelligent Lawgiver. When we are told that all 
have "been produced by laws acting around us . 
Growth with Reproduction . . . Variability . . . Ratio 
of Increase . . . Struggles for Life . . . Natural Selec- 
tion," we have to inquire how nature acquired these laws ? 
They must have had a cause anterior to themselves. 

Take, for example, the germ of reproduction. So 
far as human ken can reach, the protoplasmic germ in 
man cannot be distinguished from that of the dog or 
fish. Yet each develops, as a Darwinian would admit, 
into the kind from which it was derived. Why does 
the canine never develop into a man, or the human into 
a dog? Can the law which controls these wonderful 
processes be due to anything less than a wise Lawgiver ? 
It is needless to repeat the argument which shows, that 
the natural order of things could not originate in mere 
matter. My present object is to point out that to admit 
the theory of Evolution, in its essential features, does 
not logically require us to surrender the Theistic 
argument from causation. 

(hi.) Evolution does not get rid of final causes. That 
final causes are not dispensed with by Evolution is 
evident. How can it be doubted, for instance, that 
seeing is an end for which the optic nerve and the 
construction of the eye are means? It may be 
answered that the faculty of vision results from the 
laws and properties inherent in nature. That, however, 
does not affect the argument ; for it is all the same to 
our question, whether God brings about the effect by 



iy FIRST PRINCIPLES OP FAITH. 



His immediate energy, or by investing nature with 
properties which shall bring it about. In either case 
the end is designed beforehand. Again, the mutual 
adaptation and proclivities of sexes, generative organs, 
provision for parturition, and for nourishment of the 
embryo, and new-born infant, are evidently means co- 
ordinated for the reproduction, and continuance of the 
human species. But that end must have been conceived 
before those means were provided. And the same may 
be predicated of ten thousand manifest ends in nature. 

However averse to theological inference some Evo- 
lutionists may be, they cannot avoid language which 
betrays the notion of finality. They are unable to 
expound the facts of nature without speaking of 
-adaptation;" of "the reason why" certain organs- 
exist ; " manifold contrivances, by which nature seeks 
effects • " many different methods whereby this end (fer- 
tilization of flowers) is secured ; » " an evident intent." 1 
It has been observed that some of the leading Evo- 
lutionists are decided teleologists while rejecting 
teleology. Not rarely they employ such language as 
the following,—" Contingencies are often duly provided 
for in remarkable ways ; " " the weak and primitive are 
prevented, and perhaps wisely, from cumbering the 
ground ; " " the animal or plant is found to possess 
certain means for acquiring relations of more or less- 
definite kind with its surroundings ;» " nature contrives 
by such means to effect cross-fertilization;" "the clear 
plan and method of creation ; " " nature's purport in 

~T77Z s a a-ainst the implication of final causes it has been sug- 
♦ JMafthese terms '< may possibly be used merely to avoid 
f™^ St ^e, if language must 

Teased which means just the opposite of what is intended ;. 
and that in science. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 171 



inaugurating such change." The first nervous acts of 
the amoeba have a " use and purport ; " organs are " co- 
ordinated so as to work to a common end." There is 
often the latent consciousness of advantage, or desir- 
ableness as an end to be attained. " What advantage 
would it be" to a lower form, to be more highly 
organized ? " How simply are these facts (certain 
relations of stamens and pistils) explained on the view 
of an occasional cross with a distinct individual being, 
advantageous or indispensable." "Thus from the 
common ground that cross-fertilization effects the 
greatest good in nature — namely, the efficient increase 
of the race — we may find many roads and ways for the 
recognition of further effects of such action in favouring 
the operation of the conditions that increase the species 
by variation and modification." 1 How came "the 
greatest good in nature " to be an " advantage," for the 
attainment of which so many arrangements are sub- 
servient, unless the idea of the result were previously 
present to some mind, which devised the arrangements 
for effecting the result ? It is very well in poetry to 
personify Nature as contriving to accomplish various 
ends ; but in philosophy we are bound to attribute such 
proceedings to a real and not a figurative personality. 

Dr. Wilson 2 makes the argument of Mr. Spencer 
his own. " Why under the down-covered body of the 
moth, and under the hard wing-cases of the beetle, 
should there be discovered the same number of divisions 
as in the calcareous framework of the lobster? It 
cannot be by chance that there exist just twenty seg- 

1 Most of these extracts are from Wilson's Chapters on 
Evolution; but similar language is common with other 
Evolutionists. 2 Ibid., p. 152. 



1/2 MUST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

ments in all these hundreds of thousands of species. 
There is no reason to think that it was necessary, in the 
sense that no other number would have made a possible 
organism. And to say that it is the result of design — 
to say the Creator followed this pattern throughout, 
merely for the purpose of maintaining the pattern — is 
to assign a motive which, if avowed by a human being, 
we should call whimsical. No rational interpretation 
of this and hosts of like morphological truths can be 
given, except by the hypothesis of evolution ; and from 
the hypothesis of evolution they are corollaries." 

This paragraph narrows the matter to a choice 
between Design and Evolution as the explanation of 
these resemblances of structure. But the passage con- 
founds two questions. The two explanations set in 
opposition (Design and Evolution) are not opposites. 
So far from being antithetical, both may be true. Con- 
sequently the adoption of the one does not necessarily 
involve rejection of the other. Supposing the effect to 
have been produced by the process of Evolution, it by 
no means follows that it was not designed. " Why ?" 
may here mean for what reason? referring to the final 
cause ; or it may mean by what efficient cause ? Mr. 
Spencer's argument confounds these two meanings. 
One refers to the method, the other to the reason or 
end of producing the effect. To assign Evolution as the 
method does not touch the question of the end for 
which the evolution took place. The end might or 
might not be to display a varied application of the 
same principle, or to secure a family likeness in the 
various contrivances, so disclosing the unity of their 
origin, or to accomplish some ulterior end not yet 
apparent to us. But whatever might be the reason or 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 1 73 

end, that is quite a different question from the process 
of producing the resemblance. There remains another 
question, namely, How is the conformity of the pro- 
ductive efficiency to the principle of Evolution to be 
accounted for ? It is no answer to say such is the law 
of that efficiency. The question recurs in a different 
form, What made it the law ? that is to say, What 
ordained and imposed the law ? The question is never 
answered until we bring in Mind as the cause. 

Returning to Mr. Spencer's question, it may be 
reasonably affirmed that the effect (=the resemblances 
of their consequences) is so good, and their efficient 
causes so wisely adapted to produce the effect, that 
both effect and causes must have been designed ; or to 
put it more strongly, the production of the effects we 
see in nature by the gradual process of Evolution, is 
not only consistent with, but requires the idea of final 
causes for its explanation. Of course to u call " this 
solution "whimsical" does not make it so. Mr. 
Spencer's paraphrase for design is altogether incom- 
mensurate, and vitiates his argument. We may hold 
that the phenomenon is " the result of design " without 
accepting his explanation of design — i.e., " merely for 
the purpose of maintaining the pattern." It might be 
so ; but more probably, uniformity of pattern was with 
a view to still further designs. The argument from 
final causes does not require that the reason or object 
of every contrivance shall be at once apparent to us. 

The Evolutionist might reasonably contend that 
absolute perfection may not have been reached in the 
ends or means of nature; that the eye of man, the 
human frame, the solar system, or any, the most useful 
thing in nature, may, in future ages, develop into a 



174 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



character and function far superior to its present ; and 
thus the adaptations of nature may be gradually im- 
proving. Granted : yet the argument from final causes 
remains in full strength. Future and higher adapta- 
tions cannot lessen, except by comparison, the marks 
of intention, with which we are familiar. The human 
eye, as we know it, was evidently constructed for the 
purpose it answers ; none the less so because it may, 
in future ages, become a more powerful instrument of 
vision. Seeing is the final cause of its existence. The 
idea of constant improvement in the processes of nature 
and their results, so far from disproving final causes, 
rather enlarges our view of their range. If, for example, 
it be admitted that the processes and results of nature, 
in the future, will far surpass those of the present, then, 
not instead of, but in addition to the finality manifest 
in innumerable particulars, the whole system of nature 
shows itself intentionally constituted in order to pro- 
duce the advances insisted upon by the Evolutionist. 
Accepting his view of gradual improvement, that im- 
provement must have been an end to effect which 
the order of nature was adapted as means. On the 
assumption, therefore, of continued general advance- 
ment, the intelligence of Nature's First Cause must be 
immeasurably great. 

(iv.) Atheism not logically necessary to Evolution. The 
attempts of Atheism to identify itself with the theory 
of Evolution either as a constituent element or a 
logical inference are altogether unwarranted. Develop- 
ment of the present admirable order of the world from 
primordial cosmic vapour, whether true or false, may 
be easily conceived and believed without logically com- 
mitting its adherents to the denial of God's existence. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 175 



Atheism, though too often a concomitant of Evolutionism, 
so far as that is scientifically ascertained, is at most but 
an extraneous appendage. If matter be God, or the 
ultimate basis of the universe, it cannot be proved to 
be so by the theory of Evolution, Particular ideas may 
be associated with the theory by individuals, which, if 
true, would rob us of faith in God ; but those ideas are 
not essential to the theory. For example, it may be 
said the universe is all that exists, and that its intrinsic, 
and eternal properties are underived, and are the primary 
cause of all things. But that view, besides being a 
petitio principii, is no necessary part of the theory of 
Evolution. Development of the complex from the 
simple by natural process does not involve any such 
view. For aught which the theory implies the present 
universe may have been designed, created, and evolved 
by a personal God. 

Accordingly some eminent thinkers are consistent 
Theistic Evolutionists. Their position does not commit 
them to all that some other Evolutionists may hold, 
e.g. spontaneous generation, transmutation of species, 
and the materiality of mind. Descartes and Leibnitz 
initiated speculation in favour of the uninterrupted 
" continuity" of nature under law, and the same 
doctrine was emphatically propounded by a President of 
the British Association a few years ago ; yet we have 
no reason to think any of the three was not a firm 
believer in the existence of God. Many men of science, 
like Wallace the naturalist, and Dallinger the biologist, 
are at once Evolutionists and Christian Theists. A few 
professedly Christian teachers have gone so far as to 
maintain that even mind and morals might be allowed 
io be the product of natural Evolution, without injury 



If 6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

to the Christian faith, — a concession which is more than 
questionable. It is enough for my present purpose that 
what is essential to the theory does not logically involve 
Atheism, but, on the contrary, requires the idea of God 
for its explanation. 

2. Some elements non-essential to the theory of Evo- 
lution. 

With what is beyond dispute in the theory, tenets 
are too often associated which have no support in 
evidence, or at least are conjectural. The principle of 
continuity pervading nature, the influence of circum- 
stances on the state and powers of the living, the 
tendency of living beings to adapt themselves to their 
environment, the improvement, or deterioration of a 
species from generation to generation, the gradual 
development of organization, life, and capacity in the 
individual, the tendency of the strongest to survive, 
and other causes of modification and ceaseless variation, 
were truths familiar to observers before the Evolution 
theory took definite shape and name. So far as it 
embodies and illustrates these truths its claim to 
acceptance is unquestionable. But as set forth by 
some of its advocates, it includes doctrines which lack 
the impress of truth, and are probably destined to be 
eliminated from scientific Evolution, as alchemy was 
from chemistry, and astrology from astronomy. 

Taken as a whole, Evolution is as yet fitly designated 
a theory; for it is not yet entitled to rank as established 
science. To this character corresponds much of the 
language of its more advanced advocates. In reference 
to some doctrines which seek to pass with the theory, 
it is well they should tell us they can but " indicate 
the direction towards which modern scientific faith is 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND FHILOSOPHY. IJJ 



slowly but surely tending." The solution to themselves 
" seems to be that which science tends to supply." 
They speak of the " deductions and suggestions of 
Darwin." They " postulate " a " struggle for existence.' ' 
Instead of evidence, they rely on " its general harmony 
with scientific thought," and accept it as " probable/' 
and not yet verified by " observation and experiment." 
They say they "can imagine;" "There is reason to 
suspect that there is but one ultimate form of matter out 
of which the more complex forms of matter are built 
up." "By an intellectual necessity," said Professor 
Tyndall, " I cross the boundary of experimental evi- 
dence, and discern in matter the promise and potency 
of all terrestrial life." In the absence of proof, Darwin 
says " it may be easily supposed" Such faltering lan- 
guage is sometimes mixed up strangely with over- 
weening assertions that Evolution is the only " rational 
solution" of "the great problem of nature." Among the 
elements, whose right to a place in the theory of Evolu- 
tion is not yet clearly established, are the following. 

(i.) Spontaneous generation. Archibiosis, or spon- 
taneous generation, denotes the natural origination of 
life de novo out of non-living matter. Though held as 
a separate question by some, it is treated by other 
Evolutionists as an integrant element of their theory. 
This doctrine, which is necessary to their doctrine of 
the descent of man and all living things from a common 
amorphous origin, remains not only destitute of evi- 
dence, but discountenanced by analogy. It is allowed 
on all sides that there was a time when no life of any 
kind did, or could exist on our globe, molten as it was 
by heat. Hence the life now on the earth had a 
beginning. But how it could begin by merely natural 



I/O FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



causes is a problem which the advocates of archibiosis 
have never been able to solve. No verified instance 
can be found of life arising, except from something 
living. The chemical elements of protoplasm can be 
named; but that it cannot be manufactured, the school 
■of Professors Tyndall and Huxley are among the first 
to declare. A watch, a loom, or other machine may be 
made, though no such thing pre-existed. Not so with 
a thing of life. There is no life except from a living 
being ; no protoplasm without pre-existing protoplasm. 
How then could life begin in a world where none 
existed ? The just inference is that it did not, and could 
not begin spontaneously. Evolutionists cannot say 
how the chasm between the non-living and the living 
could be bridged. The Theist has no difficulty. It 
was easy enough, and consistent with the highest con- 
ceivable perfection, that the Author of all nature should 
supei naturally create life on the globe, for which it was 
fitted by antecedent changes. Theism thus gives a far 
more rational account of the genesis of life than is 
furbished by that form of Evolution which excludes all 
supernatural intervention. 1 

1 Dr. H. C. Bastian {Beginnings of Life) argues that since 
living Bacteria and monads all perished in water heated 
to 212° F., and yet new Bacteria and monads afterwards 
appeared in the same water cooled after being raised to 270 
F. without communication from without, there was a beginning 
of life de novo. But Roberts, Tyndall, Dallinger, Drysdale, 
and others exposed the insufficiency of Bastian' s experiments, 
and the sophistry of his arguments. They showed that while 
living monads (the same as Bacteria for the purpose) so per- 
ished, the germs or spores would retain their potential vitality 
in water heated to 300 F. Referring to his own experience 
with monads, Dr. Dallinger says : " This is one of the monads 
whose spore will develop after being heated to 300 F., that is 
to say, 25 higher than the heat endured by Dr. Bastian's in- 
fusion. Therefore I contend that this monad arose from its 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 1 79 



Were spontaneous generation proved, it would not 
disprove Theism : it would simply do away with that 
particular reason, which the creation of life affords, for 
inferring supernatural intervention, and consequently 
a supernatural Being ; while it would give an additional 
event (archibiosis) to be accounted for, which nothing 
could sufficiently account for but an intelligent First 
Cause. But seeing the question is entirely begged, it 
is utterly powerless against Theism. And if the whole 
theory of Evolution must stand or fall with spontaneous 
generation, there is little probability of its " surviving." 
The more moderate Evolutionists argue against this 
kind of Heterogenesis, on the ground that it makes 
nature capricious, causing life sometimes by heredity, 
and sometimes by spontaneous generation, being thus 
at variance with that principle of stability, in nature's 
operations, which is a foundation stone of the doctrine 
of Evolution. 

" With the vast area of facts," writes Dr. Dallinger, 
" that absolutely oppose it (Heterogenesis), as definitely 
settled as the specific gravity of gold ; and with the 
crude and undigested 'evidence' brought by its ad- 
vocates in its favour, we may scarcely anticipate that 
uncertainty or caprice in vital development, or a new 



-natural spore, which the heat Dr. Bastian used was not com- 
petent to kill" {Science Lectures for the People, No. 8 by 
Dr. W. H. Dallinger, F.R.S., F.R.M.S., pp. 149, 150). 
Dr. Bastian's contention that the beginning of life de novo is 
analogous to the formation of crystal, will not bear investiga- 
tion. Crystals are never reproductive. They have nothing 
corresponding to the functions of a living organism. They 
have no sensatory, or motor properties ; no internal tendency 
to change ; no course or period of individual existence ; no 
characteristics which render their formation analogous, to the 
origination of life. 



1 80 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



power in ' protoplasm ' to disregard its inherited ten- 
dencies, will be amongst the facts that will make the light 
of human knowledge brighter in the years to come." 1 

Another, whose right to speak in the name of science 
will be readily acknowledged, says, " But let no one 
imagine that should we ever penetrate this mystery 
(of life), we shall thereby be enabled to produce, except 
from life, even the lowest form of life." " If we were 
to trace the state of affairs back, instead of ten millions, 
to a hundred millions of years, we should find that (if 
the earth then existed at all, . . . and if the physical 
laws which at present hold have been in operation dur- 
ing that hundred million years) then the surface of the 
earth would undoubtedly have been liquid and at a high 
white heat, so that it would have been utterly incom- 
patible with the existence of life of any kind such as 
we can conceive from what we are acquainted with." 2 

(ii.) Transmutation of species. In point of probability, 
transmutation of species is not so wanting as spon- 
taneous generation. It means that, instead of a section 
or assemblage of living organisms united by similarity 
of constitution and function, and kept distinct from the 
rest by reproduction of its like only, one section or type 
may, by a long succcession of slight variations, develop 
into another type, and all may have sprung from one 
or a few primitive forms of life. As held by some 
Evolutionists, it is not identical with that theory of 
Heterogenesis which assumes vast leaps from one form 
of life to quite heterogeneous forms, for which nature 
shows neither need nor probability. This latter may be 
dismissed as unsupported by a tittle of evidence. The 

1 Life Histories and their Lessons, p. 39. 

2 Tait, Rece?it Advances, pp. 24-167. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. l8l 



transmutation under notice has something to say for 
itself, but has not yet earned its title to rank with 
established science. 

That there are endless variations, and no two living 
beings in all respects alike, modifications in the state 
and capacities of living things by the influence of 
circumstances, development of one from another, and 
of higher degrees of health and power from lower ; 
that the individuals of a species are wonderfully capable 
of adapting themselves to their environment, and some 
11 adaptive changes " may be permanent ; and that the 
same species may be crossed, so as to produce varieties 
of breed, as with horses, dogs, pigeons, cabbages, etc., 
are matters admitting of no dispute. But from all 
such changes to the creation of one distinct species out 
of another, by the course of nature, is a tremendous 
leap of imagination. No wonder that anatomists like 
Richard Owen and physiologists like Dr. Carpenter 
stoutly resist its claims to be accounted science. 
We have no well-ascertained instance of the kind. 
Experiment points the other way. For where one 
species is made to engender by another, the offspring 
is infertile, as in the mule ; and artificial " breeds " left 
to themselves tend to revert to former characteristics. 
Where a new species seems to be produced by human 
contrivance, nature left alone refuses to perpetuate it, 
and declares she will have none of it. 

Exponents of the doctrine have found it hard to 
explain the deterioration, or absence of progress 
among many lower forms of life. Countless myriads 
of the simplest and lowest organisms exist, which, 
on the reasonable assumption of their species having 
existed from the earliest stages of mundane life, ought 



1 82 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



long ere this, if the doctrine be true, to have developed 
into much higher forms, if not to equality with the 
human. To say the doctrine " does not necessarily 
include progressive development" is really to say it 
holds but partially. 

Transmutation is brought in to explain the assump- 
tion that all vegetable and animal species have grown 
out of one stock, like the branches of a tree, " from the 
monad up to man." But imagination alone can so 
connect them. Nature does not present the successive 
variations of type necessary to establish the unbroken 
relationship. There are immense gaps, which fancy has 
to fill up in order to eke out the scheme. An advanced 
Evolutionist acknowledges that it is impossible to trace 
"this continuity of structure." "The gaps between 
the included forms are many and wide, and nature, 
as we observe her processes, does not appear to supply 
the ' missing link ' in the existing order of affairs at 
least." The same writer supports his confession by 
the words of Darwin, "'The distinctness of specific 
forms, and their not being blended together by innu- 
merable transitional links, is a very obvious difficulty.' 
That a few fossils indicate intermediate species, e.g., 
the Zenglodon between the whale and the seal, the 
Anaplotherium between the Ruminants and the 
swine, the Palseothersum between the pig and the 
rhinoceros, has but little bearing on the question ; for 
it merely shows that these intermediate species once 
existed, not that they were transmuted out of, or into, 
other species. The boneless lancelet may come be- 
tween the vertebrate and the molluscous, without 



Chapters on Evolution ', pp. 144, 145. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 183 



belonging to either, nor have we any experience of one- 
type melting into another. 

On the analogy of a tree, man is not derived 
from the ape. The two are extremities of different 
branches, the point of connection being far lower 
down towards the common trunk. But in that case, 
where is the next before man, from which he was 
derived ? The chasm would be wide enough between 
man and the monkey; how much wider between man 
and the common ancestor of himself and the monkey t 
As we must not look to the ape, where must we look 
for our lineal pedigree ? Can nothing be found nearer 
than the fish, or possibly the lobster ? and are we to 
suppose the intervening species, perhaps thousands in 
number, are extinct and have left not a trace behind > 
After developing man at the end of their long series, 
are we to believe they, with every relic and fragment 
of them, disappeared, and left him alone intact ? And is- 
this to be accepted without evidence in order to meet 
the exigencies of a theory ? This demand on human 
credulity is not science. 

Support for transmutation is sought in the resemblances- 
of organs in different species. The arm of a man, the 
foreleg of a horse, the wing of a bird, the paddles 
of a whale, though diverse, bear a general likeness of 
structure, and to some extent of function, whence it: 
is concluded that they were actually developed from 
the same stock; which by no means follows. It is 
quite conceivable that their ancestors were quite as- 
distinct, and as diverse as themselves. Their resem- 
blances suggest a common cause, but one which was. 
capable of perceiving, and designing the resemblances 
along with the diversities. The many points of likeness. 



1 84 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

are so skilfully graduated; as to be due to nothing less 
than an intelligent cause. 

This brings us to the true explanation in the ideal 
plan of the universe, which must have been present 
to the mind of its Author, and according to which 
His work proceeded. Without a previous ideal, it is 
impossible to account for the systematic gradation 
of resemblances and diversities, extending from the 
highest to the lowest organisms. It is not essential 
to our argument that I should be able to state why 
such resemblances should have been in the ideal, any 
more than why there should have been the diversities. 
Enough that Theism alone finds the sufficient cause. 

An analogical argument in support of transmutation 
of species is attempted from the course of development 
in the individual. The human germ is a protoplasmic 
speck. In its embryonic growth it assumes the form 
of a large head, with a fish-like tail, and passes through 
several stages, gradually attaining to birth, sensation, 
external relations, childhood, and youth, ere its organs 
and life arrive at maturity. So, it is suggested, the 
species had a simple beginning, perhaps as a speck, 
then as an animalcule, and thus onward with increasing 
complexity, until the human organization was reached. 1 
Of course this is not evidence, but a suggestion, and 
a very weak one. Between the development of the 
individual from its germ and that of the race, or more 
strictly, of all living beings, the points of difference are 
so many and so great as to leave nothing in common 
but the general idea of growth and improvement. In 
the one case, the stages, or successive states, are all 



1 Wilson, p. 114. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 185 



homogeneous, differing only in degree, never aught but 
human despite the tail-like form ; in the other, the suc- 
cessive states are heterogeneous, now vegetable, then 
animal, now an animalcule, then a fish, then a bird, 
again a quadruped, and finally man. In the one case' 
it is a single line from the germ to the man; in the 
other, it is a germ, dividing as it develops, like a tree, 
into innumerable kinds. To infer the latter from the 
former deserves only to be regarded as a freak of fancy. 
It is contended that transmutation of species is coun- 
tenanced by the existence of rudimentary and apparently 
useless organs, such as the pocket attached to man's 
stomach, the wings of the ostrich, and the penguin, 
useless for flight, the teeth of ruminants which never 
cut the gum, and the ulna of the horse's foreleg or splint 
bone. It is supposed these organs have degenerated 
from want of "need" in the environment. Were the 
evidence of such deterioration conclusive, that would 
not be sufficient to prove transmutation of species; 
for the species may degenerate without becoming 
another species. 

Again, on the assumption of a plan in the mind of the 
Creator, there is no difficulty in understanding that He 
might prefer to proceed according to certain typical 
ideas admitting of endless diversity, conjoined with 
similarity, and resulting, under general laws, in rudi- 
mentary organs in the species, as well as exceptional 
abortions in the individual. Our knowledge, moreover, 
does not warrant us to say such organs are utterly 
useless in the whole economy of nature, though their 
utility may not yet be apparent to us. 

The same answer may suffice to the suggestion that 

man had once a tail because in other species the tail is 
■lo 



1 85 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



a prolongation of the spinal column. Whether the 
appendage be deemed an advantage or not, assuming 
that the Creator designed to produce one species with 
and another without it, there was surely no need to 
first produce it in the human, and then to remove it. 
The transmutationist has to forget, or deny the Creator's 
existence before he can see the need of man's having a 
tail in order to be deprived of it. 

But the reality of species is denied. The idea of 
species has been denounced as an " empty " and " crass 
superstition " of modern science. 1 Without endorsing- 
these sweeping terms, it must be admitted that the 
validity of species is losing its hold on some eminent 
scientists. The known actual variations of living organ- 
isms are so many and so gradual, from the lowest to the 
highest, as to render lines of demarcation between what 
we have been accustomed to regard as species, to say 
the least, indistinct. But the point to be kept in view is 
that the abandonment of the idea of species, would not 
silence, and probably would not weaken the clear testi- 
mony of nature to the existence of an Intelligent First 
Cause. Were we to repudiate all specific distinctions, 
a multitude of facts would still point direct to God. 
Nor would abolition of species imply that the higher 
forms of life had developed naturally out of the lower. 
It was as easy, and for aught we know as wise, for the 
Creator to originate each type of living beings separately, 
and make it reproductive of its own kind, as to educe 
one kind from another, or all from one. 

Our chief consideration here, however, is that, if 
transmutation of species or development of higher from. 



1 Lange, Hist. Materialism, vol. Hi., p. 27 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 1 87 



lower forms of life were established, it would necessitate 
an Intelligent, Almighty First Cause as plainly as does 
the old theory of species. The change would be in the 
creed of science, not of Theism. The evolution of all 
forms of life from one, or a few, according to invariable 
law, and in harmony with the entire system of the 
universe, is impossible without a God of amazing 
wisdom and power. 

(iii.) Continuity. Continuity can only be admitted with 
the proviso that it shall not so far exclude God from 
His own works, as to render it impossible for Him to 
intervene. The scientific principle of continuity is per- 
fectly consistent with this proviso. From similar results 
under similar conditions, we infer the reign of law. But 
in those data there is nothing to warrant the conclusion 
that the Being whose power made nature, and imposed 
its laws, could not intervene if He would. Admit the 
personality of God, and the opposite conclusion must be 
drawn. However improbable a miracle may be in ordi- 
nary circumstances, the continuity which would make 
it absolutely impossible in all circumstances, has not a 
shadow of evidence. This point guarded, it is beyond 
denial that, in conformity with natural law, cause and 
effect make up the whole course of events. 

(iv.) Protoplasm may be necessary to every living 
organism as a sine qua non or basis ; but it is not all 
that is meant by life. For, when death overtakes the 
organism, the protoplasm is dead. It is more than 
organization and protoplasm, and more than a 
" property of matter." It is something additional to 
matter. The nature of life is still inscrutable. 
^ (v.) Materiality of mind, as explained by some Evolu- 
tionists, is a mere assumption to make out a theory ; 



I 88 FJKST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

and is confuted by th$ essential disparity between 
the properties of matter and those of mind. There is 
evidently intercommunication between them ; but how ; 
the acutest philosophers are unable to conceive. No 
wonder it is so : the two substances are so essentially 
unlike that to identify them is impossible. Nor does 
the theory of Evolution necessitate their being con- 
founded with each other ; or resolved into a single 
substance. Were it established that all material events 
are evolved by natural processes, it would not thence 
follow that mind was evolved from matter. No facts 
yet discovered, and no argument yet constructed, will 
justify the statement that " whatever mental powers 
are exhibited by man, or by animals which possess a 
brain, or nerve centres of any kind, are the direct 
products of the nerve energy stowed up within the 
cells of the nerve centres ; and as we have seen, 
protoplasm constitutes the essential materies of these 
cells." 1 If the fate of Evolution depends on the truth 
of this assertion, it is doomed to fall. Mind can never 
be resolved into matter. 

(vi.) Morals Evolved. Not a jot more reasonable is 
the moral philosophy of Materialistic Evolutionists, 
who resolve conscience into an elaboration and product 
of the properties of matter. Consciousness bears in- 
dubitable witness to the radical difference between right 
and wrong, to intrinsic moral qualities of actions, and 
to moral freedom and responsibility, which no mere 
habit of association can account for. As to think, so 
also to will, to have remorse, to pass moral judgments, 
and to have a conscience, require what matter, however 

1 Chapters on Evolution, p. 75. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOIHV. 189 



organized and refined, can never supply. To accept 
this unsubstantiated theory of morals is to do violence 
both to our intellectual and our moral nature. 

Seeing then that the general principles of develop- 
ment by gradual and continual variation are perfectly 
compatible with intelligent Theistic belief, and with 
the Theistic arguments based upon nature; that 
the Atheistic elements sometimes associated with the 
theory of Evolution are not an essential part of it, 
but unfounded in, or refuted by evidence ; and that 
the scheme of nature is inexplicable without an In- 
telligent First Cause, we may conclude, with confidence, 
that there is nothing in scientific Evolution to silence 
or even weaken nature's many-voiced testimony to her 
Divine origin. 

iii. The Philosophy of the Infinite. 

Emanuel Kant in his Critique of Pure Reason en- 
deavoured to show that our ratiocinations lead to 
conclusions contradictory of each other, and are 
therefore unreliable as a guide to the knowledge of 
God. Accordingly he assailed all the usual lines of 
argument from nature, except the moral, and pronounced 
them inconclusive. He was inconsistent in excepting 
the moral argument. For it also is a process o*f 
inference. If the teleological proof be inadmissible 
because its result— the existence of God— is contrary 
to the result of some other course of reasoning, the 
same sort of contradiction will invalidate the Theistic 
proof reasoned from our moral nature. 

Kant could not divest himself of the ideas of an 
Infinite, Intelligent First Cause, as the explanation of 
the universe. But with him these ideas were " regu- 



190 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

lative" only, and not "speculative? that is to say, they 
are necessary in the human mind in order to explain 
phenomena, but we have no right to say they are the 
attributes of a real existence. The conception of God 
is but an hypothesis necessary for the explanation of 
nature. We cannot reconcile Kant's position with his 
avowed belief in God. Where it might have been 
expected that knowledge would sustain faith, Kant 
declared he must " abolish knowledge to make room for 
faith." 1 

Schelling and others sought rest from the unsettle- 
ment created by Kant in the subterfuge of Pantheism. 
Resolving the Infinite Being into " the one and all" 
(to ev koX ttccv), they affected to know Him by a kind 
of rapt vision, or rising into the consciousness of the 
infinite. They escaped some difficulties by running 
into greater. 

Even Sir William Hamilton, though avowedly anta- 
gonistic to Pantheism, did not entirely escape its taint 
when he adopted the phrase, " the one and all," for 
the infinite, which really left no room for creation, or 
finite existence as distinct from the infinite. At any 
rate, he supplied the germ from which Pantheism might 
be evolved when he laid down too literally that there is 
nothing in the effect which was not in the cause, a pro- 
position which in Dean Mansel's putting means that God 
amounts " to nothing less than the sum of all reality." 
Differing from Kant in many respects, Hamilton travelled 
some distance along the same Agnostic path, elaborating 
the doctrine that the infinite, the absolute, and the un- 
conditioned are to man unknown, and unknowable. 

1 P. XXXV 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. i 9 r 



Dr. Mansel, Hamilton's most distinguished disciple, in 
his Bampton Lectures (1858), pushed this species of 
Agnosticism still further against natural theology, and, 
more consistent than his predecessors, surrendered 
nearly the whole of the moral argument. 

On the other hand, this Hamiltonian philosophy has 
been combated with vigour and success by such writers 
as Cousin, M'Cosh, Maurice, Calderwood, and Conder. 
Cousin, though not free from the influence of Pantheism, 
rendered good service by vindicating the reality of our 
knowledge of the infinite. Calderwood hits many blots 
in the philosophy of Hamilton and Mansel; but in 
founding his reply on an intuitive knowledge of God, he 
assumes what is neither tenable in itself, nor needful 
for the purpose. M'Cosh, Janet, and Conder contend 
for the reality of knowledge in a way which leaves 
the Theistic arguments from causation clear, and 
invincible. 

It is one of the curiosities of this controversy that 
Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel resort to Agnosticism in 
defence of the Christian faith, while their principles of 
nescience are appropriated by Spencer and others in 
the service of Agnostic Atheism. Mansel's position was 
taken in recoil from the alleged consequences of Ration- 
alism. In decrying reason, he seems to assume that 
the only use to which its friends would apply it is to 
make it "supreme " arbiter in dealing with Divine things. 
"If reason," he writes, "is to be the supreme Judge 
of Divine Truths, it will not be sufficient to follow its 
guidance up to a certain point, and to stop when it is 
inconvenient to proceed further. There is no logical 
break in the chain of consequences, from Socinian- 
ism to Pantheism, and from Pantheism to Atheism, 



192 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



and from Atheism to Pyrrhonism ; and Pyrrhonism is- 
but the suicide of reason itself." 1 

Mr. H. Spencer seized on the principle of Hamilton 
and Mansel as the basis of a much more sceptical kind 
of Agnosticism, which excludes all proofs of God's 
handiwork drawn from nature, and separates know- 
ledge from religion. In the inscrutability of the ultimate 
power of religion and of science, he seeks the " recon- 
ciliation " of the two. 

The most formal and practical embodiments of 
Agnostic principles are found in the organized Secu- 
larism of Holyoake, and the Positivism of Comtek 
They agree with the Christian philosophers just named 
in denying the knowability of God, without accepting 
their belief in God. The result is Atheism, practical if 
not theoretical, negative if not positive. But in both 
these Atheistic systems, the exclusion of Divine things- 
is quite as much a matter of will as intellect. Secular- 
ists and Positivists welcome whatever considerations 
promise to discredit the knowledge and belief of God ; 
but independently of evidence pro or contra, the 
supernatural is ignored, not simply as beyond ascertain- 
ment, but as being a question of no great concern to 
man. Indeed, Comte, will not even allow the question 
of causation to be inquired into. By this prohibition 
he seeks to establish his Agnosticism on an ethical 
basis, rendering investigation into theology a derelic- 

1 Bamfiton Lectures, p. 19. 

2 Positivism has branched out variously, and gives different 
reasons for its existence. But that it finds countenance in 
the philosophy of the unknowable can scarcely be denied. 
Dr. Paulsen, an Agnostic, replies to Professor Flint by seeking 
to maintain that Theism is belief, but not knowledge. See 
Flint's Anti-Theistic Theories, p. 506. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 193 

tion of duty ; so far as duty can have any place in 
his system. The attempt, however, cannot ultimately 
succeed, inasmuch as it does violence to our necessary 
laws of thought, which though partially and temporarily 
over-ridden, will sooner or later reassert themselves 
with the irresistible force of nature. Despite all advice 
to the contrary, the human mind cannot but seek for 
causes of phenomena. Comte's Atheism looks like grim 
irony in the light of another part of his scheme. The 
saying of Voltaire, If there were no God, it would be 
necessary to invent one, finds illustration in the conduct 
of Comte, who, having banished God from his system, 
found it needful to substitute an object of worship in 
the shape of Humanity, or rather an abstract assemblage 
of all human virtues, objectively represented by a 
woman. 

In A Candid Examination of Theism the doctrine 
of the unknowable is made the basis of a scheme of 
argumentation designed to prove that neither Theism 
nor Atheism can be either affirmed or denied. The 
arguments are feeble enough as it is ; but take away the 
alleged unknowability of the supernatural appropriated 
from Hamilton, and the Atheistic fabric will fall to 
pieces. The writer demolishes Fiske's Cosmic Theism, 
which, accepting Spencer's Agnosticism, offers us for a 
God, an unknowable, unintelligent, impersonal, causal 
agency, or power, whose nature is neither matter nor 
spirit. Why the system should be called Theism 
rather than Atheism does not appear. But it claims 
lineal descent from the Agnosticism of Kant. 1 

The criterion by which the philosophy of the unknow- 

1 See Physicus, p. 129. 
9* 



,194 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

able is to be estimated is not so much the extent to 
which it has impressed itself on the thought of the age, 
or the number of its disciples, as its intrinsic quality of 
truth or falsity. 

Leading features. The following are characteristics 
•of the position assumed by Sir W. Hamilton and Dean 
Mansel. Belief in the infinite God is a duty, if not 
also a psychological necessity. We are " inspired with 
a belief in the existence of something unconditioned " 
beyond the sphere of all conceivable reality. "A God 
understood would be no God at all." Whether God 
exists, and whether His nature and character are as 
represented to us, reason can neither affirm nor deny. 1 
Our reason, faithfully followed, leads to conclusions 
mutually contradictory, e.g., a limited infinite, a condi- 
tioned absolute, an unchangeable Being changing, a 
something besides all, an indivisible Being consisting of 
parts. A direct revelation of the infinite nature of God 
is impossible. Our knowledge is trustworthy so far as it 
goes ; 2 but we cannot think the infinite, the absolute 
or the unconditioned. Finite knowledge of an infinite 
object is impossible. The co-existence of the infinite 
and finite is inconceivable. The infinite cannot be con- 
ceived as giving birth to the finite. Our conception of 
the infinite is a mere negation of thought. The con- 
ditioned, i.e., the conditionally limited, "is thus the only 
possible object of knowledge and of positive thought, 
— thought necessarily supposes condition ; " therefore 
whatever we think is conditioned and limited. What- 
ever is related is limited ; consequently a plurality of 

1 Mansel, p. 96. 

8 Ibid., xvii., xxix., 36, 118, 119. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 195 



beings or attributes is contradictory of the infinite. 
"The last and highest consecration of all true religion 
must be an altar— 'Ayvcoarw Sea— 1 To the Unknown 
and Unknowable God.' " 1 

Sir W. Hamilton presents four opinions of the un- 
conditioned. The first is his own, the second Kant's, 
the third Spelling's, and the fourth is that of Cousin,' 
viz., < 1, The unconditioned is incognizable and in- 
conceivable; its notion being only negative of the 
conditioned, which last can alone be positively known 
or conceived. 2, It is not an object of knowledge; 
but its notion, as a regulative principle of the mind 
itself, is more than a mere negation of the Conditioned. 

3, It is cognizable but not conceivable ; it can be known 
by a sinking back into identity with the Infinito-Absolute, 
but it is incomprehensible by consciousness and reflec- 
tion, which are only of the relative and the different. 

4, It is cognizable and conceivable by consciousness 
and reflection, under relation, difference, and plurality." 2 
The infinite and the absolute are spoken of abstractedly, 
in order to avoid too familiar reference to the Divine 
Being; but the whole bearing of the discussion must 
be understood as applying to real existence and not to 
mere abstractions. 

The principles of Hamilton's Agnosticism apply to 
philosophy as well as theology. Hamilton's words are 
Mansel's chosen motto, " No difficulty emerges in theo- 
logy which had not emerged in philosophy." The 
ignorance is not that of part of mankind, which has 
been overcome by the other part, and may by mental 

1 Hamilton, Dzsczisswns, pp 14, 15. 
Ibid., p. 12. 



I96 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

culture be overcome by all ; but a universal necessity 
of human nature, an ignorance which " exists in relation 
to the whole human race, as men, bound by the laws 
of man's thought," " from the cradle to the grave, from 
the creation to the day of judgment." 1 

Bearing of the question. The bearing of this philo- 
sophy on Theism is apparent. If it be true, all effort 
to know God by His works must fail. We have no 
way of escape from darkness. Ours is the " un- 
known God." Whatever ideas we form of Him, we 
can have no certainty of their correspondence to any 
reality. Even a finite God could only be the creature 
of fancy. Natural theology is lost. Nor is it easy 
to see how belief in God as infinite can be long 
retained after its rational supports are relinquished. 
To Hamilton or Mansel, nothing could have been 
more repugnant than the Materialistic Atheism which 
fortifies itself in Agnosticism. But how is it to be 
logically avoided if God cannot be known or conceived ? 
To fall back on belief without knowledge, if it could in 
some sort satisfy the believer, can have no fitness to 
convince the unbeliever. At any rate, Theistic argu- 
ment is irrelevant and worthless, if to know or conceive 
of God be an intellectual impossibility. 

A noteworthy inconsistency of this philosophy is 
that, while often referring to the future as intended to 
supply that knowledge of the Infinite Being which is 
impossible here, hoping for the state when we shall 
know as " we are known," it lays down a principle 
which renders that knowledge as impossible in the 
future as the present. Mansel especially teaches that 

1 Mansel's Hampton Lectures, p. 171. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 197 



our ignorance is the necessary result of our being 
finite ; but if so, as we shall never be infinite, we can 
never know the Infinite Being. 

Definitions. It is important at this stage to define 
the terms infinite, absolute, and unconditioned. Sir 
W. Hamilton sets down the last as the genus of which 
the other two are species — the infinite being the un- 
conditionally unlimited, and the absolute being the 
unconditionally limited, that is, the finished, per- 
fected, completed ; and so the infinite and absolute are 
contradictory opposites. He gives another meaning of 
the absolute as not " opposed to the infinite," viz., 
u what is aloof from relation, comparison, limitation, 
condition, dependence, etc. ; " but it is in the former 
sense that he chooses " exclusively " to employ the 
term absolute. In reply, Dr. Calderwood x has shown 
that to be limited is to be conditioned and restricted, 
which is an imperfection. Consequently the absolute 
cannot be limited. Moreover, the infinite is without 
imperfection, or incompleteness. Therefore the infinite 
is the absolute, and not its contradictory. Each may 
be predicated of the other — the infinite is absolute, and 
the absolute is infinite ; and each is unconditioned, 
that is, without restriction. For the purposes of our 
inquiry, therefore, the terms may be employed inter- 
changeably, as they generally have been by philosophers. 
Dr. Mansel writes, " By the absolute is meant that 
which exists in and by itself, having no necessary 
relation to any other being. By the infinite is meant 
that which is free from all possible limitation, that 
than which a greater is inconceivable, and which 



1 See Calderwood, On The I?i finite, p. 180. 



I98 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

consequently can receive no additional attribute or 
mode of existence which it had not from all eternity." L 
Omitting the last clause of the second definition, which 
is but an inference from the definition proper, the two 
definitions may be accepted as excellent. Following 
Hamilton, and winning the approval of Mansel, Dr. 
Calderwood says, " The only legitimate meaning which 
can be attached to the terms unconditioned and abso- 
lute is freedom from all restriction. The absolute is- 
that which, though actually related, is free from all 
necessary relation as a condition of existence." 2 Again, 
" The infinite expresses the entire absence of all 
limitation, and is applicable to the one Infinite Being 
in all His attributes." Dean Mansel accepts these 
definitions. 3 

It is of great importance to observe the distinction 
between relation and necessary relation. The latter 
implies that its subject is thereby conditioned, restricted, 
limited. Mere relation has no such implication. To say 
a thing is related affirms nothing as to whether it is 
limited or not. Between absoluteness of perfection and 
relation, there is no necessary contradiction. This dis- 
tinction neutralizes much of the reasoning of Hamilton 
and Mansel, which purports to show that knowledge 
of the infinite and absolute is self-contradictory. 
Mansel correctly defines the absolute as freedom from 
necessary relation, and then incorrectly argues as if it 
meant freedom from all relation. 

It is to be regretted that other definitions less sound 
than the above are sometimes expressed or assumed. 

1 Bamfiton Lectures, p. 30. 

2 The Infinite y pp. 177, 178. 

3 Bamfiton Lectures, p. 200. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 199, 



For example, the question is argued as if the infinite 
could refer only to duration or extension, that is, the 
quantitative infinite, overlooking the qualitative. If we 
speak of an Infinite Intelligence, we make no reference 
to duration, or space, but to quality, or degree of the 
quality. This is not a mathematical infinite; but 
infinite nevertheless, inasmuch as it is intelligence 
without restriction or imperfection. There is no in- 
congruity, or unintelligibility, in speaking of thought as- 
finite or infinite, provided we take the words in a sense 
corresponding to the nature of the subject. But in 
reasoning about God as of infinite presence, we must 
not assume that He is extended like matter, and thus- 
divisible into parts. Whatever the mystery of His- 
omnipresence, He can have no such relation to space 
as that which belongs to a divisible body ; nor does- 
He " occupy" space in the same way. There is no 
place where He is not fully present. " His centre is 
everywhere, His circumference nowhere." One may 
argue about the parts and whole of matter, but not 
of the Infinite One. 

The ruling question before us is, Can we know God as 
Infinite ? 

(I.) It is affirmed that to man the Infinite is incon- 
ceivable. Inconceivability is not here to be confounded 
with unimaginability, which has reference to an extended 
form pictured or imaged before the mind. Nor must it 
be confounded with mystery, which attaches to every 
truth, however clear. It is also important to distinguish 
between mentally conceiving of an object and embracing 
or comprehending it. Mansel seems to have lost sight 
of this difference when he concludes that " it is a duty,, 
enjoined by reason itself, to believe in that which we 



200 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



are unable to comprehend." 1 Yes, so long as it is 
"comprehend/' and not apprehend, the proposition 
may be accepted. But if that be all, the " philosophy 
of the unconditioned " breaks down ; for its essential 
i doctrine is that we cannot apprehend the infinite. It 
tends to obscure this distinction when Hamilton and 
others speak of thinking the infinite, rather than 
thinking of it. To think of the infinite is to think of 
something, not everything included therein, just as to 
think of a million of men or things is not to have direct 
cognition of every unit at once, or as to think of a 
grain of sand is not to directly and at once cognize 
every part into which it is divisible. If to think an 
object is to cognize or directly think of everything it 
includes, it is as impossible to think an apple as the 
infinite Being; for all the atoms of an apple, with all 
their qualities and relations, are far too numerous to be 
grasped in detail by one act of the human mind. To 
think of the Infinite God is to conceive of Him as 
infinite, in contradistinction to the finite. 

But in so conceiving of the infinite, we do not regard 
it as consisting of parts, but as being indivisible as 
truly as it is unlimited. Hence Hamilton is wide of 
the mark when he argues as if we began with a point 
of the infinite, and simply extended our notion to other 
points indefinitely, which would really be a process of 
imagination, imagining to ourselves a larger and larger 
form. Whatever idea in respect of parts or form may 
tend to attach itself to the proper notion of the infinite, 
that notion is not itself of a form, or of parts. 

(i) Conceivability of the infinite, it is intimated, 



1 Bamftton Lectures, p. 63, 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 201 



would logically land us in Pantheism, because the 
infinite must include all that exists ; otherwise it is not 
infinite. Hamilton, who disavowed Pantheism, seems 
to favour it when he speaks of the infinite as "the one 
and all." Adopt this definition, and neither Hamilton's 
philosophy, nor that I am opposing to it, can stand. 
Pantheism is inevitable. God is everything, and every- 
thing is God. But the definition simply begs the 
whole question. That the infinite is "the one and 
all " is the proposition which Pantheism has to prove, 
not the undisputed axiom from which to reason. 

In other places the aim of the Hamiltonians seems 
to be not to favour Pantheism, but to show that if we 
decline their philosophy, we are logically driven upon 
the rock of Pantheism. " The metaphysical represen- 
tation of the Deity, as absolute and infinite, must 
necessarily . . . amount to nothing less than the sum 
of all reality." 1 " < What kind of an absolute being is 
that/ says Hegel, ' which does not contain in itself all 
that is actual, even evil included ? ' We may repudiate 
the conclusion with indignation ; but the reasoning is 
unassailable " ! 2 So says Dr. Mansel. " The reasoning 
is unassailable " only if the false Pantheistic definition be 
allowed as the starting point. To those who reject the 
definition, Pantheism has no logical root in the con- 
ceivability of the infinite. 

(ii.) It is further contended that to affirm the con- 
ceivability of the infinite involves consequences mutually 
contradictory, that is to say, such conceivability is 
contradicted by its logical results. 

The law of contradiction is that a thing cannot both 

» Bamfton Lectures, p. 30. 2 Ibid., pp. 30, 31. 



202 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

be and net be. Self-contradiction is " the affirming and 
denying of the same statement." 1 Dr. M'Cosh says it 
is to affirm and deny the same attribute of the same 
subject at the same time. Kant is represented by one 
of his translators as meaning that "a conception is 
always possible if it is not self-contradictory." 2 We 
need not fear to test conceivability of the infinite by 
this rule. Where is the self-contradiction ? 

Dr. Mansel says, " I can only know two ideas to be 
contradictory by the distinct conception of both ; and 
where such a conception is impossible, there is no 
evidence of contradiction." 3 If then Dr. Mansel main- 
tains that the finite is contradictory of the infinite, he 
must have a " distinct conception " of both, in which 
case the infinite is no longer inconceivable. If, on the 
other hand, he has no conception of the infinite, " there 
is no evidence of contradiction." 

We are told, "to think is to condition." 4 Dr. 
Calderwood has thrown Hamilton's argument into the 
syllogistic form, thus: "To think is to condition; the 
infinite is the unconditioned ; therefore the infinite 
cannot be thought." 5 The fallacy lies in the major. 
To have any force the meaning must be, not that to 
think implies conditions in the subject or thinker ; but 
that it imposes conditions, that is, limits or restrictions, 
on the object thought about. But this is by no means 
the case. A mans thought of the sun, or Uranus, has 
no effect whatever on that luminary. Our thinking 



1 Jevons, Principles of Science, pp. 5 — $2, 

2 Pure Reason (Bohn's), p. 367. 
Bamftton Lectures, p. 293. 

4 Hamilton, Discussions, p. 14. 

5 The Infinite, pp. 198 — 254. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 20 



J 



of some Red Indian chief may no more affect him than 

our thinking of Alfred the Great can add to, or take from 

the conditions of his life. So to think of the Infinite 

God implies the conditions under which we think, but 

no restriction of God Himself. In thought there must 

be a subject thinking, and an object thought of; but 

we have good reason for dissenting from the further 

statement that these two necessarily limit each other. 

When God, as both subject and object, thinks of 

Himself, subject and object are both infinite — in fact, 

the same being: but when man thinks of God, the 

thought and the thinker are finite; but it does not 

thence follow that the object of thought is so. The 

conception is immeasurably inadequate to its object, 

but it apprehends the object nevertheless. 

Again, it is alleged that all relation is limitation, and 
that as all thought is relative, and cannot rise above 
the relative, it cannot rise to the infinite, which is not 
relative. The fallacy here is in assuming that the 
relative is always conditioned because it is so some- 
times. The Infinite God is not " the relative " as man 
is, that is to say, He is not conditioned, yet He is 
related ; and to think of Him as related is no derogation 
from His infinite excellence. Were He necessarily 
related, it would be a limitation. He would not then 
be absolute. He may, however, choose to be related 
as Cause, Ruler, or Proprietor, to the finite ; but while 
that conditions and restricts the finite, it has no such 
bearing on the Infinite. It brings Him under no 
restriction of power, intelligence, goodness, or per- 
fection. Whatever glory He had before, He retains 
after the relation commences. The Infinite Being may 
be related without being thereby limited, provided the 



204 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



relation be not necessary, but of His own choice, and 
determinable at His will. 

To think of the Infinite is declared to imply in Him 
many relations incompatible with infinity. 

For example, it is held that the Absolute canno't be 
conceived as cause, inasmuch as that would imply 
relation to another being, which would be a limitation 
on Him who caused, and render Him no longer 
absolute. Cousin goes to the opposite extreme, con- 
tending that the Infinite Being could not but cause ; 
thus making causation a necessity, and leaving no way 
of escape from the dilemma indicated by Hamilton and 
Mansel, except in Pantheism. It is only needful to 
compare the assertion that the Absolute cannot be 
a cause with Mansel's excellent definition. " By the 
Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, 
having no necessary relation to any other being." The 
term " necessary " makes all the difference. When the 
Absolute causes the finite to exist, since it is not done 
necessarily, there is no loss of absoluteness ; therefore 
the Absolute may be a cause. It is asked, how the 
Infinite can become a cause. I reply, He may be 
regarded either as potential, or as actual cause. As 
potential, ail power is in Him. Putting forth power, 
He becomes actual cause. Yet there is neither loss nor 
gain to His perfection, no change in Him for better 
or worse, nothing to affect His infinity. All power, 
wisdom, and glory remain His as much as ever, while 
causation may be the means of manifesting His glory. 

It is even argued that the Absolute and Infinite 
cannot be conceived as without any possible mode of 
existence, as that would be a lack of the property of 
limitation ; that is to say, His perfection necessitates 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 205 

His existing in every possible or conceivable mode, 
because the absence of any would be the want of 
something. Thus the lack of finiteness, or of any 
evil, moral or natural, would be a defect. On this 
principle, the absence from Him of causation, change, 
or restriction, would be an imperfection ; and such 
absence, therefore, is impossible to the Infinite. This 
shows, not the impossibility of the Infinite according 
to reason, but the absurdity of the principle on which 
the argument proceeds to such self-contradictory 
issues. 

Whatever would tarnish or diminish the perfection 
of God is precluded by His infinity and absoluteness. 
Consequently, His infinity cannot require that all modes 
of being — evil as well as good — shall be in Him. It is 
no imperfection that being perfectly just, He cannot act 
unjustly, or being perfectly benevolent, He cannot act 
malevolently. Is it a limitation of power that it is not 
limited ? Yes, according to Dr. Mansel's reasoning ; 
but the reasoning which leads to this self-contradiction 
must be inherently vicious. Dr. Mansel might retort 
that it results from our mode of reasoning, not his. 
But in truth, it results from reasoning, on Dr. Mansel's 
false principle that whatever is related is limited. If, as 
Dr. Mansel truly says, the Infinite is " that than which 
a greater is inconceivable," it is clear His infinity cannot 
include His having finite modes and qualities, which 
would certainly render Him less than He is, or than 
our highest conception of Him. 

Following Mansel, Mr. H. Spencer says, "To think 
of the First Cause as totally independent is to think 
of it as that which exists in the absence of all other 
existence, seeing that if the presence of any other exist- 



206 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

ence is necessary, it must partially depend on that 
other existence, and so cannot be the First Cause." x 
Existence is here confounded with necessary existence. 
The first statement, "To think of the First Cause as 
totally independent is to think of it as that which exists 
in the absence of all other existence" is utterly baseless. 
It is rather to think of it as co-existent with " other 
existence." In the latter clause of the sentence the 
word " necessary " is sophistically slipped in; for the 
argument is worthless unless the idea of necessary 
existence be included. But as it is not in the premisses, 
— the first clause — it ought not to be in the conclusion 
— the latter clause. Insert the word necessary in the 
premisses, and it must be admitted that to think of such 
First Cause is to think of it as existing in the absence 
of all other necessary existence. But when that is done it 
does not consequently " partially depend on" any " other 
existence," and so it does not follow that " it cannot 
be the First Cause." If Mr. Spencer simply meant 
that an effect is necessary to an actual cause, i.e., action 
must have a result, it is perfectly true ; but that does 
not imply the dependence of the cause upon its effect, 
and so would not answer Mr. Spencer's purpose. If, as 
Cousin held, the effect were necessary, then the cause 
would be so far conditioned by the necessity ; but the 
hypothesis under notice includes no such necessity. 
In thinking of the First Cause, we think of that which 
might have existed "in the absence of all other 
existence," though not as actual cause. 

Mr. Spencer adds, "The First Cause can have no 
necessary relation within itself. There can be nothing 

1 First Principles, p. 38. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2Dy 



in it which determines change, and yet nothing which 
prevents change. For if it contains something which 
imposes such necessities or restraints, this something 
must be a cause higher than the First Cause, which is 
absurd." But " this something " being " contained " in 
the same being, it cannot be higher "than it, that is, 
higher than itself. It is " absurd " to say the internal 
powers of a thing are greater than the whole thing 
itself. Where " change " is nothing more than freely 
entering into the relation of actual cause, involving 
neither loss nor gain to the nature or perfection of the 
cause, there is no restriction in the being, nor absurdity 
in our conception of it as absolutely perfect. 

Again, it is contended that absoluteness and infinity 
are merely negative, because relation is implied in 
plurality and distinction, as, for instance, where more 
than one being exists, or where the one Infinite Being 
has more than one attribute. 

As to co-existence of the finite, the same kind of 
refutation holds here as before. Dr. Mansel says two 
or more infinite attributes would be a plurality of 
infinites, which is impossible. This is to confound 
attributes with existence. It is often convenient to 
individualize, and sometimes to personify the per- 
fections of God, or the several aspects of His one 
indivisible perfection; but strictly speaking, there is 
but one Infinite Being — infinite in all respects. Viewed 
in this light, His omnipresence is not limited by His 
eternity, nor His infinite power by His infinite know- 
ledge. There is no ontological division of His attributes. 
Their separation is in our conception only. We speak 
of them as if they were so many entities, whereas they 
are the different manifestations of His one simple 



208 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

entity. To speak of the several attributes as if they 
were so many different, or parallel mathematical lines, 
is well enough as a metaphor, but intolerable as meta- 
physical philosophy. 

In the same way Dr. Mansel considers infinity and 
personality as mutually contradictory, because personality 
implies a plurality of attributes, which is sufficiently 
met by the answer just given. Divine intelligence and 
moral excellence — both infinite in the sense applicable 
to these qualities, that is qualitative rather than 
quantitative — are in no wise contradictory of each 
other, or of the simplicity of the Divine nature. The 
one has no fitness or tendency to limit the other. They 
are not two beings, but two harmonious qualities of 
the same Being. 

If God's thoughts were as ours — if He, like us, 
acquired intelligence by observation, reflection, and 
reasoning, that would amount to a condition or restric- 
tion. But the Omniscient cannot be thus dependent. 
With Him there can be no such thing as acquiring 
knowledge or wisdom. All finite actualities, and all 
infinite possibilities, in Himself or the universe, are 
eternally and perfectly known. With us all conscious- 
ness consists in a succession of states of consciousness, 
which is limitation ; it cannot be so with Him to whom 
the darkness is as the light. 

Further, we are told we can only conceive of the 
Infinite One as existing under the conditions of time 
and space. In reply to the conclusion of Dr. Mansel 
that " if all objects of human thought exist in time, no 
such object can be regarded as exhibiting or repre- 
senting the true nature of an infinite being," Prof. 
Calderwood shows " (i) That succession in conscious- 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2CQ 



ness does not necessarily involve the recognition of 
transition or mutation in the objects presented." Our 
thought of God's ceaseless existence may be a suc- 
cession of states of consciousness in us without our 
thinking of His existence as a succession of states. 
(2) That duration in existence does not necessarily 
involve succession, (3) That the Infinite Being, as 
above succession, and yet having an eternal duration, 
is not beyond the sphere of knowledge and thought, 
because of the subjection of consciousness to the law 
of time. In apprehending an object, we are conscious 
of a succession in time, or passing from one portion of 
time to a later. But the succession may be only in 
our mode or states of consciousness ; and when the 
existence of an eternal being is the object, we err if we 
attribute the succession to Him. 

As to space, God, being spirit and not matter, is not 
mathematically extended. We may think of a point or 
portion of space, and multiply it to any extent ; but that 
is a process of imagination in which we are continually 
enlarging our mental picture, and it is very different 
from the true conception of infinite space. The latter 
is a simple notion, to which the notion of parts is 
unnecessary and alien. Dr. Calderwood was convinced 
by Hamilton that space and time must be excluded 
from our idea of the infinite. Others, not without 
reason, still hold that we have distinct conceptions of 
infinite time, and infinite space. On either view, the 
notion of parts co-existent, or successive, is not at all 
essential to the notion of an infinite being. 

By similar arguments it is contended that the infinite 



1 Calderwood, On The Infinite, pp. 307, 2> 2 2>* 
10 



210 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

is impossible of conception, because it is contradictory 
of difference or distinction, and, Mr. Spencer adds, of 
likeness also, difference and likeness being inseparable 
from our conception of the infinite. Virtually these 
and other objections of the same class are answered 
already. So far as the ground of objection is in the 
relation of the Infinite Being, such relation is not 
contradictory of infinity, so far as there is actual 
limitation, that is, in the finite thinker, and not in the 
infinite object of thought. It is no limitation of Him- 
self that He is different from all others. Supposing 
none but He were existent, it is conceivable that 
He could cognize Himself either without distinction 
from, or in contradistinction to possible finite beings. 
It was not necessary for another to exist in order to 
His knowing Himself. 

Having pointed out the unsoundness of the argu- 
ments against, let us now turn to those in favour of the 
conceivability of the infinite. 

(hi.) It is implied in the belief of the Infinite. Hamil- 
ton writes of the doctrine of the Infinite Being, it 
""is, must, and ought to be believed," and by 
this reservation hopes to save mankind from the 
utter loss of true religion ; that is, by requiring us to 
believe as true what, according to our reason, is false. 
But to do away with thought of the object of belief is 
to do away with belief itself. 1 Whatever is an object 

1 " Every man is conscious that he can conceive a thousand 
things of which he believes nothing at all, as a horse with 
wings, a mountain of gold ; but although conception may be 
without any degree of belief, even the smallest belief cannot 
be without conception. He that believes must have some 
conception of what he believes ; . . . conception enters as an 
ingredient in every operation of the mind." " We can neither 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 211 



of belief must be an object of thought. Truth is the 
object of belief, and truth is incompatible with a mental 
state which does not apprehend it. The object of 
belief may be stated in the form of a proposition, e.g., 
God exists, the soul of man is immortal, there will be 
retribution after death, or, Christianity has existed 
eighteen centuries ; or it may be the intuitive belief 
that an event is never uncaused, or that the whole is 
greater than its part, in each of which cases there is 
presented what purports to be a truth, as the object on 
which faith fixes, a truth from which other truth may 
be deduced. That every event must have a cause 
may be an object of belief; but suppose it announced 
to one who disbelieves it ; there is still a conception in 
the disbeliever's mind of what is meant by the statement. 
His refusing to trust in it makes the proposition none 
the less a symbol of an idea cognizable by his in- 
tellect. 

Nothing is believable that is not thinkable. What 
kind of belief is that in which there is no thought of 
the object of belief ? Belief is often a moral process ; 
it is always an intellectual one. It may dispense with 
proof, but it cannot dispense with the mental percep- 
tion of its object. If our " primary beliefs " in many 
cases involve other truths deduced from them, they 
must be themselves truths, and capable of apprehension. 
To name an object of belief is to name an object of 
thought. We must think of what we believe. Hence 
it follows that we cannot believe in God as infinite 
without thinking of Him as such. 



judge of a proposition, nor reason about it, unless we con- 
ceive or apprehend it " (Hamilton's Ediiion of Reid, pp. 360- 
735)- 



212 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

In reply, it is pleaded that faith and conception are 
not commensurate — that we may believe more than 
we can conceive. Dr. Calderwood admits that belief 
embraces more than knowledge. I am compelled to 
doubt this. That about which we believe may exceed 
our utmost stretch of comprehension, but it also equally 
exceeds our utmost stretch of faith. We believe in 
God, but not in anything in Him of which we have no 
thought. We believe that there is much in God which 
we have not thought, and we also think the same 
proposition. We cannot cognize all there is in the 
Infinite, neither can we believe it all. We can believe 
that God is infinite, and we can think the same, but 
can neither believe nor think all that is comprehended 
by the term infinite. 

To suppose the object of faith broader than that of 
thought is to suppose the object of faith divided into 
parts, one part being the object of thought, and the 
whole the object of faith. But if thought be not 
necessary to faith in the part which is not cognized, it 
is not necessary to the other part, that is to say, it is 
necessary to none, and faith is possible without thought, 
which is contrary to what Dr. Calderwood has already 
proved. If from the nature of belief cognition is 
necessary to one part of faith's object, it is, for the 
same reason, necessary to every part. As is often 
remarked, we may be able to believe that a thing is, 
without being able to believe how it is ; but the same 
remark holds good of thought, and thus cognition 
keeps pace with belief. Consequently belief of the 
Infinite implies a conception of the same. 

After asserting that the " Absolute is conceived merely 
by a negation of conceivability," Hamilton adds, " By a 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 21 3 



wonderful revelation we are thus, in the very conscious- 
ness of our inability to conceive aught above the 
relative and finite, inspired with a belief in the exist- 
ence of something unconditioned beyond the sphere 
of all comprehensible reality." Mr. H. Spencer cor- 
rectly remarks that " the -last of these assertions 
practically admits what the other denies." He also 
points out that Mansel falls into the same inconsistency 
in the words, "We are compelled, by the constitution of 
our minds, to believe in the existence of an absolute 
and infinite being— a belief which appears forced upon 
us, as the complement of our consciousness of the 
relative and the finite." 1 

(iv.) Appealing to consciousness, we find conception of 
the infinite a psychological and unavoidable fact. When 
we read that « His understanding is infinite," and that 
it is unreasonable to " limit the Holy One of Israel ; " 
when we address Him as absolutely perfect, and 
ascribe to Him alone infinite excellence; when we 
carry on meditation and discussion respecting His 
infinite greatness, there must be some conception 
represented by these words. Many leaders of thought 
and multitudes of ordinary minds hesitate not to speak 
of infinity as something of which they think without 
difficulty. They pretend not to think of all it implies, 
yet they have a distinct and positive notion of God as 
infinite. How otherwise could Agnostics and their 
opponents argue the alleged consequences of infinity ? 
To compare the infinite with the finite can only be done 
by those who have a conception of both. The notion is 
abroad in the human mind, and refuses to be dislodged. 



1 First Principles, p. 92. 



214 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



Sir W. Hamilton attempts to explain away our 
conception of the infinite as merely a negation of the 
finite. He says, " They " (the infinite and absolute) " can 
be conceived only by thinking away from, or abstrac- 
tion of, those very conditions under which thought 
itself is realized ; consequently the notion of the un- 
conditioned is only negative — negative of the conceivable 
itself." 1 Dean Mansel follows in the same track : " The 
Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable 
and the Imperceptible , names indicating, not an object of 
thought or consciousness at all, but the mere absence 
of the conditions under which consciousness is possible." 2 
These are but paralogical statements of the thesis, 
having the form without the power of argument. 
Grant that thought cannot be realized except on 
conditions which restrict it to the finite, and of course 
it is impossible to think of the infinite. But that 
limitation of thought is precisely the question in 
dispute. I deny that such are the only conditions 
of thought. 

Our idea of the infinite is said to be a mere negation ; 
that is to say, not a negation or absence of thought, but 
a positive thought of a negation or nothing. Now the 
antithesis to a finite being is not an abstraction, but an 
infinite being, and thus understood, our positive idea 
is by no means of a mere negation. The question is 
whether God as infinite is something, or nothing to our 
thought. It cannot be settled etymologically by the 
negative prefixes, such as m-finite, z/w-conditioned, 
tttt-limited. We adopt these terms to represent anti- 
theses. But they no more imply mere negation than 



1 Discussions, p. 13. 2 Bamfiton Lectures, p. 63. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 21$ 

do zVz-decent, //z-human, un- natural, zw-alienable, ex- 
changeable, z///-believing, ^-subordinate, «w-answerable, 
and z/w-pertinent. We are obliged to use such terms 
as our poverty of language will permit. But we may 
also indicate the same idea by positive terms, as when 
we speak of God as the Perfect Being, or of any one 
of His attributes as perfect according to its kind. 
His infinity is synonymous with His perfect power, 
intelligence, or duration. The notion of the finite is 
the necessary complement to that of the infinite ; 
but that no more proves the infinite a mere negation 
than it proves the finite to be the same. Our con- 
ception of the infinity of God is not only a real con- 
ception, but a conception of a reality. The words 
convey an intelligible meaning of a great and positive 
excellence, and are not mere symbols of our imbecility 
to think. 

" The very consciousness of our own limitation of 
thought bears witness," says Mansel, "to the existence 
of the Unlimited, who is beyond thought. The shadow 
of the Infinite still broods over the consciousness 
of the finite." 1 True, He is " beyond thought," as 
He is incomprehensible ; but how can we have this 
" witness to the existence of the Unlimited " without 
thinking of the Unlimited ? Is " the shadow of the 
Infinite " brooding over the consciousness of the finite 
a mere negation ? Dean Mansel writes, " The Infinite 
as such is not an object of human thought." It is " the 
mere negation of thought." 2 If so, as all nothings are 
alike, the negation of the finite world must be just the 



1 Bamp'ton Lectures, p. 80. 

2 Ibid., pp. 223-tf. 



2l6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



same as the negation of the extended, or of the 
material, or of the intelligent, that is, the infinite, the 
unextended, the unintelligent, are in themselves all the 
same— each is nothing. To Hamilton's defence on this 
point that " correlations certainly suggest each other, 
but correlations may or may not be equally real and 
positive " (e.g., the finite and the infinite, the divisible 
and the indivisible), and so the infinite may be nothing 
but a negation of reality, Mr. H. Spencer answers, " In 
the antithetical notion of the Unlimited, the con- 
sciousness of limits is abolished, but not the con- 
sciousness of some kind of being." If all such 
correlations were nothing else but negation of the 
positive, " it would clearly follow that negative contra- 
dictories could be used interchangeably : the Unlimited 
might be thought of as antithetical to the divisible, 
and the indivisible as antithetical to the limited, while 
the fact that they cannot be so used proves that in 
consciousness the Unlimited and the Indivisible are 
qualitatively distinct, and therefore positive or real, 
since distinction cannot exist between nothings." * 

The argument of Hamilton that we cannot conceive 
of the infinite because we cannot conceive infinitely is 
manifestly fallacious. Distinguishing between subject 
and object of thought, it is clear that thought of the 
infinite is not the same as infinite thought. The latter 
is impossible to a finite thinker ; but to think of an 
object as infinite is, in man, a finite act. Here lies one 
of the chief mistakes of the negative philosophy. It 
confounds the limitation of our thinking with that of 
the Infinite Being of whom we think. The infinity of 



1 First Principles , p. 90. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 21 J 

God presents to our minds a distinct conception, which 
they are able to appreciate, on which they can reason, 
and by which God is to them differentiated from other 
beings. The question of impotence is settled by matter 
of fact. The readiness with which we conceive of 
the infinity of God proves that we are not impotent to 
do so. 

Nay, more ; our notion of the infinite is not only of 
something positive, but the necessary complement of our 
conception of the finite. We cannot think of the finite 
as such without thinking of its correlative, the infinite. 
We may think of nature without reference to its 
extent or limits; but no sooner does the idea of its 
being finite arise, than the antithesis also arises — the 
notion of infinity. The conception is thus seen to be 
not only possible, but unavoidable. Let the idea once 
occur to the mind, and it can no more be cast off than 
the notion of the finite. 1 



We find within ourselves the idea of infinity, i.e., immen- 
sity and eternity, impossible, even in imagination, to be 
removed out of being " (Butler's Analogy, part I., chap 6) 

In answer to Locke's remark that the idea of infinity is very 
obscure (though Locke speaks of the infinity of God and of 
space); Cousin pertinently observes, "But obscure or not 
obscure, is it in the intelligence ? That is the question, and 
obscure or not obscure, it is your duty as a philosopher, if it 
is real, to admit, whether you can elucidate it or not " To 
Locke s statement that we have no positive idea of infinite 
space, Cousin replies, "There is no more an idea of succes- 
sion without the idea of time, than an idea of time without the 
previous idea of succession, and no more an idea of body 
without the idea of space, than an idea of space without the 
previous idea of body, that is, there is no more an idea of 
the finite without the idea of the infinite, than there is an idea 
of the infinite without the previous idea of the finite, whence it 
follows that, m strictness, these ideas suppose each other and 
it any one wishes to say it, reciprocally limit each other ■ 



2l8 * FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



It is admitted by the negative philosophers that we 
have a " regulative " notion of the infinite, which may 
or may not correspond to the reality, but which " may 
be sufficient for our practical guidance," 1 whence it 
would appear that even Dr. Mansel feels bound to 
associate something positive with the word infinite. 
An idea of " nothing " would not be " sufficient." True, 
he immediately explains the infinite to be the " in- 
definite." But even the indefinite is not the same as 
nothing. But the infinite is not the indefinite. The 
indefinite is subjective, while the infinite is objective to 
our thought. The indefiniteness is in our thought of a 
thing; the infinity is in the thing itself. When we 
widen more and more our conception of an object, the 
change is in our conception, not in the object; but 
when we think of a being as infinite, the process of 
widening our view is no part of that mental act. The 
infinite is as great at our first conception of it, as at 
any later stage. Thus the infinite and the indefinite 
are not identical, either in themselves, or in our con- 
ception of them. The "regulative" explanation of 
our ineradicable notion of the infinite proves altogether 
unsatisfactory. 

(2.) It is also affirmed, with more or less of the same 
meaning as in the case of conception, that the Infinite 

is unknowable. 

In this controversy to know is often used as synony- 

consequently the idea of the infinite is no more the negative 
of that of the finite, than the idea of the finite is the negative 
of that of the infinite ; they are negatives on the same ground, 
or they are both positive, for they are both simultaneous 
affirmations, and every affirmation contains a positive idea 
(Hist. Modern Philosophy, vol. 11., p. 195). 

1 Mansel, Hampton Lectures, pp. xx. to xxvm. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 219 



mous with -conceiving or thinking, that is, to construe 
to the mind, or cognize an object as existent. Know- 
ledge is said to be "the recognition of objects as 
existing." A few points remain to be noted in addi- 
tion to what has been said against inconceivability. 
"Believe in order to know," and "know in order to 
believe," are both right in their respective places. 
The trustworthiness of sensation, and of our laws of 
thought must be believed in order to our knowing 
external nature. Much must be taken on trust from 
our parents, teachers, historians, travellers, and scientific 
investigators, in order to the extension of our know- 
ledge. On the other hand, what we believe must be 
presented to the intellect for cognition, though not 
necessarily for reflection, ere it can be relied on as 
true ; e.g., the intuitive beliefs and the conclusions of 
science must be cognized in order to be depended upon, 
(i.) The negative philosophy makes much of the 
relativity of all our knowledge, that is, there is always 
the relation of subject (knowing) and object (known), 
whence it is unwarrantably inferred that subject and 
object necessarily condition each other. But to know 
the infinite no more limits it than to think of it. The 
perfection of God is not affected for better or worse 
by our knowledge of it. 

It is alleged that we cannot have finite knowledge of 
an infinite object. But we can. We may " know in 
part" the Infinite Being, which is very different from 
knowing parts of Him. The former is to have a partial 
knowledge, correct so far as it goes, of Him as infinite. 
The finite mind cannot include the Infinite, but it may 
know that He is infinite. If knowledge must include 
all that is included in its object, that is, a distinct per- 



220 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

ception of every ultimate element of which it consists, 
we can know nothing. For our knowledge of finite 
things is never complete; e.g., we know the sun as a 
luminous body of such and such dimensions, but not all 
that includes as such a body ; and so of an atom. 
Our knowledge of things finite, or infinite, is not unreal 
because it is inadequate. We cannot believe that a 
thing is, without believing, to some extent, what it 
is ; for the terms are unintelligible if no quality of 
the object be cognized. But to cognize is to know. 
To believe in God, we must see what He is, though 
we are unable to believe or know all that He is. x 

The "relativity of knowledge" is also taken in the 
sense that no object can be thought of except in 
relation to another, or in distinction, and, consequently, 
" that two objects are the smallest number required to 
constitute consciousness, that a thing is only seen to 
be what it is by contrast with what it is not." This is 
anything but unquestionable. The act of comparison or 
contrast may be a process quickly, and, as matter of 
fact, perhaps universally following, yet distinct from, 
and not essential to, the nature of consciousness. " The 
mind," says Dr. M'Cosh, " commences, we may suppose, 
with a perception, — which is knowledge, — of an external 
object, and a consciousness, — which is knowledge, — of 



1 Dr. Calderwood has culled a sufficient number of sentences 
from the negative philosophers to convict them of incon- 
sistency, e.g., from Hamilton : " ' God exists for us as we have 
faculties capable of apprehending His existence.' ' From 
Mansel: " ' It is by consciousness alone that we know God 
exists. ... It is only by conceiving Him as a conscious 
Being that we can stand in any religious relation to Him at 
all.' " He who knows himself " ' will at least be content to 
knczv so much of God's nature as God Himself has been 
pleased to reveal' " (Calderwood, On 2 he Infinite, p. 294). 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2 2I 



self as perceiving the object. Then it remembers, and 
in doing so has a belief in the object which has been 
perceived. In all this there is no comparison, but 
having this, the mind can forthwith institute a com- 
parison, and pronounce a judgment." 1 As turned to 
account by the school of J. S. Mill, the " relativity of 
knowledge " necessitates the existence of more than one 
being from eternity. That consequence is avoided by 
rejecting the doctrine of relativity as invariably of the 
essence of the most simple perception or thought. Dis- 
tinction brings the object out into relief, and is habitual 
in our way of looking at things ; but we can easily 
conceive of a simple direct perception of the quality of 
an object as taking place, before the perceiving mind 
begins to compare the object with, or to distinguish it 
from others. 

(ii.) Knowledge, like conception, is necessary to belief. 
Belief sometimes denotes opinion, or inclination to 
regard as true what is not positively known. In the 
question under discussion, it means certain reliance on 
something as indubitably true. Faith without appre- 
hension of its object is no faith at all. If the object 
be not known, no intellectual use can be made of it, 
no inference drawn from it, no conduct reasonably 
based upon our belief in it. In no sense could it be 
treated as a truth; for truth is apprehended by the 
intellect or knowing faculty. An element of belief is 
intellectual assent. But how can the intellect assent 
to that of which it has no consciousness ? Faith in a 
being of which we have no knowledge would be the 
same as faith in any other unknown being, i.e., faith in 



1 Exam. Mill's Philosophy, p. 2^. 



222 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



no certain or definite object. If God be altogether 
unknowable, faith, though said to be in Him ; can no 
more attach our minds to Him than to any other being 
of whom we are utterly ignorant. All unknown objects 
are alike to our consciousness. Clearly faith cannot 
exist apart from knowledge. 

Dr. Mansel says, "We are bound to believe that 
God exists, and to acknowledge Him as our Sus- 
tainer and moral Governor, though we are wholly 
unable to declare what He is in His own absolute 
essence." * Then it would appear the object of faith 
is not that which is unknowable, but that which is 
known, and ought to be acknowledged ; this involves 
the condemnation of Mansel's theory. But what God 
is to our belief He is known to be. All that is implied 
in His absolute essence is a direct object of neither 
our knowledge, nor our belief. At the same time we 
believe, and think, and know that He is absolute. 

I am unable to agree with Dr. Calderwood's conces- 
sion that the object of faith is wider than that of know- 
ledge or conception. When we believe that God is 
infinite, we think and know the same. When we 
know the cause gives rise to the effect, but not how 
it causes, the same is true of our belief on the subject. 
We know that God is omnipresent, omniscient, self- 
existent, and infinite, but not how He is so. And as 
little do we believe how He is so. What is out of the 
reach of thought and knowledge is beyond the compass 
of belief. Of God as infinite, we may have a concep- 
tion and knowledge, partial, inadequate, progressive, 
and our belief in Him as infinite is also partial, inade- 



1 -Bamftton Lectures, p. 112. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 22$ 



quate, and progressive. Faith can only see as far as 
its own mind sees. We believe God is infinite, and 
we know the same. It is said we believe in mysteries 
which our knowledge cannot fathom. Explained, this 
only means that we perceive and believe truths con- 
nected with things of which we are, and perhaps must 
ever remain ignorant. But that, of which we are utterly 
ignorant and unconscious, is also beyond the object 
of our belief. How three Divine Persons inhere in 
one Godhead we neither know nor believe, yet we 
know and believe that three Divine Persons do inhere 
in the one Godhead. Faith believes what reason can- 
not explain, not what it cannot think or know. By 
faith in the Divine testimony we may ascertain truths 
which reason could not otherwise descry, yet all the 
truth thus gained is known, as well as believed. I 
venture to think Dr. Calderwood's refutation of the 
negative philosophy would have been more complete 
had he taken this ground, instead of denying part of 
the object of belief as an object of knowledge. For 
Dr. MansePs disciples might retort that if part of the 
object of faith may be unknown, why not another, or a 
greater part ? And why not the whole ? A rejoinder 
of no force as against the view adhered to in the fore- 
going criticism. 

3. The word knowledge is often used to signify, 
not merely recognition of an object as existing, but the 
certainty thereof on sufficient grounds. It is in this 
sense that many Agnostics turn Hamilton's philosophy 
to an Atheistic account. Divine things, say they, can- 
not be ascertained, because the Infinite and Absolute 
are inconceivable, and because no evidence is available. 
The philosophers of the Unknowable yield all in this 



224 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

direction, and seek to retain religion by falling back on. 
a necessary Agnostic belief in the Infinite and Absolute 
God. Dr. Calderwood and others endeavour to meet 
this form of scepticism by insisting on an intuitive 
belief in God. It is better met by showing the nega- 
tive philosophy unsound, thus cutting the ground from 
under the feet of modern Agnosticism, and by clearly 
presenting the witness of nature, especially in causation,. 
to the reality and greatness of its intelligent First 
Cause. The Comtist, if the negative philosophy be 
true, may be justified in declining to consider the 
question of evidence for the existence of an infinite 
God. But seeing that the philosophy is erroneous, he 
is, in reason, bound to look into the claims of Theism,, 
with a view to arriving at a just, and practical decision 
according to the evidence. 

4. It is no recommendation of the negative philo- 
sophy that it is fitted to undermine both the faith and 
fervour of religious devotion. According to its teaching, 
God may or may not be what we think Him, however 
pure our faith. Our best views are " not what God is 
in Himself, but what He wills that we should think of 
Him." 1 Knowing this, how can we admire, love, and 
confide in One whose attributes, for aught we know, 
may be the opposite of those which command our trust, 
love, and adoration ? What kind of believing is that 
which is combined with a consciousness that the object 
of belief may be in all respects opposite to what we 
believe Him ? This associated consciousness must 
tend to destroy the very foundations of belief. If what 
God " wills us to think " may not be true, on the same 

1 Mansel, Bump" ton Lectures, p. 84. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 22$ 



principle, our thinking of Him as so willing may not 
be true, and so on interminably, leaving us destitute of a 
true thought concerning Him. To believe in what we 
are aware may be a falsehood about the Supreme Being 
is bad enough, but to be necessitated to believe it is 
still worse. What sort of religion must that be of 
which this is the philosophy ? 

" Our love toward God," says Dr. Mansel, 1 " if it is 
to be love at all, must not be wholly unlike our love 
towards our neighbour." Then should He not have 
a character fitted to be the object of such love, that is, 
such as we are accustomed to think it— holy, loving,' 
true, wise, and almighty ? If these ideas of Him are 
false, it may be the same as to His supremacy, and 
even His very existence. This philosophy, though 
begun by Christian men, and in the behalf of religion, 
when carried out, really saps the foundations of religion! 
5. This philosophy degrades and discredits human 
reason in the sphere of philosophy as well as in that of 
religion. The principles which, if sound, deprive us of 
God, imply that there can be no such thing as mind 
distinct from body; no body, no efficient causation, 
neither noumen, nor phenomenon, neither unity nor 
plurality, neither moral liberty nor necessity, in fact 
no philosophy whatever, because every one of these 
positions leads to contradiction. The doctrine of the 
Unknowable, says Hamilton, 2 "can supply not merely 
the only satisfactory solution, but the only solution 
at all " ; that is, by consigning the inquirer to inevitable 

' Bampton Lectures, 86. The merely " regulative " ideas of 
Kant, Hamilton, and Mansel are reproduced in different form 
by Spencer, First Princ, p. 68. 

2 Discussions, p. 632. 



226 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

ignorance. Bodily perception, says Mansel, " reposes, 
in its ultimate analysis, upon a mystery no less in- 
soluble than that which envelops the free agency of 
man in its relation to the Divine omniscience." * 

Evidently mystery " insoluble " is here mistaken for 
contradiction ; and all opposing schools of philosophy 
are gratuitously set down as equally rational, or irra- 
tional. Philosophy will, no more than theology, 
consent to be thus summarily dismissed. u How can 
these things be ? " is an unanswerable question, un- 
derlying every clear truth, but no contradiction of the 
truth itself. How can one thing cause another ? 
How can mind and matter intercommunicate ? How 
can moral freedom co-exist with dependence ? How 
can there be unextended substance ? How can the 
mind intuitively perceive truths? may be unanswerable 
questions, each involving a fathomless mystery ; but 
they are not contradictions. As Mr. H. Spencer 
observes, 2 " we cannot conceive of any explanation 
profound enough to exclude the question — What is the 
explanation of that explanation ? " But in neither 
science nor religion does the fact of any unfound 
explanation necessarily imply a contradiction of what 
is known. The doctrine of one school that the thinking 
substance is material, and of another that it is im- 
material, are mutually contradictory ; but it does not 
follow that both are false, or unknowable. 

If the school of Mr. Spencer be right in employing 
the principles of Hamilton to exclude all theological 
knowledge, it is bound in consistency to carry them 



1 Bamfiton Lectures, p. 98. 

2 First Princ., p. 16. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 227 

out in the direction of science, to the exclusion of all 
philosophy respecting nature. What then becomes of 
the " reconciliation " between religion and science ? In- 
stead of resting, one on faith, the other on knowledge, 
the latter, in its ultimate analysis, rests on neither, for it 
will not be pretended that it rests on unreasoning, unin- 
telligent faith, and ex hypothesi it cannot rest on reason. 
Mr. Spencer falls into Mansel's mistake, in assuming 
that rational argument proves the existence of God, 
and another line of argument, equally sound, proves 
the contrary, thence concluding that neither is to be 
accepted. The two lines are very far from equally 
sound. Indeed, the latter compared with the former 
is feebleness itself. It may prove the infinite to be 
incomprehensible, but not a contradiction. The pro- 
position, that there is a Supreme First Cause, rests 
upon evidence plentiful as the works of nature, 
appreciable by the common understanding, and ade- 
quate to produce full conviction. Sound reason never 
conducts to the contradictory of this proposition. 

Mr. Spencer's "reconciliation" of religion and 
science must be rejected as needless. He writes, " Of 
all antagonisms of belief, the oldest, the widest, the 
most profound, and the most important, is that between 
religion and science." ' This may pass, if the reference 
be to whatever may have borne the name of religion 
or science. Between true religion and true science 
there is no antagonism. They are but twin branches 
of truth. In proportion as religion and science, so 
called, are delivered from what is erroneous, their 
essential agreement is unfolded to view. The verities 



1 First Pr inc., p. n. 



228 FIRST FRINCIPIES OF FAITH. 

of religion are matters of evidence and knowledge, as 
well as of faith, and stand in no contradictory relation 
to the accurate deductions of reason. Our knowledge, 
as we have seen, is dependent on faith in first principles 
and testimony, while, but for the inlets of knowledge, 
faith would be impossible. He concludes that " though 
the Absolute cannot in any manner or degree be 
known, in the strict sense of knowing, yet we find that 
its positive existence is a necessary datum of con- 
sciousness ; that, so long as consciousness continues, 
we cannot for an instant rid it of this datum ; and that 
thus the belief which this datum constitutes has a 
higher warrant than any other whatever. Here then is 
that basis of agreement we set out to seek." 1 This 
conclusion " reconciles religion with science." 

This is a variation from Hamilton and Mansel. But 
the positive existence of the Absolute, as a necessary 
datum of consciousness, needs to be reconciled with 
our inability to know it "in any manner or degree." 
What is this again but "belief" in an unknown and 
unknowable God ? But while Hamilton and Mansel 
allow to faith an infinite, personal God, Mr. Spencer 
only affords an "inscrutable power," the "Ultimate 
Cause," common to science and religion, which may, 
or may not be a personal being, and which remains 
to us " the Unknowable." 2 The ultimate truth 
common to religion and science, and that by which 
they are to be reconciled, we are told, is "that the 
Power which the universe manifests to us is utterly in- 



1 First Pr inc., pp. 98, 99. 

2 Mr. Spencer has recently told us the more advanced intel- 
ligence of the future will resolve God into an infinite and 
eternal energy {Nineteenth Cent., Jan., 1884.) 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 229 



scrutable." x It is more than difficult to see how like- 
ness in this respect can harmonize religion and science 
if, as is alleged, the conclusions of science contradict 
the doctrines of religion. The only way in which this 
inscrutability bears on the question is by reminding us 
that mystery underlies all our knowledge. But if science 
and religion are contradictory opposites, surely the in- 
scrutability of the causal Power in both does not remove 
the contradicton, or effect any reconciliation. Indeed, 
the contradiction is imaginary, and "reconciliation" 
needless. 

The religion offered to us by this " reconciliation " 
is worthless. How long would rational beings retain 
a religion confessedly devoid of a rational basis, and 
whose credentials made no appeal to their understand- 
ing ? Scientists may propose, but Theists can never 
accept a "reconciliation" which requires religion to 
deny its own reasonableness, and to continue to exist 
by the forbearance of its reputed enemy. In the 
Spencerian, as in the Hamiltonian form of this philo- 
sophy, we are invited, and commanded to believe in a 
power which may be what we take it for, or the direct 
opposite. Carried out, the system reduces religion to a 
merely subjective human state, with no certainty of any 
corresponding objective reality, a worship with no 
assurance of a God worthy of the name, a stage below 
that of the groping Athenians who erected an altar to 
the Unknown God. 

Oddly enough, the faculties by which the conclusions 
of reason are thus discredited are those of reason 
itself. By means of reason the negative philosophy 



1 First Pr inc., p. 46. 



230 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

seeks to prove that reason is not to be trusted when it 
conducts us to a positive philosophy, or theology. It is 
only to be used in the suicidal process of proving that its 
conclusions are self-contradictory, and therefore to be 
avoided. But if, as its exponents allow, the philosophy 
of the Unknowable also leads to conclusions diametri- 
cally opposed to those of other philosophies, why is it 
to remain any more than they? For example, it re- 
quires us to believe that God is infinite. But infinity 
is alleged to be contrary to reason. Therefore the 
philosophy which commands us to believe in the infinite 
is condemned by its own rule. If others are to be 
rejected, because they involve " insolubilities," why not, 
for the same reason, reject this negative philosophy, and 
that prior to its destruction of all other philosophies ? 

Assuming the truth of this philosophy, to accept 
the Infinite and Absolute Being by faith, along with 
a merely "regulative" conception of His nature and 
character, and so retain the blessings of religion, is 
not the only possible course. The Comtist, with some 
show of reason, may say, " I accept the negation of 
Hamilton and Mansel, but will have none of their 
injunction to believe what I cannot think or know. 
Since theology is rationally unknowable and self- 
contradictory, I betake myself to the positive, present 
realities of life, with which my physical perceptions 
make me familiar, and in which my interests are certain 
and immediate." The Hamiltonian has no defence 
against the Materialism of the Positivist. 

In relation to man's duties and interests, it is needful 
to reassert the dignity and value of reason. Not that it 
is sufficient of itself to educe from nature all we need to 
know ; nor that it is infallible within its own sphere ; but 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2$\ 



though injured through association with moral evil, it is 
the naturalfaculty by which it becomes us to ascend'from 
ignorance to knowledge, respecting the sublime realities 
of things Divine in their relation to the present and the 
future. This faculty gone, poor as it is, the ladder is 
thrown down by which we struggle, step by step, out of 
darkness into light. It is not itself the staple of the truth, 
but our instrument for seeking, inferring, comparing' 
testing, and accumulating the truth. Nor does it exceed 
its province when, from nature, it rises to the super- 
natural. The negative philosophy, though propounded 
by thinkers of the highest mental calibre and moral pur- 
pose, and appropriated by Atheistic Materialism, has 
signally failed to supersede, or overturn the convincing 
evidence, furnished by causation, of the existence of 1 
Supreme Personal God. " The abnegation of reason » 
says Bishop Lightfoot, " is not the evidence of faith, 
but the confession of despair. Reason and reverence 
are natural allies, though untoward circumstances may 
sometimes interpose, and divorce them." 

4. Connection of natural effects with their First Cause. 

Among those who regard God as the First Cause of 
all things, opinions have varied, and sometimes con- 
flicted, in reference to the directness or indirectness of 
His connection with natural effects. Did He, at the 
outset, endow the created Cosmos with such qualities, 
as would secure all its movements and results, accord- 
ing to His plan and purpose for all time? Has He 
given it such inherent forces, and directive tendencies 
as, without extra agency, produce all its changes with 
that harmony and continuity, which enable us to infer 
and formulate the laws of nature ? Does the course of 



232 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

nature, after the constitutive act of its Creator, proceed 
by its own properties, uninfluenced by anything 
external to itself? or does He either occasionally, or 
continuously interfere to compel it to fulfil His designs ? 
or are its existence and operations continued by the 
direct action of God, leaving neither room, nor need for 
self-action in the creature? or is there a harmonious 
co-operation of the First Cause and second causes — of 
the supernatural and the natural — the immediate and 
the mediate ? Each of these questions has, from one 
or another, received an affirmative answer. The two 
extremes are, that theory which excludes all direct, 
Divine energy from the operations of nature, and that 
which excludes all second causes. 

It must be admitted that the question belongs, in 
great measure, to the region of speculation. The 
modus operandi of God's ways is not laid open to our 
view. We may trace an effect to its cause, and yet 
find out nothing of the nexus between the two. The 
mode in which Divine power acts on created substance 
may be inscrutable to us. It is permitted to us, how- 
ever, to balance probabilities, and forecast the inad- 
missible consequences of this theory or that, and thus 
arrive at conclusions consistent with, if not implied 
in, truths already known. From among these diverse 
theories, we may prefer that which appears most 
reasonable. But our chief concern is to show that 
whichever of these theories be true, it does not invali- 
date the etiological evidence of Theism, and also, in 
the light of the foregoing arguments, that a supernatural 
Being is the only satisfactory First Cause. 

(i) Divine Sustenance. The theory which seems 
most consistent with all we know of God and nature is, 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 233 



that which supposes the Creator to have constituted the 
world with certain qualities, attributes, or tendencies, 
by which one part has a causal influence on another, 
and one state or combination of parts produces another, 
according to what we call laws of nature, the result 
being the co-ordination and succession of events, which 
we call the operations of nature. At the same time, 
all nature is pervaded by the living presence of God, 
sustaining the being and operations of the world He 
has made and governs, retaining a supreme control 
which may at any point supersede, or vary the usual 
course of natural causation. Ordinarily He neither 
sets aside the causal qualities of nature, nor leaves 
them to themselves. 1 This is the reconciliation, if 
any were needed, of the primary with second causes. 
God is immanent in natural causation, as truly and 
necessarily as in natural being, in the operations as in 
the existence of matter, or mind. In this sense " God 
is everywhere every moment, energizing in nature." 2 
" He made the causes, and both imparted to them 
and sustained in them their efficacy." 3 

Should it be asked how His power is active in the 
action of natural causes, we can no more tell than we 
can how His power brought nature into being, or 
how He, at any time, may act immediately on created 
nature. And it is equally true that we cannot say or 
conceive how any second cause acts immediately on 
its object. One body, for instance, gravitates to 
another ; but who can tell us how the force of gravita^ 

1 See M'Cosh, On the Divine Government, book ii., 
chap, i., sect. 5. 

2 Row, Ba?npton Lectures, p. 71. 

3 Bishop Cotterill, Does Science aid Faith ? p. 71, from 
Augustine. 

16 



234 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

tion becomes motion ? We note the fact, and draw 
the inference that somehow one body is moved towards- 
another, in proportion to their relative density, and 
distance ; but we know nothing of how the force acts 
between the two. How causal power or efficiency 
passes to the effect is apparently an insoluble mystery. 

The energy of the Almighty would seem to be as 
necessary to sustain as to commence the existence of 
the universe, and as necessary to sustain the causal 
action of created things as their existence. This view 
recognizes the all-pervading, active presence of God 
in His works, in opposition to every theory which 
would reduce Him to the position of an inert spectator. 
It also consists with our experience of causal power in 
the creature, as when we voluntarily exert ourselves 
to produce some effect. 

The theory also agrees with the imperfect character 
of second causes. They are essentially different from 
the First. They cannot, like it, be self-sufficient, or 
self-supporting. Their efficiency is limited, derivative, 
instrumental, dependent, passively obeying the direc- 
tion of the First. The First is original, infinite, free,, 
absolute, commanding. They without it are nothing. 
It without them is still all in all. The First Cause 
cannot produce a second equal to itself, as there 
cannot be two infinite, or independent beings. Second 
causes depend on the First, both for their beginning 
and their continuance. Hence the law of causality is 
never satisfied with second causes alone. 

On this theory, the Theistic argument from causa- 
tion remains clear, and strong. The sufficient cause, 
demanded by the laws of thought for observed facts, 
appears in Him who creates and sustains all things, — 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2$$ 



who constitutes mind and matter with an aptitude to 
produce certain changes, and upholds their causal 
working. He who constituted the earth to bring forth 
grass, the herb to yield seed, and the fruit tree to 
yield fruit after his kind, " is above all, and through 
all, and in you all." In Him who maketh the winds 
His messengers, and flaming fire His minister, " we 
live, and move, and have our being." 

(2) All causation by direct energy of God. Another 
theory resolves all the causal energy of nature into 
the direct energy of God. It holds that He is not 
only immanent and active everywhere, but that there 
is no causal energy besides His ; all action or change 
being the immediate exercise of His power. If a 
stone fall, or a vapour rise, or a fish swim, or a spirit 
think, or will, it does so by His direct energy, or 
rather His energy does it, while the material, or spiritual 
subject is entirely passive. The order of events is 
what it is, because He has made it a law or rule, 
according to which He will work. As an image in a 
mirror is continued by a continual supply of similar 
rays of light, so it is said the world in all its parts is 
upheld by "a continued succession of acts of the 
Divine will, and these not differing from that which 
at first caused the world to spring into existence." ■ 
Bishop Butler repeatedly alludes to this theory, not 
to accept or reject it, but to intimate that whether 
true or false, it does not affect the evidences of natural 
religion. 2 



1 So illustrated by Jon. Edwards; see M'Cosh, Divine 
Government, p. 148. 

2 a F ^ r wh ? n men find th emselves necessitated to confess 
an Author of nature, or that God is the natural Governor of 



22)6 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



It is idle to charge this theory with representing God 
in an undignified aspect, as if it were beneath His 
greatness to attend to all the minutiae of the universe. 
The great and the little are alike under His control. 
It would be a limitation, and derogation, if He were 
unable to watch and rule all things great or small. 
Human rulers relegate details to subordinates, because 
of inability to attend to them personally. The infinite 
Lord need not entrust to others the least of His 
affairs. His omnipresent all-sufficiency is a mark, 
not of defect, but Divine dignity and magnanimity. 

Neither is there any cogency in the objection that, on 
this theory, God is always working miracles, or that 
every event is then a miracle. The essence of a miracle 
is not in its being done by the immediate energy of 
God, but in its exceptionality to His ordinary course of 
working, whether that be direct, or indirect. If the 
distinctive peculiarity were in the mode of His acting, 
it would be much less easy for us to distinguish a 
miracle, than it now is by the special manifestation of 
Divine energy as a striking exception to the ordinary 
course of nature. 

It is an objectionable feature of the theory that it 
virtually excludes all second causes. There cannot be 



the world, they must not deny this again because His 
government is uniform ; they must not deny that He does 
things at all because He does them constantly, because the 
effects of His acting are permanent, whether His acting be so 
or not, though there is no reason to think it is not " {Analogy, 
part i. chap. ii.). Again, "whether the pleasure or pain, 
which thus follows upon our behaviour, be owing to the 
Author of nature's acting upon us every moment which we 
feel it, or to His having 'at once contrived and executed His 
own part in the plan of the world, makes no alteration as to 
the matter before us " {Ibid.). 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 237 



even derivative efficiency in natural causes, if everything 
be effected solely by the direct efficiency of God. Indeed, 
they are not then causes in the proper sense, but ante- 
cedents only. In that case the seed, earth, moisture, 
and warmth are no more the efficient cause of vegetation 
than night is of day. There is then no efficiency except 
in God. But our experience testifies the contrary. In 
voluntarily producing movements of our bodies, and 
through them, in the external world, we are conscious of 
exerting efficient force. Are we to suppose the direct 
energy of God gives us this consciousness of causing 
effects when we do no such thing ? Can any reason be 
assigned for the illusion ? And if the deception were 
for some good end, how strange that it should be found 
out to be an illusion, the end being thereby frustrated. 
Dr. M'Cosh, though not venturing to adopt the theory, 
suggests a consideration in its favour: " Had God not 
seen fit to proceed by general laws in the government 
of the world, it would have been acknowledged that 
every separate event required a separate operation of 
the Divine will. And why, it may be asked, when God 
sees fit, for beneficent reasons, to act otherwise, should it 
ever be supposed that such Divine agency is not equally 
needed ? M1 This argument goes to show that the method 
in question was possible, and not entirely destitute of 
antecedent probability. But if we might understand by 
" operation of the Divine will " what I have already re- 
ferred to as constant, immediate sustenance of every part 
of creation and its causal operations, this argument would 
be quite consistent with the theory I have first named 
and preferred. Either with, or without general laws, such 



1 Divine Government, p. 148. 



238 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

Divine agency may be " needed/' yet not so as to super- 
sede, or preclude the derivative efficiency of second 
causes. Granting all Dr. M'Cosh argues for, it does not 
follow that nature may not be endowed with such efficient 
causes as bring about the ordinary course of events. 1 

Assuming, however, the truth of this theory, the 
Theistic argument from nature remains firm. The 
world and its manifold events are still as wonderful as 
before, in their magnitude, unity, harmony, co-adapta- 
tion, and pre-adaptation. The signs of supreme power, 
wisdom, and benevolence display themselves with un- 
diminished beauty and glory, and require an adequate 
cause to account for them, which cannot be found in 
aught less than an omnipotent, personal God. The 
elimination of second causes from nature would in no 
degree lessen the necessity for a First. 

(3) Plastic Nature. Ralph Cudworth, the most dis- 
tinguished of the Cambridge Platonists, in his elaborate 
refutation of Atheism, The Intellectual System of the 
Universe, supporting his position by quotations from 
Plato, Aristotle, and other ancient philosophers, along 
with much argumentation of his own, advocated a theory 
of plastic nature, or plastic life in nature, " a certain 
lower life than the animal, which acts regularly and 
artificially, according to the direction of mind and 

1 " It seems neither decorous in respect of God, nor con- 
gruous to reason, that He should avrovpyeiv airavra, do all 
things Himself immediately and miraculously, nature being 
quite superseded and made to signify nothing. The same is 
further confuted by the slow and gradual process of things in 
nature, as also by those errors and bungles that are committed 
when the matter proves inept and contumacious, arguing the 
agent not to be irresistible " (Cudworth, I?itellectual System, 
vol. i. p. 382). On the question of miracles see paragraph 
supra, p. 236. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 239 

understanding, reason and wisdom, for ends, or in order 
to good, though itself do not know the reason of what 
it does, nor is master of that wisdom according to which 
it acts, but only a servant to do it and drudging 
executioner of the same, . . . essentially depending on 
a perfect intellect." It is presided over by a higher 
Providence, which " doth often supply the defects of it, 
and sometimes overrule it, forasmuch as this plastic 
nature cannot act electively, nor with discretion." It 
is a formative energy which God has imparted to nature, 
and by which natural effects are produced. If the 
architect could impart his ideas of a house to the 
materials of which it was to be built, so that they 
might arrange themselves into a house, or if the 
musician could endow the strings, or other musical 
instruments, with the music which is in his mind, so 
that they would of their own operations make the 
music, the qualities so imparted would be something 
like the plastic nature, or formative energy, with which 
God is said to have endowed passive matter. The gift 
thus bestowed gives rise to the orderly course of nature, 
and accomplishes the wise ends designed by the Creator. 
It is a kind of " Divine art embodied," in which God 
puts into created substance that which unconsciously 
produces what He designs. 

But this theory by no means excludes from the 
world the constant presence and support of its Creator. 
The plastic life "depends immediately upon the Deity 
itself." It is "essentially secondary, derivative, and 
dependent," the " instrument or manuary opificer of a 
perfect mind." 1 Seeing then that, on the one hand, it 

3^ff^! CaUal System > voL [ " PP- 370, 322, 369, 3/i, 373, 



240 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



implies an endowment of nature as the cause of its 
changes, and on the other hand, is immediately de- 
pendent on the Deity, the theory is so far at one with 
that we first considered. 

Exception might be taken to Cudworth's calling the 
plastic life " incorporeal," not meaning that it is either 
immaterial substance, or property. What then can it 
be but matter, or a property of matter ? If it be " in- 
corporeal" because it is not essential to matter, but 
a quality superadded to it, it must still be a quality of 
matter, whether essential or not. Whatever is the 
attribute of body is corporeal. 

Unless we may interpret the words figuratively, 
which the context will scarcely allow, objection may be 
taken to the description of this formative energy as a 
"life," though " the last and lowest of all lives;" or 
inferior sort of " soul," " though devoid of animal 
consciousness," as well as of intention, discretion, 
perception, and cogitation. This investment of plastic 
nature with incorporeal life, distinct from the substance 
of nature, is neither necessary, nor helpful to Cudworth's 
Theistic argumentation. 

Very emphatically, however, and on several grounds, 
does Cudworth repudiate Hylozoism or Stratonism, 
which attributes a low degree of life or mind, or, as 
Professor Clifford calls it, " mind stuff," to every particle 
of matter, as the cause of material movement. He 
complains that the Hylozoists " pervert " and " abuse " 
the notion of plastic life " to make a certain spurious 
counterfeit God Almighty of it." He also objects that 
they derive the higher forms of life from this lowest, 
and senseless. They ascribe mind and understanding 
to it, whereas he makes it but " a faint and shadowy 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 24 1 



imitation of mind and understanding." In any case the 
plastic life and effects could not be accounted for without 
the Intelligent First Cause. 

(4) Pre-established Harmony. Leibnitz, while in- 
fluenced by Cudworth, originated a theory of his own 
under the name of "pre-established harmony! 1 This is 
not the harmony arising from an all-comprehensive 
plan, enforced by the established interdependence of the 
parts, and apparent in the beautiful correlations and 
proceedings of all nature. In the view of Leibnitz, the 
whole mental and moral creation consists of an infi- 
nitude of monads, or unextended points, each having 
some degree of active, and perceptive power. Each 
monad was at first endowed, by the Creator, with the 
qualities and potencies which produce, and determine 
all its subsequent changes to eternity. The human 
soul is a monad of a "dominant" or superior kind. 
The human body consists of innumerable monads. As 
each monad produces from within itself all its changes, 
there is no such thing as interaction between one and 
another. One does not perceive another because that 
other exists, but because the percipient is constituted to 
be at the time as if an external object were in sight. 
As every event of each monad is determined by what in 
it preceded, and as the inherent qualities of each monad 
produce the changes for which it was originally con- 
stituted, all events take place by a kind of necessity, 
the doctrine of which is called " Determinism." Thus 
evil was necessary, and the universe is that of the 
Optimist. 

But as there is no interaction between any two 
monads, the question arises, How comes it to pass that 

minds, with their bodies, and the infinity of monads of 
11* 



242 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



which the world consists, act together with such 
admirable harmony ? In reply it is laid down that the 
Infinite Creator, foreseeing the infinite possibilities and 
conditions of all monads, at the outset constituted, and 
endowed each in such wise that its mode of action should, 
at any and every stage, harmonize with its surroundings. 
All states and stages were thus provided for, somewhat 
as a number of clocks might be made to keep the same 
time without dependence on each other. For example, 
my mind just now wills to move my arm; and my 
arm moves, not because my will acts upon my arm, 
or my brain upon the muscles of my arm, but because 
all were so made that, at this instant, my mind should 
be in the state called willing to move my arm, and the 
muscles and bones of the arm should be in the state of 
moving, and each monad should, independently of all 
others, be in such state that altogether they should make 
up what I regard as a voluntary moving of my arm. 

It is not within the scope of this treatise to point out 
the objections to this theory; otherwise much might 
be said of the moral freedom which its determinism 
virtually destroys; of the absurdity of an infinity of 
monads and infinite series involved in its principle 
of " continuity " ; of its contradiction of final causes, 
and other vulnerable points. Enough that its peculiar 
elements are altogether hypothetical. Being a con- 
trivance of imagination, rather than of reason, it is not 
surprising that it has failed to win for itself a lasting 
home in the philosophic world. Sir W. Hamilton 
affirmed it to be matter of dispute whether Leibnitz 
were serious in propounding his theory. But if it 
were proved true, we should as much as ever require 
a First Cause. In fact, this theory of God's connection 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 243 



with natural effects was broached in the behalf of 
Theism ; and if it were sound, nothing less than the 
existence of an infinite God could account for the con- 
stitution and course of nature. 

(5) Occasionalism. Rene Descartes and his followers, 
in order to solve the difficulty of intercommunica- 
tion between matter and mind, devised the theory, 
that there is really no interaction between them, but 
when one appears to produce an effect on the other, it 
is the direct energy of God, producing the effect at a 
moment corresponding to what we suppose to be the 
action of the other as cause. For example, when the 
mind walls its body to speak, the immediate action of 
God on the vocal organs produces the speech, but the 
mind, or will, exerts no influence on those organs. 
Because God thus acts at the precise moment when 
there is occasion, the theory is named "occasional 
causes!' or " occasionalism." What we call causes are 
but occasions for God's direct action. In this respect, 
the theory resembles the second already considered. 

But along with this make-shift to meet the case of 
mind in relation to body, it was held that physical 
effects came of physical causes, and that animals and 
other complex creatures were but automata, possessed 
of emotional but not reasoning faculties, or as some 
of the school held, possessed of neither. Descartes' 
remark, that his theory of vortices was a romance, has 
been frequently extended, by others, to other parts of 
his philosophy. But this theory is not at all antago- 
nistic to Theism. Nay, nothing is more necessary to 
the hypothesis than the agency of the First Cause. 
Descartes' reliance on efficient, and neglect of final 
causes, while not disproving the value of the latter,. 



244 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

shows how necessarily nature, in his system, depended 
on God. 

(6) Mechanical Theory. The merely mechanical or 
automatic theory supposes the universe to be a sort of 
self-acting machine, consisting of substance, with its 
forces and laws, and operating continually by virtue of 
its own inherent character, unaffected by any direct 
agency external to itself. This view may be associated 
with Theism, Pantheism, or Atheistic Materialism. 
With the two latter, the question is, not the kind of 
connection which the events of the world have with 
the supernatural First Cause, but really whether there 
be any such cause. 

(i.) In its Theistic form it means that God as First 
Cause created, and endowed the world in such wise 
that, like a clock wound up and set a-going, its 
operations proceed of themselves, either for a long 
period, or forever. Obviously this hypothesis, as much 
as any other, necessitates a First Cause. For, though 
the huge machine may work of itself, it could neither 
create, nor endow itself; nor could it begin its own 
movements. It owes all to the First Cause. This was 
generally the view of the English Deists. 

It is a great weakness of this theory that it repre- 
sents the Creator as standing by inactive, watching, it 
may be, but never directly influencing the world. 
Every moment, from the date of creation, widens the 
distance between Him and His work. As time rolls 
on He is more and more remote from the act of 
creation, through which alone He has any connection 
with the present existence and order of things. 

A still more fatal objection is that it makes the 
creature independent of the Creator, seeing He has 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 245 



given to it such properties that it can do without Him. 
He has made it self-existent ; for what exists without 
dependence on any other has the entire support of its 
being within itself, whatever its dependence at the 
outset. It is equally independent for its motion, and all 
its activities; for, though indebted for all at the 
beginning to its Maker, it can thenceforth exist, and 
act independently of Him. Were He to cease to be, 
it would not on that account lose its being, since it has 
in itself the sufficient cause of its continued existence 
and operations. 

Hardly less serious is the objection that the theory 
rests on a false analogy. The world is much more 
than a machine, and God is to it much more than a 
mechanist. Man, having constructed his machine, may 
leave it to work by laws and forces, not depending on 
him, nor derived from him, but simply appropriated by 
him : God cannot so leave His work ; for there are no 
laws or forces but from Him. The one merely arranges 
pre-existing materials, so as to direct the inherent forces 
of nature in a particular way. God, in constituting 
nature itself, had no anterior natural forces to rely on. 
He had both to construct, and to provide the forces and 
laws, whereas the human mechanist has but to adapt 
and utilize forces and laws already existing. The very 
machine which he makes, moves by forces, and according 
to laws, which another, and not he, supplies. He can 
set his machine a-going, and stand by inactive, only 
because God sustains the energy by which it moves. 
The man-made machine acts by the same forces and 
laws as does the whole world. In fact, it is merely a 
modification, not a creation, of forces already at hand. 
The human will derives all its materials and motion 



246 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



from the established universe, of which it is itself a 
part. But God had to provide all the materials, all the 
forces, and all the laws. 

The analogy of a machine is seen still further to fail, 
as we recollect that part of the universe consists of 
animated and thinking beings. Man, for instance, has 
spontaneity, which a mere machine has not. He can, 
by exercise of his own will, vary the course of material 
things around him. He can start a new series of 
events. His consciousness protests that he is not a 
mere machine, nor merely part of one. The mechanical 
theory implies that all events take place by stern 
necessity, according to the constitution of the machine. 
Our conscious freedom, with its concomitant sense of 
responsibility, contradicts such necessity, and thus 
refutes the theory. 

The Theistic inference on this theory has been called 
by Physicus, apparently in derision, " metaphysical 
teleology," as distinguished from "scientific." The 
latter sees the hand of God in effects as, and when, they 
are produced within the sphere of nature ; the former 
sees it only in His original constitution of the world. 
In both cases the inference is of the same kind, and 
logically sound. Whether He causes the effects we see 
by mediate, or immediate action, so long as He does 
cause them, it is sufficient for the Theistic argument. 
Probably the more accurate view of the method is that 
which regards the Creator as acting on present events 
both ways— mediately as Creator, and immediately as 

Sustainer. 

(ii.) Pantheism has assumed so many various aspects, 
from the rigid system of Spinoza to the mystical dis- 
coursings of Hegel, or the dreamy maundering of some 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 247 



semi-Pantheists, that its full definition is most difficult. 
The more salient features may serve our present 
purpose. Its essential doctrine is that God is the one 
and all. There is no God but nature, and no nature 
but God. The universe is not His workmanship, but 
Himself. It is uncreated, and consists of one substance 
only, now presenting the aspect of body, and again of 
mind, which latter is occasional and partial, as in man. 
Nor is there any Divine mind apart from such as man's. 
God is not a person, nor necessarily intelligent ; and if 
the universe were not dignified with the title of God, it 
would not be unreasonable to identify the system with 
Atheism ; for it contains nothing worthy of the Divine 
name. All events take place by internal, inevitable, 
and, for the most part, blind processes of nature. It is 
throughout a system of rigid necessity, whose wheels 
grind on for good or ill, devoid of forethought, design, 
hate, love, moral purpose, or consciousness, in its 
government. Indeed, it has no government apart from 
the movements of nature itself. 

A specimen of argument in support of Pantheism is 
that creation is inconceivable, therefore impossible. 
According to this logic, what is possible ? Is the 
nexus of causation conceivable, or the mode of inter- 
communication between body and soul? We can 
conceive that, but not how, these things are ; just as we 
can that, but not how, infinite power may bring some- 
thing into being. 

Again, it is urged that God's infinite power is at fault, 
if it creates a finite world, seeing that only engages 
a finite degree of power. But where is the fault ? Is 
the power not still infinite, though not all in exercise ? 
Infinite power does not necessitate infinite action. It 



248 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



is no defect in a man's power that he has a reserve not 
put forth. Neither is it a fault in the power of God. 
To insist that what He does shall be equal to all that 
He is, or to all that He can do, would require a second 
God, as the effect, equal to the first, a third equal to 
the second, and so on, ever repeating the impossibility 
of a plurality of infinite beings. Until Pantheism sets 
up a more real and worthy God, it has no claim to be 
called religion ; and until it relies less upon assump- 
tion, and more upon the evidence of facts, it has no 
claim to be called either philosophy or science. It is, 
in fact, incongruous to represent the Pantheistic God 
by the personal pronoun He or Him ; and more appro- 
priate to speak of it; for at best it is only a thing. 

This, however, is not the place to weigh the merits 
of Pantheism as a whole ; but only to point out that 
its explanation of facts is extremely unsatisfactory. 

How does it find an adequate cause for the existence, 
and motion of the universe ? By making it the cause 
and God of itself. But what is " itself" ? Not a simple 
unit, but innumerable units, each distinct from the rest, 
and each having an individual reality. Their being joined 
together does not make them simple. If each be eternal, 
and self-existent, having the potencies of its motion 
within itself, as it must, if it be so with the whole, it 
follows that each is a God, and there are as many Gods 
as atoms. Spinoza says there is but one substance : 
" monism " is an essential dogma in his creed. But it 
is clear, so far as matter is concerned, that the one kind 
of substance consists of many individual things. Where 
then is the unity necessary to the Pantheistic God ? If 
the universe is God because it is eternal and necessary, 
so is each ultimate atom. To say every atom is self- 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 249 



caused, or uncaused, and causes its own motion, is to 
deify it, and so to involve deities as numerous as the 
atoms. But further, how is it known that matter is 
eternal and necessary ? Evidence there is none. It is 
simply assumed in order to account for the world with- 
out a personal God. 

How does Pantheism account for the incessant changes 
which characterise the course of nature? Now its 
forces are active, then quiescent ; here developing in this 
form, there in that ; in one case constructing, in another 
destroying. They are the effects, Pantheism tells us, of 
nature's own necessary evolution, or devolution. Then, 
as nature and God are the same, these changes are in 
God. And is He so mutable a Being as all this ? Is 
the one eternal, self-existent God subject to all the 
variations of state which characterize the ever-changing 
world ? Moreover, this explanation again throws back 
present effects upon an eternal regress of second causes, 
which we have seen to be absurd and impossible. No 
help is found in Hegel's notion that all things are 
evolved from Being, devoid of attributes, which he 
dignifies with the name of " pure Being." Such being 
is inconceivable. 

How does Pantheism account for the harmony and 
beneficent order of the universe ? It cannot be denied 
that its parts are admirably suited to each other, and 
co-operate as perfectly, and uniformly as if wisdom had 
devised the whole arrangement. It is equally certain 
that good ends are accomplished thereby, as if benevo- 
lence had been in the counsels which determined the 
order of events. Nature is clothed in beauty, and teems 
with benefits. Had it been contrived by the highest 
intellect for beneficent purposes, with co-adaptation of 



250 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



parts to each other, and pre-adaptation of means to 
ends, it is hard to see how the system, as a whole, could 
have been better planned and worked. Pantheism 
excludes benevolence, design, forethought, and intelli- 
gence from the cause of this excellent order of things, 
and attributes it to blind, necessary, eternal forces. 
Reason cannot be permanently satisfied with this 
explanation, which is altogether inadequate. 

How does Pantheism account for the reality of mind, 
with its wondrous powers of perception, reflection, 
judgment, memory, imagination, sentiment, and taste ? 
By making it simply a phase or development of the 
same substance as, in body, is extended and gravitates. 
Passing by the lack of evidence for this view, we note 
that it makes thinking an attribute of that which is 
extended, and divisible. Qualities having nothing in 
common, but alien to each other, are alleged to be 
attributes of the same substance. We know nothing of 
substance except by its attributes, and we reason that 
every attribute must inhere in a substance corre- 
sponding to it. But to ascribe the properties of thought 
and extension to the same substance is to ascribe, at 
least, one of them to a substance alien to all we know 
about the property attributed to it. 

Further, Pantheism makes mind the effect and sub- 
ordinate of matter, instead of its cause and master. 
Mind is the highest kind of being we can conceive ; but 
here it is made to spring out of something else which is 
its inferior ; for with Pantheism, mind is not necessarily 
existent and eternal. 

How does Pantheism account for morality ? Instead 
of explaining the facts of morality, it lays down prin- 
ciples which banish all moral qualities and distinctions 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 25 I 



from the universe. As all things take place by a fatal 
necessity, and without original plan on the part of any 
personal God, the inevitable result is that no one action 
can be better or worse than any other. All are alike 
unavoidable, and none can be intrinsically worthy of 
praise or blame. 

But nature, through the voice of conscience, revolts 
against this doctrine. An appeal to consciousness at 
once reveals that moral distinctions are a part of 
nature, and can no more be got rid of than existence. 
The intuitive idea of moral approbation and dis- 
approbation, with its complementary sense of respon- 
sibility, frustrates all attempts to persuade us there 
is no such thing as morality. The system, which 
can only account for the universe by annihilating all 
moral principles, must be rejected as contrary to 
nature. 

How does Pantheism explain religion ? With what- 
ever errors, and superstitions commingled, religion is 
a fact. Mankind clings to the doctrine of a supreme 
Being above nature. A God is necessary to satisfy 
the human heart. Pantheism can neither explain, nor 
satisfy this need. All the adoration, trust, love, hope, 
fear, emotions, and acts, which make up religion, and 
seek their object in a deity, are, according to Pantheism, 
utterly worthless and out of place, in a universe which 
has no personal God. But these religious instincts, 
which Pantheism must allow to be a necessary part 
of the universe, persist in forming an important part 
of human experience. In its inability to account for 
them, Pantheism is itself condemned. As little can 
it satisfy them. To a soul longing for the favour, 
guidance, protection, and deliverance of a moral 



252 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

Governor, it is but mockery to point it to the uncon- 
scious, non-moral, impersonal substance of the universe. 
Of moral and religious nature, as of all other, Theism 
is the best and only satisfactory solution. 

(iii.) Atheistic Materialism, yet more plainly than 
Pantheism, meets the question of the connection of 
effects with the First Cause, by denying its relevancy. 
It contends that there is no cause beyond nature 
itself; and, consequently, that the effects we know can 
only be connected with anterior second causes. In our 
search for the First Cause, it will not permit us to pass 
the boundary of matter. By this narrow, unscientific 
restriction, however, reason refuses to be fettered. 1 

English Deism, rejecting the Christian Revelation, 
argued for a universe working of itself, yet overlooked 
by its Deity. Atheistic Materialism cast off the Deity, 
and endowed the self-acting world with eternal self- 
sufficiency. In its eyes there is no God, no immaterial 
substance such as spirit, no creation, no supreme 
Master-mind: there is nothing but matter, or matter 
with its force, or motion, acting according to law. All 
events occur as the necessary result of foregoing 
events. Morality has no deeper basis than our 
gathered notions of utility ; and moral actions are as 
destitute of freedom and intrinsic moral quality as the 
revolution of the globe. 

Probably Materialism has never been extinct since 
the days of Democritus, its varied fortunes notwith- 
standing. It was modified by his disciples, Epicurus 



1 Some questions noticed in Part III. reappear under this 
head; but in a different relation. The object here is more 
particularly to note how Theism is affected by the develop- 
ment of science. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2$$ 



and Lucretius. In the hands of men like Holbach, 
La Mettrie, and Comte, of Haeckel and Biichner, of 
Mill and Clifford, it has been variously shaped, but, 
for the most part, has evinced the characteristics just 
indicated. 

In our day, the attitudes assumed by Materialism 
are chiefly the following. First, there are those who 
have a theory concerning the cause of things, and feel 
bound to account for the world without a Creator or 
Supreme Ruler. Then there are those who delibe- 
rately ignore the question as of no moment, and declare 
it of no consequence whether there be a God or not. 
Some leading Secularists, as well as Positivists, take 
this position, teaching that man's whole interest lies 
in looking to his present secular affairs. Again, there 
are those who profess to go into the inquiry, and to 
conclude that, if there be a God, we cannot know the 
fact, nor get beyond material nature. To this class 
belong those Agnostics who affirm, not only that we 
do not, but that we cannot ascertain the existence of 
a First Cause beyond the phenomena of the world. 
Finally there are those who say we need not, nay we 
ought not to consider the question, whether there be 
a supernatural cause ; which implies a sort of tacit 
confession that possibly one might be ascertained on 
investigation. By thus blocking the way to inquiry re- 
specting the most profoundly interesting of all questions, 
it tends to stultify reason. But our duty and interest 
alike, despite this Agnostic dictum, bind us to seek after 
God as Source and Ruler of all. For if there be one, 
no knowledge can be more vital to our welfare than the 
knowledge of Him ; nor can the pursuit of any know- 
ledge be more in the way of duty. 



254 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

If it concerns us whether there be a God, it also 
concerns us to know the same. To cast off such 
concern is a magnified form of the folly, which prompts 
the citizen to declare that it concerns him not whether 
the community to which he belongs is subject to a 
civil ruler, or whether he is under any ethical obligations. 
The position assumed is the less excusable, because 
many earnest men report that they have sought ?nd 
found the knowledge of God. The claims of Theism 
cannot be justly or safely evaded by this nonchalant 
style of repudiation. But our thoughts must be 
directed principally to the first of these aspects, which, 
in its treatment of the subject, to say the least, is not 
guilty of the flagrant irrationality which distinguishes 
the last. 

The Materialism in question not only avows its sub- 
jection to reason, but enters on the same rational course 
as Theism, by recognizing the principle of causality, and 
seeking to account for events. But it stops short before 
reaching the First, and in the most proper sense, the only 
efficient Cause of all, without which there can be no satis- 
factory explanation. We may here remind ourselves of 
what is meant by explanation of effects. In science it has 
been said to consist in " classification." In this sense 
an object is explained when it is assigned to the class 
of objects which have the same properties. " Every 
act of explanation," says Professor Jevons, " consists 
in pointing out a resemblance between facts." 1 But 
the word is often used to denote the connecting of 
effects with their causes by synthetic generalization, 
as when we infer the unknown from the known. This 

1 Principles of Science, p. ^l- 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2$$ 



is the kind of explanation required for the universe, 
that is, to find a sufficient cause for the effect. Amon°- 
quotations from others having a similar bearing, 
Dr. Stallo 1 gives the following from E. Haeckel : 
The modern theory of evolution "is the only scientifi: 
theory which affords a rational explanation of the 
universe, and satisfies the craving of the intellect for 
causal connections, inasmuch as it links all the phe- 
nomena of nature as parts of a great unital process 
of development, and as a series of mechanical causes 
and effects." The need of causation for a satisfactory 
explanation is here implied; but the limit put upon 
its extent does not satisfy, but violently disappoints 
' the craving of the intellect for causal connections." 
The intellect which craves to know the cause of " the 
rolling stone," "the growth of the plant," and "the 
consciousness of man," when told they are caused by 
' atomic mechanics," still craves to know, not if the 
" atomic mechanics," and all the second causes in the 
train, have a higher and First Cause, for of that it is 
intuitively certain ; but only to know what or who is 
that First Cause. Reason can more easily be satisfied 
without second causes, than without the First. 

The favourite form of the mechanical theory is the 
Atomic, according to which the ultimate elements of 
matter are rigid atoms, probably all exactly alike, and 

unchangeable; molecules— a compound of atoms 

being the smallest parts into which matter is practically 
divisible by man. Still more certain are physicists, 
about the law of the conservation of energy, the cause 
of motion. Force or energy, of which light, heat, 



1 Concepts of Modern Physics, p. 20. 



256 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

electricity, and gravitation are said to be but modes, 
may be transferred from place to place, or from cause 
to effect ; it may be dissipated, or pass out of activity ; 
but we are told its total amount can neither be increased 
nor diminished. Apart from this energy, matter is 
perfectly inert ; it can neither begin nor terminate its 
own motion. All physical motion is due to energy. 

But nothing is more manifest than that all these 
movements are under law. They are always the same 
in the same conditions. Invariably the denser bodies 
tend downwards ; ice melts in a certain temperature ; 
the fruit corresponds to its seed ; friction evolves heat ; 
and everywhere events occur just as they would on the 
assumption of a course or rule previously prescribed 
for, and enforced upon them. 

These three, matter, force, and law, are the only data 
available, if, ignoring God, we attempt to explain the 
universe by itself. In these alone we have to find the 
cause, not only of all physical change, but of all life, 
thought, feeling, morality, religion, with whatever there 
may be of efficiency, design, harmony, beneficence, and 
unity in the order of nature ; for all these are compre- 
hended in the universe. 1 How utterly inadequate are 
these three data to the task becomes evident, as soon 
as they are put to the test. 

Matter, being inert, cannot be the cause of natural 
phenomena, for they are the effect of change ; whereas 
it cannot even change itself. So far from solving the 
question, matter itself has to be accounted for, as a 
contingent existence. How came it to consist of atoms 

1 The atomic theory supposes all chemical change to consist 
of motion, and thus to be essentially mechanical ; but this 
question does not affect our present argument. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 



2 S7 



f 



and molecules ? How came its atoms all to correspond 
in shape, size, and quality ? Whence did they derive 
their mutual congruity, and capability of cohesion, and 
co-operation ? Theism draws the rational inference 
that a personal First Cause, nothing else being pro- 
portionate, so created it. To avoid this inference, 
Atheism makes the unwarrantable assumption tha 
matter is eternal, and consequently needed no Creator. 
But the inference is far more reasonable than the 
assumption. Our intuitive principle of causality in- 
stinctively connects matter with a First Cause ; while 
Atheism resorts to the unprovable hypothesis of eternal 
matter, in order to evade the inference ; and thus it is 
obliged to take for granted, that every atom is necessary 
and self-existent, and that millions of self-existent 
beings were, from eternity, exactly congruous to each 
other, and all of corresponding size, pattern, and quality, 
without any cause of their being so. To believe this 
we must first divest our minds of all regard for the 
laws of probability. In the oft-cited words of Sir John 
Herschel, these atoms " have the essential character of 
manufactured articles." 

Recognizing the law of the parsimony of causes, 
Materialism claims the credit of resolving all things 
into unity — the unity of matter. But matter, though 
one in kind, consists of millions of millions of atoms, 
each one a distinct being, and, on Atheistic principles, 
self-existent and eternal. Thus instead of resolving all 
into one cause, it multiplies the causes by the number 
of ultimate atoms. 

As to the motion, or force of which motion is the action, 

while as a second cause it explains many things, it 

requires itself to be explained. What caused the force 
12 



2 $8 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

or energy ? It is futile to refer us from one event to 
another — from a new phenomenon to its cause in 
motion, and from motion to its cause and force. It is 
idle to point us to the interdependence between one 
form of motion and another. That is an ignoratio 
elenchi. The question remains unanswered, what is 
the sufficient cause of all the motion, and all the force ? 
The intellect insists on there being one, whether we 
discover it or not. It brings us no nearer the answer 
to say the effect we see is dependent upon a series, 
or any number of series of causes preceding ; for the 
question returns, what are the series dependent upon ? 
No solution is found until we pass from all second 
causes to the First. 

Mechanical motion has no congruity with thought, or 
will ; and therefore no fitness to be their cause. How- 
ever diversified the forms of motion, its essential idea 
never approaches to that of mental action. 

To trace all to matter and energy united, does not 
mend the case. One is as inappropriate as the other 
to produce thought, will, and personality ; and two 
causes are no more capable of producing an effect to 
which they are both inappropriate, than is either of 
them separately. A mere hypothesis, which, by 
ascribing mind to matter and force alone, has to en- 
counter insuperable difficulties at every step, has no 
claim to the title of science, or to rank as a rational 
account of the universe. 

Failing to explain all by matter and energy, the 
Materialist sometimes brings in Law to complete the 
solution. But Law, when questioned, like Balaam, 
blesses what Materialism bids it curse. Force works 
so uniformly in a set order that, in a given case, its 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2$g 



future modes can often be foretold. On its doing so, 
men daily stake the greatest issues. Atheism attributes 
this to law. But since law is not efficiency, that only 
shifts the question to the meaning and cause of law. 
Law is not a substance, nor a force; but a rule to 
which the ways of force conform. It is the reason why 
force proceeds in this way rather than that. The 
proper notion of law is that of a precept authoritatively 
imposed by a lawgiver, and applies to moral govern- 
ment ; and it is because we see how physical forces act, 
as if commanded by an authority who determines their 
courses, that we borrow the term from moral govern- 
ment, and say the changes of all nature are subject to 
law. Observing that those forces are regulated, and 
harmonized, and always act in the same way under the 
same conditions, we infer there must be a rule, plan, or 
order, according to which they act. But all this pre- 
supposes intelligence to devise the plan, and authority 
to enforce it. Law is not substantial, but ideal, and 
belongs to mind. It makes no difference to our argu- 
ment whether the law be enforced by constituting the 
substance, or the energy, so that it cannot but act as the 
law intends, or by incessant influence of the Lawgiver ; 
there is an ideal in either case, which necessitates a 
master-mind. 

An Agnostic Atheist tells us, laws are " the product of 
self-evolution." 1 Then that, out of which they were 
produced, was previously in the self-evolved subject; 
for they could not be produced out of nothing. But 
how came they to be latent in matter ? and how came 
laws, such as intelligence alone could produce, to be 



i «« 



Physicus," p. 86. 



26o FIRST PR1NC1PIES OF FAITH. 

produced by unintelligent matter ? and whence came 
the law of self-evolution, which produced all the other 
laws ? All laws must have been produced by something 
anterior to themselves ; and therefore before the law 
of " self-evolution " originated. Thus " self-evolution " 
was produced by law before any law existed ; and 
law was produced by " self-evolution." Ill conditioned 
indeed must be that philosophy whose foundations are 
laid in such circular reasoning. 

The law itself is a fact to be accounted for ; and as 
neither matter, nor force, can arrange, co-ordinate, and 
adapt, especially on the vast scale visible in nature, 
the cause of law must be sought outside the Materialist's 
universe. Atheism fails to find that cause — nay, forbids 
all search where it is likely to be found. Theism easily 
finds it in Almighty God. 

By way of finding the First Cause of nature within 
itself, it is sometimes represented as a machine in 
which one form of motion eventuates in another, that 
in a third, and so on, the unchangeable sum total of 
energy being continually transferred, all events taking 
place on the principle of interdependence between the 
parts, that is, action and reaction. For example, the 
ice thaws because energy, as heat, is transferred to it 
from the sun ; the mill-wheel is turned because energy 
is transferred to it from the melted and falling water ; 
the corn is ground by the energy it derives from the 
wheel ; the energy passes from the flour to give action to 
the animal frame, and is thence transferred to the objects 
on which the animal acts, and may ultimately find its 
way back to the sun. This is no solution of the problem 
at all ; but so far as it goes, explains a totally different 
problem, namely, how the parts of nature affect each other. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 26 1 



The question to be answered is, what is the prime cause 
of all the changes, and of the entire machine ? What 
caused the interdependence ? Whence did the machine 
obtain its forces and laws ? We have an instance of 
this see-saw kind of explanation in the words of Dr. 
Louis Biichner. Speaking of the reciprocal depen- 
dence of animal and vegetable life, he writes, "They 
in no way follow a supernatural order, but a strict 
necessity, which results from the things themselves and 
their relation to each other." l The " things themselves " 
are the animal and the vegetable. Each feeds upon 
what the other throws off as refuse. Could blind 
necessity suit them to each other, with such 
precision, uniformity, and universality ? To say " the 
things themselves " are the cause of their interdepen- 
dence, only evades the question at one point, to be 
confronted by it at another ; thus — What causes " the 
things themselves " to cause this interdependence ? and 
the question is never answered until we reach an 
uncaused cause. It must be that, or again, an eternal 
succession of causes, which, as we have seen, is for- 
bidden by the law of contradictions. 

We need not insist too tenaciously that "their 
relation to each other " Is their mutual dependence ; 
and therefore, not its cause. For it might be intended 
that one relation is the cause of another. It is, how- 
ever, relevant to ask, how this "strict necessity" is 
ascertained. Is it anything but a baseless assumption, 
used as a way of escaping a Theistic conclusion? 
Again, if such finely-adjusted events take place by 
'strict necessity," how does that exclude a "super- 



1 -Force and Matter, p. 103. 



262 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



natural order"? "A supernatural order" is not, as 
the statement assumes, the antithesis of a " strict 
necessity " in the motions of animal and vegetable life, 
and therefore is not excluded by it. Not only are the 
two compatible; but even if the "necessity" were 
granted, it would still be easier to account for such 
necessary relations by reference to a supernatural 
intelligence than by an utterly unintelligent, and un- 
intelligible abstraction under the name of "strict 
necessity." i he former readily explains all ; the latter 
explains nothing. On the whole, despite the semblance 
of argument, Buchner's statement amounts only to an 
unsupported Atheistic assertion, which will not bear the 

light of truth. 

The same writer observes, that "the search of 
philosophers after a First Cause is like ascending an 
endless ladder." 1 Precisely so, as long as they ob- 
stinately refuse to recognize any cause but matter, with 
its energy and laws. But how is it known to be 
endless, not having been climbed ? The futile effort 
to find all in second causes is obviated by the Theist, 
who, instead of attempting to ascend an endless ladder, 
ascends from second causes to the First. 

The speculations of scientists concerning matter or 
"mass," their unquestionable, and invaluable dis- 
coveries respecting energy, their vastly enlarged ac- 
quaintance with physical laws, while highly serviceable 
to the ends of science and man's secular interests, so 
far from enabling the Atheist to account for the world 
without a God, have enriched Theism with new displays 
of Divine wisdom. 

1 P. xxviii. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 263 



To make up for the failure of necessity to explain the 
world, resort is had to the ancient theory of " fortuitous 
combination." « The combination of natural materials 
and forces/' says Buchner, « must in giving rise to the 
variety of existing forms, have at the same time be- 
come mutually united, and determined, and must have 
produced corresponding contrivances, which, super- 
ficially considered, appear to have been produced by 
an external power. Our reflecting reason is the sole 
cause of this apparent design, which is nothing but the 
necessary consequence of natural materials and forces " 
' What is now existing in the world is the remains of 
an infinite number of beginnings." As nature acts not 
from -conscious design, but according to an immanent 
necessary instinct, it becomes obvious that it must be 
guilty of many purposeless absurdities." 1 The meaning 
is that after millions and millions of abortions, the 
atoms and forces in existence were of such a character 
that, at last, without thought, design, or act of any 
other being, they necessarily happened to fall into 
harmonious combination, taking the form of the present 
universe. 

It is almost superfluous to remark that this is a 
wild hypothesis, for which no tittle of evidence can 
be adduced, and whose only raison d'etre seems to be 
that some supposition, however extreme, must be 
devised, rather than accept the Theistic solution. 

_ But the hypothesis is overwhelmed with improba- 
bility. For instance, it implies that not two, but 
countless millions of atoms fell into harmonious com- 
bination, that their qualities and forces became adjusted 

1 Force and Matter, pp. 89, 90, 92. 



264 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAI1H. 



throughout the immeasurable range of existence, 
leaving none out of the arrangement to subsist or 
wander aimlessly, each taking its place and work in 
an all-comprehensive, perfectly balanced system, which 
everywhere works on uniform principles, and bears as 
much the impress of unity, as if infinite intelligence 
had contrived and conducted the whole ; and yet 
intelligence had nothing to do with it ! In asking us 
to believe this stupendous improbability, Atheism must 
reckon on a credulity not surpassed by mediaeval 
superstition. Far more accordant with sober truth 
seems the view of Sir Isaac Newton, that " God in 
the beginning formed matter in solid, massy, hard, 
impenetrable, movable particles of such sizes and 
figures, and with such other properties, and in such 
proportion to space as most conduced to the end for which 
He formed them." 1 

Presuming that all the sounds essential to a skilled 
performance of Handel's Messiah are contained in the 
discordant noises of the city of London, it is con- 
ceivable that, at some juncture, they, or some of them, 
might without design, happen to unite in such harmony 
and orderly succession as would be identical, in the 
result, with an artistic performance of that master- 
piece ; and that without any previous conception of 
the music by Handel, or any other intelligent, being. 
But the chances against such a coincidence are so 
vast that we are as certain it will never occur, as we 
are that two and two will never be equal to five. Or 
suppose by a similar combination of accidents, coal, 

1 Quoted from Newton's Optics, by Dr. Stallo, Concepts, 
p. 40, 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 2 6$ 



timber, stone, brick, leather, oil, iron, wool, and every 
other element comprised in a large manufactory, were 
to come together and produce large quantities of useful 
fabrics, without intelligence. The improbability of such 
occurrence, though very great, is far less than that offered 
to us by Atheism. Or take the more familiar illustration. 
Suppose the type, which, skilfully composed, would 
print Paradise Lost, to lie in a confused heap, and then 
being knocked about by accident, to fall together just 
as the compositor would place it for the printing of 
that poem ; suppose too, that the press came together 
in the same way, and, by a fortuitous combination of 
forces, the machine struck off a great number of copies; 
and stranger still, suppose no mind, Milton's or any 
other, had previously made the poem ; and that it was 
afterwards read and admired by intelligent beings; 
everybody must see this is an hypothesis devoid of the 
faintest trace of probability. But far more extreme 
and incredible is the hypothesis that all materials and 
forces, being in a state of chaos, came .into the mutual 
fitness harmony and order now everywhere visible, 
and that without prevision, or intelligent contrivance. 

It is important to note further, that if this extravagant 
theory of cosmogenesis were allowed to pass as sound, 
it would not carry the Atheistic conclusion. We should 
still have to ask for the cause of this strange genesis of 
our cosmos. A fortuitous event is no more uncaused 
than any other ; how much less such a collocation of 
events as this hypothesis is invented to explain. 
When we have supposed the present world, with its 
magnificence and systematized forces, to have origi- 
nated by the accidental correlation of chaotic .elements, 
the laws of thought declare that such beginning must 



266 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF .FAITH. 

have been the effect of some anterior cause ; just as 
certainly as are the ordinary operations of to-day. 
Thus the hypothesis would not bring us a hair's 
breadth nearer an explanation of the world. 

We are led to the same result, if we seek an 
Atheistic explanation, by means of any particular theory 
of cosmogenesis. Take, for example, the nebular 
theory. Our question is not, whether it be true ; but 
whether, if true, it would sufficiently explain the 
present world. Our objection is not to the theory ; 
but to its Atheistic application. According to the 
theory, all matter was primordially attenuated and 
uniformly distributed. By some means, large portions 
got separated into nebulous masses, resembling in con- 
sistence some now existing. Gradually these masses 
cooled, and consequently revolved more quickly, until, 
in course of time, they developed into the present 
celestial and terrestrial bodies, and, by similar pro- 
cesses of evolution and motion, attained their respec- 
tive structures and movements. Much has been 
adduced from the laws of motion and other quarters 
against the theory. 1 

My only concern is to point out that were the 
theory accepted, it would fail to account for our 
universe, with a First Cause. At every point the 
principle of causality demands efficiency, and when 
the search has brought us through the formation of 
the orbs and of the nebulae to the primordial atoms, 
the question remains, how could these uniformly dis- 
tributed atoms begin to fit, and act upon each other, 
and act together in unison ? How came they to be 



1 See Stallo, Concepts, etc., pp. 277-286. 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 267 



thus uniformly distributed ? and how was it they all, 
just at the same time, acted according to similar laws ? 
How, unless they were so constituted and correlated by 
some intelligent power ? The impossibility of account- 
ing for the existence attributes and procedure of the 
primordial atoms, without God, is as fatal to Atheism 
as the impossibility of so accounting for the complex, 
and highly organized universe of the present time. 

Take, again, the hypothesis of " meteoric agglome- 
ration," which supposes that primevally there were 
swarms of meteors, " of all sizes, and of all degrees and 
forms of consistency and aggregation, moving about at 
all rates of velocity, in all directions, and in orbits of 
every degree of eccentricity. These masses would be 
consolidated, and movements, both of rotation and re- 
volution, would be generated in the bodies so formed by 
their collisions." 1 Again, causality demands a cause 
for the swarms of meteors, their likenesses and diversi- 
ties, their directions and velocities, their capability of 
collision, rotation, and consolidation. Nor can it be 
satisfied with merely second causes, however remotely 
traced. 

The impotency of Atheism to explain the universe 
becomes yet more manifest, when we recollect that 
life, and mind, and morality, and religion, are as truly a 
part of the universe to be accounted for, as matter and 
motion. It is beyond question that life cannot be pro- 
duced in nature, except from life ; that all the chemistry 
and mechanics of science are unable to originate it. 
Materialism is bound to confess it cannot find out how 
non-living things could develop life from themselves 



1 See Stallo, pp. 287, 288. 



268 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH, 



alone. Yet rather than believe it is due to the wisdom 
and power of a First Cause, it makes the enormous 
assumption that life is only a form of ''atomic 
mechanics." 

Assumption grows yet more desperate, when it 
insists that mind, with its marvellous faculties of per- 
ception reflection memory judgment imagination and 
sensitivity, is nothing but matter and motion. Pro- 
perties altogether foreign to matter are declared to be 
material ; operations having no conceivable congruity 
with mechanics are pronounced mechanical ; the process 
of thinking, the connection of which with the most highly 
organized form of matter — the human brain — defies all 
conception, must nevertheless be assumed to be only a 
state of matter, in order to meet the exigencies of 
Atheism. And this method of proceeding, forsooth, is 
the one which lays special claim to be considered the 
ally, or the child of modern science. Professor Tyndall 
at Birmingham acknowledged the mysterious chasm 
between brain and thought ; but when at Belfast, he 
" discerned " in matter " the promise and potency of 
every form and quality of life ; " it was when he had 
" prolonged the vision backward across the boundary of 
the experimental evidence," that is, it was " discerned " 
by a stretch of imagination less excusable in a great 
scientist than in a neophyte. 

Pressed by the essential difference between matter 
and mind, and unable to dispense with the latter in 
accounting for the phenomena of the former, the ex- 
ponents, of Atheism have sometimes sought help in the 
stoical doctrine of Hylozoism, which considers every 
minute particle of matter as intimately united with a 
measure of mind, acting as the formative energy of 



BEARING OF SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY. 269 



nature (natura naturans), and the cause of all mental 
phenomena, indeed the God of the universe, so far as 
anything can be so designated. Hylozoism leads now 
towards Pantheism, and then towards Materialism. 
Not to dwell on the preposterousness of a God thus 
divided distributed and eternally tied down to matter, 
we observe that such a God must be impersonal, having 
no united control over the world, and incapable of 
moral government. But how comes the mind of each 
atom to behave in harmony with that of every other, 
and all of them to unite in a system which comprehends 
all existence, and to operate through innumerable ages as 
perfectly as if designed and ruled by the wisdom of an 
Infinite Mind? This theory of " mind stuff" besides 
being a mere hypothesis, utterly fails to make up for 
the incompetency of Atheism to account for the existing 
world. 

Morality constitutes a large proportion of human 
experience. The notion of moral qualities is universal 
and ineradicable. Much of human conduct is directed 
by moral judgments. Such is the character of most 
men's social behaviour ; and many of their emotions are 
associated with moral approbation or disapprobation. 
But how it was possible for all this to arise out of matter 
and motion, the materialist is unable to explain. He 
has to make his choice between a gross utilitarianism 
from which everything worthy the name of morality is 
eliminated, and the renunciation of morality altogether ; 
either of which, being contrary to nature, is fatal to 
Atheism. 

Of course religion and Atheism are exclusive of each 
other. But religion is a great fact in what the Atheist 
calls nature ; for on his scheme, whatever is must be 



270 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



natural. Consequently he is bound to reconcile the 
fact with his system. But how can he? Unless 
nature, in its external order, and its human intuitions 
and ratiocinations, as well as in the deepest instincts 
of the human heart, clinging as they do to the idea of 
God, be the greatest and most deceitful lie— that is, 
nature lying to itself— the dictates of human reason and 
the religious needs and bias of human nature admit of 
no solution except as the work of God. 

In conclusion, we are warranted by the foregoing 
considerations to affirm that Atheistic Materialism is 
condemned on its own appeal to science and reason. 
With some exceptions, it, like Theism, recognizes the 
principle of causality, and reasons on natural phenomena 
as effects of antecedent causes ; but it stops short of 
tracing up the regression to an adequate cause, in which 
alone " the craving for causal connections " may firmly 
and for ever rest. Indeed it deliberately refuses to be 
led by the same principle of causality to Him in whom 
it might gratefully find the source and end of all things. 



PART V. 

RELATION OF NATURAL TO REVEALED 

THEOLOGY. 



PART V. 

RELATION OF NATURAL TO REVEALED 

THEOLOGY. 

THE Revelation referred to is that which comes to 
us through the supernatural inspiration of the 
Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The scope 
of our inquiry does not comprise the credentials of 
Christianity, or of its Sacred Books. Assuming that, 
in the Scriptures, we have Divinely authoritative doc- 
trine of Divine things, distinguished as pre-eminently 
The Revelation, and that, at least, something of the 
same doctrine may be educed from nature, which is 
also, in a more general sense, a revelation from the 
same source, it becomes much more than a matter of 
curiosity to inquire how the two revelations stand 
related to each other. For doubtless if both be true, 
and have a common origin, there must be correspond- 
ence between them. We may reasonably expect that 
one will be complementary, supplementary, or auxiliary 
to the other, and that the more they are understood, 
the more they will manifest their mutual agreement in 
doctrine, and as means for common ends. 

There are earnest defenders of the faith who might 
object to the phrase " Revealed Theology," on the 
ground that Theology is human and revelation Divine. 
It must be granted at once, that the process of throwing 



274 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

Scriptural truth into systematic form is the work of 
men, and the theology thus produced may err, more or 
less, in both substance and form. So far as it is human 
and not Divine, it is no part of the Revelation. But 
so far as, in substance or form, it is derived from the 
Scriptures, it is Revealed Theology, just as the faith 
and practice of religion, so far as they are drawn from the 
inspired Scriptures, are Revealed Religion. For example, 
the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation, being 
unknown to us except through the supernatural Reve- 
lation, remain Revealed Theology when correctly set 
in the creeds of the Christian Church. They are 
Divine in their source, and belong to the subject-matter 
of Divine teaching. 

Moreover, beyond the systems which men form, 
there is a real, infallible, and Divine system of truth in 
relation to Divine things. The truth to God's mind is 
one. Its several parts to His view are not, as they 
may seem to ours, at various points unrelated or 
disjointed, but perfectly harmonious, one involving 
another, and all constituting a unity without excess 
or defect. Our systems of theology are attempts to 
reproduce that perfect system, in whole or in part. So 
far as we reproduce it from the Scriptures, it is matter 
of Revelation, and is Revealed Theology. 

In the present case, however, there is no begging of 
the question in the use of the phrase. It is employed 
not to stamp any particular system as Divine, but as 
a convenient form of words to distinguish our know- 
ledge of Divine things, as derived from the inspired 
Scriptures, from kindred knowledge gathered by obser- 
vation of nature. 

Respecting the comparative value of the several lines 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 27$ 



ot argument, by which natural theology is constructed, 
opinions of believers differ. To some there is nothing 
so assuring as general consent, while others cling 
to what they consider intuitive dictation. A few 
may claim the palm for the necessary concepts of the 
human mind, and the necessity of corresponding reality. 
These, in the estimation of others, yield but little 
support in comparison with the universal tradition, 
which, from the earliest times, has handed down from 
sire to son, though in widely different forms and 
degrees, the sublime idea of a Supreme Being, around 
which argument has entwined itself, but whose en- 
largement consistency and splendour are due to 
supernatural Revelation. Difference of mental calibre 
and habit, combined with diversity of outward con- 
ditions, may do much to account for this variety of 
preference. 

I may therefore be allowed to declare my preference 
for the course of argument pursued in the foregoing 
pages, as the most simple, cogent, and available. At 
any rate, whatever its comparative value, it is a factor 
of the highest importance, in the maintenance of 
Theistic belief. It requires no extraordinary mental 
power or training to grasp its significance, and feel its 
force. It is accessible to ordinary minds ; and if 
attention be centred on the subject, the inference of a 
First Cause is often felt to be unavoidable. To look for 
the causes of things is one of the most familiar and 
interesting exercises of the intellect. Applied to the 
First Cause, it is but the same law of thought carried 
out within its legitimate province. 

Truly enough, there has grown up around the 
question much metaphysical and abstruse controversy. 



276 FIE ST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



But the kernel of the question remains simple, and the 
Theistic inference easy, and convincing. That every 
event must have a sufficient cause, that all second 
causes must have a First, and consequently, that a 
First is required to account for known events, is an 
argument quite within the compass of the generality of 
minds, while the materials for its construction are as 
plentiful, and ready to hand, as the facts of human 
experience and observation. 

The value of the argument is not to be measured 
solely by our ability to present, or even to remember all 
its parts and their logical articulation. All the better if 
we can, at any moment, retrace the grounds of our 
conviction. But on secular, and scientific, as well as 
sacred, subjects it is neither uncommon nor unreasonable 
to hold fast a conclusion when the reasons for it have 
more or less faded from the memory. Not unfrequently 
men feel bound to abide by a judgment, though unable 
to recall all the decisive steps of the process by which 
it was formed, or to detect on the instant the flaws of 
objections raised against it. In such case, we recollect 
having seen good reason for the result ; and our 
inability to recollect fully the process of conviction does 
not deprive us of that result. Unable to answer an 
assault upon our position, we are nevertheless sure we 
have honestly chosen safe ground. Many a mind might 
be puzzled to detect the fallacies of Hume's or Mill's 
objections to the etiological proof, and yet justly 
decline to surrender a jot of its assurance that the 
proof was sound. 

Doubtless many honest minds see the power and 
wisdom ot God in nature, and devoutly connect His 
wonderful works with Himself, without ever throwing 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 2JJ 



their thoughts thereupon into logical form, and possibly 
without ever thinking that they are reasoning at all, 
though a challenge may set them on adducing or 
formulating their reasons. So simple and natural i s 
the process of associating the effect with its cause. On 
the other hand, perversity of disposition may obscure, 
and even destroy the recognition of the First Cause, 
as it did in the corrupt Gentiles, who, because " they 
refused to have God in their knowledge," lost sight of 
"that which may be known of God." "For the in- 
visible things of Him since the creation of the world are 
clearly seen, being perceived through the things that 
are made, even His everlasting power and divinity." 
But any other branch of Theistic evidence is liable to 
be nullified in the same way. 

I cannot but think the etiological argument has 
received scant justice at the hands of some orthodox 
theologians. Dr. Hodge, for example, says it "does 
not give a satisfactory reason for the universality and 
strength of the conviction of the existence of God. 
Our own consciousness teaches us that this is not the 
ground of our own faith. We do not thus reason 
ourselves into the belief that there is a God ; and it is 
very obvious that it is not by such a process of ratio- 
cination, simple as it is, that the mass of the people are 
brought to this conclusion." 1 In these sentences the 
proof is confounded with the first discovery of the 
notion of God in the minds of individuals, which may 
rest on different grounds. Some of the statements 
seem to refer to the former, and others to the latter. 
As a matter of fact, men seldom, if ever, "reason 

1 Theology, vol. i. pp. i 99 , 2 oo 



278 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



themselves into" the discovery ; but they often do into 
the evidence, and into more consistent views of God. 
The proof may be elaborated long after the idea is 

conceived. 

There is a logical, and a chronological order of our 
knowledge of God. In the order of time, the first 
ideas of God, among all nations, are commonly derived 
from parents teachers and elders, as they received 
them from their predecessors ; and that prior to proof, 
or controversy, just as we derive our first impressions 
of Christianity, and even of science. It is generally, in 
the first instance, a matter of testimony by those whom 
we can trust. But by-and-by questionings arise from 
within ; attacks are made from without. Theism comes 
into conflict with anti-Theism. Everything is challenged. 
We have then to feel our way down to first principles, 
to analyse our consciousness, to question external 
nature, and, according to our ability or need, to 
formulate the reasons of oui faith. This logical order 
amplifies, corrects, and proves the idea of God received 
previously by tradition ; and in the etiological argument 
it reasons upwards from nature to God. If not " the," 
it is certainly a very important " ground of our own 
faith : " and though it does not give all the reasons, it 
does "give a satisfactory reason for the universality 
and strength of the conviction of the existence of 
God." It is undeniable that the " strength " is in- 
creased, and the " universality " maintained, more or 
less, by the evidence of nature as an effect of a First 
Cause. Even benighted barbarians get glimpses of the 
Psalmist's lofty view of God as nature's Cause. " The 
heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament 
sheweth His handiwork." 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 2?$ 

The same kind of objection has often been raised 
against the evidences of Christianity. With few ex- 
ceptions, belief in the Divine origin of the Christian 
religion precedes the knowledge of its evidences. By 
the process just mentioned, the truth is accepted on 
testimony, and its supports in reason are learned and 
arranged in the order of thought afterwards ; the last 
being often placed first, and the first last. But that 
inversion of the temporal order of Christian apologetics, 
is no disparagement of their value ; neither is Theistic 
evidence disparaged by that order which builds up 
faith in God's existence, on the foundation of reason 
applied to His works. Viewing the matter in this light, 
there is no warrant for the assertion that " our own 
consciousness teaches us that this is not the ground of 
our own faith," unless it mean the exclusive ground ; 
and even then the statement needs qualification. 

No single line of proof could be properly called the 
exclusive ground of Theistic belief; but we have a 
right to say that, without the etiological argument, no 
system of Theism can be complete ; while in respect 
of force and wide applicability, it is second to 
none. Had we any accurate test, it might be found 
that much of the strength and prevalence of Theistic 
belief, apart from Revelation, is largely due to this 
familiar habit of reasoning from causality. At any rate 
Dr. Hodge's appeal to consciousness is not conclusive 
m favour of his view. The consciousness of many 
tells them their belief in God owes much to this line 
of argument ; and probably many more are under the 
same obligation, who never analyse the bases of their 
belief; while doubtless again the known convictions 
of many etiologists, who are regarded as sincere, and 



2 80 FIKST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



competent judges, influence many in favour of Theism, 
who never investigate thoroughly for themselves. 

Dr. Hodge varies the phraseology when speaking of 
the influence of tradition. The one section is headed 
"The knowledge of God is not due to a Process of 
Reasoning/' while the following is headed " Knowledge 
of God not due exclusively to Tradition/' as if to 
intimate that it is not due at all to "a Process of 
Reasoning." Enough has been adduced to show that, 
in part at least, it is due to reasoning. 

The whole bearing of the comparison seems intended 
to imply that the one thing to which our natural 
knowledge of God is due, specially if not exclusively, 
is intuition. " There is no satisfactory way," he avers, 
" of accounting for the universal belief in the existence 
of God, except that such belief is founded on the very 
constitution of our nature." Truly enough the etio- 
logical course of argument is "founded in the very 
constitution of our nature ; " inasmuch as it is founded 
in the necessary intuition of causality. But the context 
makes it clear that Dr. Hodge means a direct intuition 
of God's existence, which, as we have seen, is the least 
reliable, ground of Theistic belief. 

The strength, however, of natural theology is to be 
estimated, not by any one line of proof, but all combined. 
The comparative value of each is of little consequence 
compared with that compact body of evidence which 
is afforded by all united. This indeed is the only 
reasonable standard of their value. The several depart- 
ments of evidence are so many pillars, though not of 
equal strength, on whose combined support our faith 
may rest securely amidst the adverse winds of doctrine 
and varying currents of scepticism to which religion is 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 28 1 



exposed; but which, to earnest faith, need be nothing 
worse than a bracing discipline. 

From one point of view natural theology confirms 
revealed; and from another, is confirmed and com- 
pleted by it. In the latter case the natural is a postulate 
and basis of the supernatural— a preparatory stage of 
Divine knowledge— a strong presumptive ground, on 
which to expect the supernatural as its complement 
and explanation. In the former case, natural theology 
is a branch of knowledge to which the supernatural is 
nearly akin, and from which it claims acknowledgment. 
1. Natural Theology as a Postulate of Revealed. 
The Christian Revelation is addressed neither to an 
anti-Theistic, nor a non-Theistic state of mind. The idea 
of God is taken for granted, which presupposes some 
means of attaining the idea independently of the Revela- 
tion. The idea may be crude, abject, inconsistent, or 
otherwise unworthy of the reality ; yet it is there. It 
would be an exaggeration to assert that natural theology 
is a sine qua non of supernatural. But the position of 
the latter would be much weakened by the absence of 
the former. Revelation gives, not an entirely new, but 
a much clearer and fuller view of Divine things ; and, in 
doing so, it has the advantage of the preparation afforded 
by the inferior state of knowledge. As is often remarked, 
the one is a republication of the other; and, in part] 
owes its success to what remains of the first publi- 
cation. The second is a Revelation of what, rather 
than that God is. Were there no natural theology, the 
supernatural could not, as now, build upon its recog- 
nized truths; but must commence its work with a 
non-Theistic state of mind, and without the data it now 

finds in natural theology. 
19 * y 



282 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAiTH. 



The position of English Deism was manifestly unten- 
able. Change towards Christianity in the one direction, 
or, in the opposite, towards Pantheism, or Atheism, was„ 
as the result showed, logically inevitable. The Deism 
of Lord Herbert and Dr. Tindal included ideas of God 
as seen through His works, which created so high a 
presumption in favour of revealed religion, that either 
Christianity must be accepted, or belief in the Deity 
abandoned. It became apparent that natural theology,, 
if true, was a postulate, from which it was easy U> 
argue the truth of the Christian Revelation. It is so 
still. As a foundation may be undervalued because it 
is hidden beneath the superstructure, there is danger 
lest the dependence of revealed religion on its natural 
supports should be forgotten or under-estimated. 
Take, for example, some of the well-known evidences 
of the Christian religion. 

The place of the Presumptive argument is anterior to 
the reception of the inspired Scriptures. It runs thus, — 
A supernatural Revelation impossible. From all we know 
of God and man, there is nothing on either side to 
preclude the possibility. For instance, if some such 
process as inspiration be necessary, as a medium of 
communication, there is nothing in nature to prevent 
its use. Moreover, such Revelation is necessary, 
because of man's ignorance on questions of deepest 
moment to himself. He knows enough to require 
more. Consequently it is probable that God will grant 
such Revelation. Assuming His ability and man's- 
necessity, it may be inferred that He will not withhold 
the knowledge of Himself for which man craves. But 
this inference of what God will do is based on our 
previous ideas of what He is, in power wisdom and 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 28 



3 



goodness. The fuller knowledge is anticipated, because 
of the partial knowledge already in possession. Ima- 
gine man in his present condition, minus all natural 
and supernatural theology ; and the argument is then 
impossible. 

Again, the supernatural Revelation is attested by 
miracles. Had the Materialistic theory of nature been 
true, miracles would have been impossible. On the 
Theistic view of nature, there is nothing therein to 
preclude miracles. The question of their occurrence is 
simply one of evidence ; not of possibility. But to 
approach the question of supernatural Revelation with 
the knowledge that the Author of nature is able to 
attest any such Revelation by miracles, is an immense 
advantage on the side of the Revelation. 

Further, if we approach the subject holding the 
philosophy of nescience, as propounded by Hamilton, 
and applied by Spencer, credulity is strained to the 
utmost, on the two questions, whether God is, and what 
He is ; for we have then to accept the idea of God 
solely on the statement of the Revelation ; and, at the 
same time, to believe the reality may be altogether 
different from our idea of Him. The certainty that we 
have found some evidence that God is, and that we 
know to some extent what He is, prepares us for 
accepting Him as being what His word declares Him 
to be. 

Again, scanty as our knowledge of God may be, it 
is enough to afford some touchstone of the character 
of the God revealed. If from nature we learn that He 
must be a Being of supreme power intelligence and 
goodness, we are prepared to reject any professed 
Revelation, the author of which is devoid of these 



284 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



characteristics. The pretended message is discredited, 
as unworthy of a Divine origin ; while the unfolding 
of these characteristics, even in far brighter lines than 
those in which nature shows them, is a prima facie reason 
for accepting as Divine any message accompanied by 
such credentials. By this criterion, systems falsely 
claiming to be from heaven have been detected, and 
justly condemned ; and by it the Christian Revelation 
has been heard speaking as became the voice of 

God. 

Once more, natural theology involves expectations of, 
and longings for certain benefits at the hands of God — 
not only the fuller knowledge of His attributes and 
general government, but assurance of His pity and help- 
fulness, and the terms on which they may be obtained. 
It may thus be concluded beforehand, that any true 
Revelation from nature's God will correspond to this 
need. Here then is another clue to aid our endeavours 
to discriminate between true and spurious Revela- 
tion. 1 

2. Natural Theology as a Confirmation of Revealed. 

Natural theology may be conceivably approached on 
the side of Revealed from either of two starting-points. 
We may suppose the Scriptural idea of God taken 
for granted, as needing no proof of its own beyond 
commending itself to the human intellect and heart 
previously blank on the subject, and so commanding 
assent ; and we may conceive of the mind as thence 
proceeding to compare it with the teachings of God 



1 Professor Flint in his able Lectures on Anti-Theism has 
well observed that no anti-Theistic system can ever lead up 
to revealed theology. On the principles of Atheism or Pan- 
theism, such revelation is obviously impossible. 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY, 285 



in nature. Of this process we have no experience. 
We know of no people, who, on first hearing the 
message of the Scriptures, were utterly destitute of the 
notion of Deity. Hence we have no test-case. Conse- 
quently, we cannot say positively that such would be 
the effect in any unknown case. The Scriptural idea of 
God commends itself powerfully to the human mind ; 
but it does so on various grounds or reasons, such as 
its intrinsic excellence, its responsive fitness to the 
human intellect and heart, and other kinds of evidence 
which presuppose some notion of God. 

Or, on the other hand, we may begin with testimony 
and history, and, on indubitable proof, conclude that the 
Scriptural Revelation of God's existence and character 
was demonstrated " by signs, and wonders, and divers 
miracles." And with the knowledge of God thus obtained, 
we may proceed to the consideration of nature, in rela- 
tion to the same subject. This is a valid line of argu- 
ment, every step of which may be logically established. 
But it rears the whole fabric of theology on a somewhat 
narrow base ; firm enough it may be for rigid logic ; 
but our faith reposes more securely, when this form of 
argument is buttressed by that which nature supplies. 

My present object, however, is to show that on what- 
ever argumentative basis the Scriptural knowledge of 
Divine things rests, when we take it with us into the 
realm of nature, it is strikingly corroborated by its 
correspondence to the revelation of God in nature. 

The God of the Bible is one, almighty, eternal, all- 
wise, righteous, and benevolent. In less definite cha- 
racters, the same attributes may be read in the 
phenomena of mind and matter. Were it otherwise, 
the silence of nature might awaken suspicion of the 



286 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



declarations of the written Word. All our ideas of the 
relation of God to nature would have to be brought 
to it from the verbal Revelation ; and thus the Theism 
of nature would be destitute of foundation in nature, 
and dependent entirely on supernatural communications. 
Happily, the credentials of supernatural Revelation are 
not required to bear this ponderous burden ; but, on 
the other hand, they receive support from natural 
Theism. As the case stands, that which the Word 
declares the works of nature illustrate and confirm. 
Revelation professes to come, not from a God having 
nothing to do with the world we live in, but from one 
to whom all things are subject, and whose attributes 
are unfolded in His dominion over all existence. 
When, therefore, we read on every page of nature, the 
signs of His wondrous unity power wisdom justice 
and benevolence, we are constrained to say, this is the 
same Supreme Being as we behold in our written 
Revelation. Thus the correspondence goes far to 
establish the truthfulness of the supernatural message. 
The lack of this correspondence is becoming increas- 
ingly felt by some anti-Christian systems, the deities 
of whose sacred books bear little or no resemblance to 
the Divinity evidently controlling the world and its 
operations. The more our knowledge of nature in- 
creases, the more fatal it proves to the teaching of 
heathen religions, respecting the relations of Divinity 
with the origin and government of the world. 

Then again, the written Revelation represents man 
as having, by sin, come under Divine displeasure .; and 
yet as under a redemptive dispensation which brings 
the Spirit of God into active intercourse with men's 
minds, awakening compunction for sin and yearnings 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 287 



after a better state in the future. The counterpart of 
all this may be traced in human nature, where sin and 
conscience are seen in perpetual conflict, and men's 
hearts aspiring after, or longing for deliverance from 
the miserable realities which cling to their mortal life. 
Human and cosmic nature reflect, with more or less 
distinctness, the Scriptural doctrine of man's deteri- 
orated relation to God. The cause of Christian evi- 
dences could ill spare the confirmatory echo with which 
natural theology answers to supernatural. 

An excessive estimate of the self-evidencing character 
of God's revelation inclines some of its friends to 
ignore, or dispense with this, and all other collateral 
support, holding that the Divine voice has only to speak 
in the Word, and it will be its own all-sufficient, and 
irresistible evidence to the human mind. Nothing 
would be more difficult to prove than this view. But 
its advocates might deem it, like the Revelation, suffi- 
cient without proof. For others, however, proof is 
essential in order to the reception of either the Reve- 
lation or this theory of its credentials. 

It is easy to mistake for self-evident truth what at 
once commends itself to our judgment taste and 
necessity, impressing us at the same time by its beauty 
its self-consistency, and its agreement with previously 
ascertained truth. Closer analysis of our thinking dis- 
covers comparison and reasoning, though it be instan- 
taneous. The intrinsic excellence of the subject-matter 
of Revelation may well command our admiration, and 
bespeak our hearty concurrence ; but on reflection our 
faith will instinctively cast about for evidential susto 
nance. 

It is plausibly represented that the idea of Cod, as 



288 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

presented in the Scriptures, is no sooner seen than it 
is self-evident, as the light of the sun no sooner falls 
on the eye than the sun is self-evident. This is merely 
saying the mind perceiving an object is assured of its 
own perception. In the case before us, it perceives the 
representation of God, and needs no further proof that 
it actually perceives it ; as seeing a round bright object 
called the sun through the eyes, it needs no other 
evidence of the fact that it sees an object of that 
description. But the question is not whether some- 
thing is perceived, but whether what is perceived is 
what it purports to be, that is, whether the round, 
bright object be really the sun, and whether the 
Scriptural representation of the idea of God be true. 
If our certainty on this point depends entirely on the 
self-evidence of that idea, what of those whose idea 
is partly correct, and partly incorrect ? The idea is 
complex, comprising several different attributes. Is 
each self-evident ? Is their internal harmony self- 
evident ? If this claim for self-evidence be valid, those 
who have been wont to accept the Scriptural notion 
of God, because it corresponds to their conceptions of 
what is most perfect, to all that is seen of Him in 
nature, and to all the characteristics and needs of the 
human soul, and because it is attested by supernatural 
signs, and by the proceedings of the same Being, as 
they are recorded in the Scriptures, must cast away 
these solid grounds of confidence, to rely alone on the 
self-evidence of the presentation — if they can. 

3. Natural Theology Inadequate. 

Notwithstanding its great value as a partial revelation 
of God to man, natural theology is far from sufficient 
to supply what man needs. As a mountain it rears its 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 2S9 



head far above the dead level of ignorance ; and as we 
climb any of its sides, we may fondly fancy it will 
prove the loftiest summit of the range ; but on scaling 
its highest eminence, we find it but a stepping-stone to 
a far higher in Revealed religion. When the latter has 
remained invisible, the most successful climbers, such 
as Socrates and Cicero, have looked away from the 
peaks of natural theology into the dark depths of the 
unknown, with feelings of despondency. This truth 
stands out in bold relief, if we consider man's chief 
needs on the subject. 

(i) The question of the Divine Attributes is all-im- 
portant to man. What God is determines what He 
does. But how incomplete is natural knowledge on 
this subject. We catch glimpses of God's handiwork, 
and, by a series of inferences, conclude that He is 
perfect But occasionally His justice and goodness are 
difficult to make out ; and instances have occurred 
where men thought wisdom was wanting. Nothing in 
nature warrants a conclusion adverse to the perfection 
of its Maker ; but " shadows, clouds, and darkness," 
sometimes obscure the view. After all our deductions, 
God seems distant and unfamiliar — a dread personal 
power behind the veil, until we hear His direct decla- 
rations, " God is a Spirit ; " " God is light ; " " God is 
love ; " " the living God ; " the "lam; " " King eternal, 
immortal, invisible, the only wise God ; " whom " heaven 
and the heaven of heavens cannot contain ; " " God 
blessed for ever;" "with whom is no variableness, 
neither shadow of turning;" "not a man that He 
should lie, nor the son of man that He should repent ; " 
"Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, 
and is, and is to come ; " " The Lord, the Lord God 
13* 



:2go FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in 
goodness and truth ; " " a God of truth and without 
iniquity, just and right is He." Then the dim outlines 
of natural theology are filled up, and the Divine per- 
fections appear full-orbed — a glorious personality, the 
supreme object of pure affection and delight. 

(2) The doctrine of God's Tri-nnity is altogether one 
of special Revelation ; yet necessary to explain the 
methods of Divine procedure. The economy of redeem- 
ing grace is framed and conducted in harmony with that 
doctrine, without which the scheme of man's recovery 
from ruin cannot be understood. But nature is silent 
on the doctrine. Nowhere but in the Revelation of the 
Scriptures do we discover that the "name" of the 
thrice Holy God is " Father," "Son," and "Holy 

Ghost." 

(3) What is to some extent deciphered from the 
attributes of the cosmos, and by metaphysical inference, 
as to the Genesis of all finite beings, the solvent of many 
problems respecting natural phenomena, becomes im- 
movable conviction, as we read in the plain Book of 
God, " In the beginning God created the heaven and the 
earth;" "All things were made by Him;" "and He 
is before all things, and by Him all things consist ; " 
" Of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things, 
to whom be glory for ever." From that source we 
learn that the same Infinite Being who " stretcheth 
forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the 
earth," " formeth the spirit of man within him ; ' and 
is thus "the Father of spirits," "the God of the 
spirits of all flesh." The First Cause, which science, 
in its narrower sense, could not see, and which reason 
descried from the standpoint of science, here declares 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 291 

Himself "God that made the world and all things 
therein." 

(4) Eagerly have men asked whether God who made 
the world, and subjected it to general laws, holds any 
intimate relations with men as individuals, and com- 
munities. Does He care for us, and control our 
affairs ? or are we left to be affected, for good or ill, 
by the perpetual change which belongs to all that is 
temporal, regardless of personal relationship to Him ? 
Is there a Divine Providence, superintending all the 
interests of the present life ? But nature has returned 
no satisfactory answer. In the extremes of human 
experience, the thoughts and desires of men have 
turned earnestly to the skies, in search of some super- 
human personal power, to whom all events are naked 
and open, and in whom they might confide. But the 
heavens have made little or no response. 

It requires a supernatural message to inform us that 
God "doeth according to His will in the army of 
heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth ; " that 
1 in Him we live, and move, and have our being ; " that 
* The Lord God is a sun and shield ; the Lord will 
give grace and glory ; no good thing will He withhold 
from them that walk uprightly ; " " In whose hand is 
the soul of every living thing, and the breath of all 
mankind ; " " Like as a father pitieth his children, even 
so doth the Lord pity them that fear Him." From His 
works alone we conclude that He may; His word 
assures us that He does care for us. Nature may raise, 
but cannot solve the important problem of God's 
attention to all human concerns ; the clearer voice from 
heaven affirms that " From the place of His habitation 
He looketh upon all the inhabitants of the earth." 



292 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

Numbering the very hairs of their heads, how much 
more does He consider the thoughts and requirements 
of their souls. He whose stupendous works in the 
heavens and the earth fill us with wondering awe, 
satisfies not the craving of our hearts until He declares 
Himself " Our Father." 

(5) Still more inadequate is the instruction of nature 
on the more strictly moral government of God. No 
question can arise of deeper importance to man than 
that of His moral rule over us, its reality, its principles, 
its bearing on our interests. Reason can trace that 
rule here and there ; but falls far short of supplying 
the amount of knowledge we urgently need. It tells us 
not why moral and natural evil are allowed to exist 
within the domain of a Righteous and Almighty Lord ; 
or why it is possible for vice to reap the possessions 
and pleasures of life, while virtue lies distressed. It 
may surmise that man has sinned, and come under 
the penal results of wrong-doing ; but Revelation 
clearly and emphatically proclaims that it is so. Reason 
may conjecture, with a measure of probability, that the 
apparent inequities of retribution here may be justified 
by rewards and punishments in the great hereafter; 
the Word certifies this conjecture as truth, with many 
additions in respect of the nature and duration of future 
retribution, awarding to every man " according to the 
deeds done in the body." Conscience, with its sense 
of freedom and responsibility, bears witness to the 
reality of moral government ; but only gropes its way, 
until it receives the guidance of the law which " is holy, 
and just, and good." 

Our moral nature and social condition necessitate 
some code of ethics ; for without it society is impossible. 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 293 

But alone they grovel under sordid and ignoble motives. 
The highest, and only sufficient motive to morality is 
that love which " is the fulfilling of the law." " Thou 
shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart/' and 
consequently, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as 
thyself," contain the grand motive power of moral 
goodness. 

Had reason been able to extract from nature a 
sufficient knowledge of duty to God and fellow-men, 
it would not have sufficed in the absence of that 
authority which Scriptural morality derives from the 
majesty of the Divine Lawgiver, and the sanctions by 
which His law is enforced. With man, at least in his 
present condition, the abstract idea of virtue is in- 
competent to enforce itself. Hence Revelation, while 
furnishing the most explicit enunciation of duty, in the 
name of the Infinite God, supplies motives to obedience, 
in the tremendous sanctions of everlasting punishment 
and everlasting life. In brief, if the moral government 
of God, of which nature affords a rudimentary know- 
ledge, is to be filled out, and duly impress itself on the 
character conduct and destiny of man, it can only be 
done by the luminous teaching of men who spake as 
they were moved by the Holy Ghost. 

(6) But Christian morals cannot be duly understood, 
or appreciated, unless related to the scheme of Re- 
demption. Nor can that scheme, so vital to our well- 
being, be discovered by natural theology. The sense 
of sin in men generally, and the endeavours among 
many nations to expiate it by bloody sacrifices, were as 
glances cast in the direction of the one great vicarious 
offering which atoned for the sins of the world ; or 
more probably, they resulted, in part, from the lingering 



294 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

beams of a lost, supernatural religion. But how sin 
came into the world, how its guilt and impurity may be 
escaped, and the favour of the Righteous Lord regained, 
are questions answerable by that Word only, Which 
reveals the two representatives of the human race, 
" the First man Adam " in the fall, " the Last Adam " 
in redemption. The propitiation for the sins of the 
whole world, by which God was in Christ reconciling 
the world unto Himself, not imputing their trespasses 
unto them ; the justification of him that believeth on the 
Son of God ; the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, 
producing conviction of sin, the consciousness of for- 
giveness, subjective and relative holiness, peace with 
God, meetness and security for eternal life ; with other 
aspects of the mediatorial work of God Incarnate, are 
themes on which nature is dumb, but which from the 
Word of God, fall on weary, sin-sick hearts more 
gratefully than the sweetest music. In the eyes of the 
Apostle Paul, " the things that are made " are sufficient 
to reveal the " everlasting power and divinity ; " but it 
required " the gospel " to unfold the way in which the 
Righteous Governor makes a sinner stand as righteous 
before His tribunal. " For therein is the righteousness 
of God revealed." 

(7) Of the Revelation granted, the brightest and. 
fullest manifestation of God is in the person of His Son 
Jesus Christ our Lord. His incarnation, resurrection, 
and other facts of His person and work, were them- 
selves supernatural events, besides being supernaturally 
displayed and attested. His words were such as mere 
man never spake. But in His personal character He- 
was Himself the Revelation of God. Nowhere else 
does the Infinite One come so near to us. He is " God 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 295, 



manifest in the flesh," the Eternal "I Am." The glory 
which He brought to light was " the glory as of the 
Only Begotten of the Father." He alone could say of 
Himself, " No man knoweth the Son but the Father ; 
neither knoweth any man the Father, save the Son', 
and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him." But 
the Revelation was in the Divinity of His character, so 
far above sin folly and weakness, that to gaze on 'the 
works and attributes of that sublime Person was to see 
God. Hence His explanation to Philip, " He that hath 
seen Me hath seen the Father." " I am in the Father 
and the Father in Me." 

This unique manifestation of God in Christ radiates, 
knowledge on the whole scheme of salvation ; but for 
both the manifestation and the scheme we are indebted 
to the supernatural. More or less articulately comes 
the cry of humanity, longing to know its origin, and its 
relation to the Divine, " Show us the Father, and it 
sufficeth us;" to which natural theology yields no 
answer. The desiderated boon is found only in the 
mission of Immanuel. Bright, and welcome are the 
rays of truth beamed forth in the words of the Great 
Teacher, outshining the lessons of nature, as -sunlight 
exceeds the light of the stars ; but the fullest and only 
sufficient Revelation of the Father is gained when, to 
the disclosure of Divine wisdom justice and love,' in 
the person and work of Christ, our unreserved trust 
and adoring gratitude respond, "My Lord and m V 
God." J 

(3) Under the influence of natural theology, man 
may desire to worship the Supreme Intelligence ; how 
it may be done acceptably he knows not. Should it 
take the form of material offerings ? or vocal praise ? 



296 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



or bodily prostration ? Will it be accepted for its own 
sake independently of any objective ground ? Must it 
proceed through a Mediator? Is there any possibility 
of its being received by the Supreme Being ? May it 
include supplication for benefits on the worshipper, or 
on others, with any prospect of success ? Are some 
times and places more favourable than others ? These 
are questions which find but meagre reply, apart from 
Revelation. But its directions are clear, e.g., as to 
the object of worship, " Thou shalt worship the Lord 
thy God, and Him only shalt thou serve." As to spirit 
and motive, "God is a Spirit, and they that worship 
Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." As to 
supplication, " If ye, being evil, know how to give good 
gifts unto your children, how much more shall your 
Father, which is in heaven, give good things to them 
that ask Him." As to mediation, and the meritorious 
ground of acceptance, "There is one God and one 
Mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus, 
who gave Himself a ransom for all," and who declares, 
" Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do, 
that the Father may be glorified in the Son." "To 
God only wise be glory, through Jesus Christ, for ever. 
Amen." As to persons and places, " God is no re- 
specter of persons, but in every nation, he that feareth 
Him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with 
Him." As to intercession, it is directed that "supplica- 
tions, prayers, intercessions, giving of thanks be made 
for all men." As to subject-matter, " In everything by 
prayer and supplication w T ith thanksgiving, let your 
requests be made known unto God." 

The immense advance of all this on the highest 
wisdom of natural religion is obvious ; proving how 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 297 



greatly such religion fails to supply what is evidently 
necessary to man's well-being in relation to his 
Maker. 

(9) On the question of man's chief good (summum 
bonum), the wide diversity of opinion among ancient 
philosophers showed the importance of the question, 
and the incompetency of nature to solve it. " Who 
will show us any good ? " did but rack the anxious 
inquirer, so long as no satisfactory answer could be 
obtained. Among the answers given— said to have 
numbered 280— the stoical answer set up virtue as the 
paramount good ; the Epicurean, pleasure; according to 
others, it was glory; and again, escape of the mind from 
matter. But all fell short of an adequate answer, 
shifting about on the quicksands of uncertainty. That 
nothing should meet this deep want but intelligent com- 
munion with God, far surpassing aught afforded by 
nature, seems now perfectly reasonable. It remained 
for Revelation to unfold life, spiritual, divine, eternal, 
uniting man in conscious fellowship with the ever- 
blessed God, as the supreme end and consummation of 
all human beatitudes ; " And this is life eternal, that they 
might know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ 
whom thou hast sent." - Who of God is made unto 
us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and 
redemption ; that according as it is written, he that 
gloneth, let him glory in the Lord." 

Lord Bolingbroke, who asserted that the law of 
nature is clear and sufficient without Revelation 
borrowed largely from the source he thus audaciously 
repudiated. Lord Herbert of Cherbury affected to 
draw from nature alone what he thought a perfect and 
sufficient religion, consisting of five articles, namely 



298 ' FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



(1) That there is one Supreme God. (2) That He 
is chiefly to be worshipped. (3) That piety and virtue 
are the principal part of this worship. (4) That we 
must repent of our sins, and if we do so, God will 
pardon them. (5) That there are rewards for good 
men, and punishments for bad men, here, and in the 
future state. But many of his followers, having aban- 
doned Revelation, were unable to retain all these. Nor 
would it be easy to establish these principles by nature 
alone. The greatest minds devoid of Revelation failed 
to find out so much of God. To all who will receive 
and fully use it, natural theology is a priceless boon, 
especially as a pathway to, and attestation of direct 
Revelation ; but alone, it fails to discover to man his 
supreme end and blessed possibilities, and how to 

attain them. 

Such is the simplicity and surpassing value of the 
Revelation of eternal life in the Son of God, that 
millions of ordinary people, like "the Dairyman's 
Daughter," have attained to a Divine blessedness, to 
which Socrates, Plato, Cicero, and others of loftiest 
intellect and aspiration, left to nature alone, were 
strangers. Listening to the voice of God, the simple 
"understand more than the ancients," who knew no 

teacher but nature. 

4. Reaction of Revealed on Natural Theology. 

It is matter of history that the highest forms of 
natural theology, such as may be attained in a Christian 
nation, were never clearly and firmly grasped by the 
leading thinkers or religionists of civilized heathen 
peoples, much less by those who sank into the dense 
darkness of barbarism. The great thinkers of Greece 
and Rome, who approximated nearest to the truth, 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 299 



never constructed a theology which exhausted the 
whole of what nature may be made to teach, or esta- 
blished a broad, solid basis of enlightened Theistic faith. 
This might be, in part, because their aims were those 
of philosophers rather than theologians. It might be 
due, in some measure, to the judicial blindness which 
fell upon communities (probably involving some earnest, 
individual seekers after God) who did not like to 
retain God in their knowledge. But there is reason to 
think it was also owing to the lack of that reflex in- 
fluence of Revelation, by which, in Christian lands, 
natural theology is illumined and improved. 

This explanation acquires probability, if we compare 
the failures of heathen thinkers with the arguments of 
Deists thinking in presence of the Christian Revelation, 
though professedly rejecting its authority. After mak- 
ing due allowance for the large amount of Christian light, 
which the Deists borrowed without acknowledgment, 
and used as if it were the light of nature, it remains 
that many of their reasonings were superior to aught 
they could ever have attained, had they never been 
acquainted with Christianity. Their greater success 
was not due to any intellectual superiority to the leading 
thinkers of ancient Greece and Rome ; but to the fact 
that they lived, thought, and wrote in the presence, and 
under the influence of Revealed religion. The same 
cause in a still higher degree accounts for the lucid, and 
well-compacted natural theology of Christian believers. 
The first part of Butler's Analogy, Paley's Natural 
Theology, and the Bridgwater Treatises, which have no 
parallel outside Christendom, though based on the 
evidence of nature alone, in all likelihood could never 
have been produced by any but Christian theologians. 



300 FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 

Such thinkers have their interest in Divine things 
greatly quickened, and their faculties whetted by Chris- 
tianity, for the investigation of the whole question of 
theology. Moreover, Revelation sets before them the 
true ideal of the Divine character, which, without 
begging the question, preserves their inquiries from 
confused and profitless wanderings, and, like a magnet, 
draws on their reasonings towards itself. Then again, 
it may be presumed that the disturbance of the intellec- 
tual balance, which results from the moral depravity 
of the race, and disqualifies for accurate research, is 
far less potent in those who have come under the 
regenerating grace of the Holy Spirit, and who have 
thus received " an unction of the Holy One," in whom 
they " know all things," than in those who are utterly 
strange to such help. Assuming the truth of Christian- 
ity, its earnest recipients surely possess special qualifi- 
cations for apprehending and appreciating nature's 
echoes of their heavenly Father's voice. 

Further, Revelation is a kind of mirror, in which 
natural theology may see itself reflected in fairer aspect 
than it presents to direct inspection. More strictly 
speaking, our ideas of the former become clearer and 
broader as they are seen in the light of the latter. 
This process may be illustrated by the history of 
physical science. For example, Copernicus discovered 
that the Ptolemaic system, which made the earth a 
fixed centre, was erroneous, and ascertained the axial 
and orbital revolutions of the earth and other planets. 
But the discoveries of Newton and others on gravitation 
and celestial motions, when superadded to the Coper- 
nican system, so far as that was sound, rendered the 
truths discovered by Copernicus still more intelligible, 



NATURAL AND REVEALED THEOLOGY. 301 

and beautiful. The later and fuller discoveries, though 
in some sense reached by means of the earlier, not 
merely supplemented, but illuminated them. 

If a fragment of a fossilised animal enables the 
palceontologist to determine its place in the realm of 
biology to a certain extent, the discovery of a perfect 
fossil of the same animal may still further improve his 
acquaintance with the fragment. Similarly, Revealed 
theology is not merely an addition to natural, confirm- 
ing our faith in Theism ; but a light rendering more 
distinct the Theistic testimony with which nature is 
overwritten. History indicates that natural theology, 
though grounded in reason, has not inherent vitality 
enough to preserve its proper place in the human mind. 
Left to itself, its tendency has generally been to 
degenerate ; whereas in presence of supernatural 
Revelation, its import and evidence have grown in 
clearness and vigour, rooting themselves deeply in the 
intellect and heart of mankind. 

This aspect of the case raises a powerful presumption 
in favour of the truth of supernatural Revelation. If 
the Scriptures expand, and illumine the otherwise waning 
theology of nature, showing that each is comple- 
mentary of the other, the fact points to a common 
origin. If, again, the message contained in those writ- 
ings meets the profoundest want of our being, it alone 
answering to our necessities and longings, the corre- 
spondence betokens the justice of the claim, advanced 
by that message, to be a revelation from Him who 
made the heavens and the earth, and endowed human- 
ity with its admirable susceptibilities and powers. 

In conclusion, despite the many quicksands on whic'i 
we are invited to build, and the pessimism which tells 



302 



FIRST PRINCIPLES OF FAITH. 



us we cannot build at all, it is manifest that our faith 
in God may rest securely on firm foundations, which 
He Himself has provided. Reflective minds, eager to 
grasp sound doctrine and to cast the bad away, 
cannot be sure of exemption from all assaults on the 
principles of their trust in God, especially in an age 
like this, when no doctrine is too sacred, or too vital 
to be flung into the crucible of reckless polemics. But 
the believer, who, from his turn of mind or his circum- 
stances, is unable to ignore the charges hurled against 
the bases of his religious beliefs, may, by honest, patient 
inquiry, work his way down to first principles — and as 
a rule the ability and opportunity of settling doubt keep 
pace with the need — to return from the task with in- 
creased assurance that God has spoken of Himself 
in all His works, and again far more distinctly and 
fully in the Word of His grace ; that Revelation is 
the enlightener of reason; that the natural and the 
supernatural answer to each other ; and that both lead 
up the truth-loving spirit to the knowledge and fellow- 
ship of "the living God, which made heaven, and 
earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein." 
"And this is the record, that God hath given to us 
eternal li r e, and this life is in His Son." 



INDEX 



Absolute and Infinite. 137, 212. 

Accounting for things, 3. 

Adequacy of cause, 47, 53, 67, 69, 
73, 82, 85, 91, 92, 100, 119, 
256. 

Agnosticism, 114, 191, 192, 223. 

Analogous organs, 183. 

Anthropological argument, 19. 

Anti-Theism, prevalence, 6, 149 ; 
how to treat, 7. 

Apologsiics and practical Chris- 
tianity, 8. 

A posteriori and a priori reasoning, 
18, 19. 

Argument and feeling, 3, 5. 

Argyll, Duke of, 7, 99, 135, 158, 

159- 
Aristotle, 101, 103, 238. 
Art and Science, 153. 
" Association " and causality, 42. 
Astronomy, 154. 
Atheism, 65, 99, 132, 174, 192, 194, 

244, 252, 257, 259, 270, 285. 
Atomic theory, 255. 
Attributes of God, 289. 

Bacox, Lord, 102. 

Barbarians and causation, 34. 

Bastian, IT. C, 163, 164, 178, 179. 

Beale. 164. 

Belief, unequal grounds of, 12, 175. 

Believing and thinking, 211. 

Benevolence of First Cause, 124. 

Biology, 156. 

Blame and praise, 1 18. 



Boasts of unbelief. 3, 149. 

Bolingbroke. 279. 

Boyle. 152. 

Brewster, 152. 

Bridgwater Treatises, 289. 

British Association. 160, 175. 

Brown, Dr. T., 35, 45. 

Biichner, Dr. L., 3, 77, 253, 261, 

262, 263. 
Buckland, 152. 
Burmeister, 76. 
Butler, Bp., 217, 235, 299. 

Calderwood, Prof., 13, 45, 59, 
100, 166, 191, 197, 198, 202, 208, 
209, 212, 220, 222, 224. 

Carpenter, Dr., 181. 

Causality, 42 ; denied, 29 ; essential 
principle of, 29 ; criteria of its 
intuition, 30 ; origin of the idea, 
39 ; active in its deniers, 40 ; in- 
volves Theism, 61. 

Causation and law, 40, 166 ; and 
evolution, 167. 

Cause, equal to effect, 47, 53 ; poten- 
tial and actual, 204, 206 ; moral, 
119. 

Certainty of knowledge, 223. 

Chambers, Dr. R., 160. 

Chance, 67, 79, 97, 263. 

Change, universal, 66, 249. 

Chief-good, 297. 

Children and causation, ^J. 

Christ and revelation, 294. 

Christian scientists, 152. 



304 



INDEX. 



Cicero, 101. 

Clarke, Dr. S., 18. 

Clififord, W. K., 96, 153, 253. 

Colding, 55. 

" Collocations " of matter, 90. 

Combination of evidences, 279, 

280. 
Complexity, not in First Cause, 

134- 
Comte, 61, 62, 131, 167, 192. 

Comtism and negative philosophy, 

224. 
Conder, Dr., 12, 65, 165, 191. 
Connection of eiiects with First 

Cause, 231. 
Consciousness of causal power, 2^>-> 

45- 
Continuance, 157, 158, 159, 171, 

173- 

Continuity, 163, 187. 
Contradiction, law of, 52, 201. 
Co-ordination and intelligence, 96. 
Copernicus, 34, 300. 
Cosmic Theism, 193. 
Cosmogenesis, 266, 267. 
Cosmological argument, 20. 
Cotterill, Bp., 233. 
Cousin, V., 37, 195, 217. 
Craving, 131. 
Creation, 29, 75, 76, 290. 
Credential, order of, 278. 
Criteria of intuitive causality, 30. 
Crystallization, 101, 179. 
Cudworth, 238, 240, 241. 

Dallinger, Dr., 153, 175, 178, 

179. 
Darwin, 157, 158. 163, 164, 168, 

169. 
Definitions, 136, 144. 
Deism, 252, 282, 297, 298, 299. 
Democritus, 252. 
Descartes, 163, 243. 
Design, 101 ; and evolution, 172. 
Determinism, 241. 
Devotion and negative philosophy, 

224. 
Doctrines and Revelation, 274 . 

Edwards, Jon., 235. 



Empirical school, 41, 81. 

End and mode, 105. 

Ends and results, 101. 

Energy, conserved, 48 ; of God con- 
stant, 233, 234. 

Epicureans, 166. 

Epicurus. 159. 

Eternal First Cause, 85. 

Eternity of matter, 75, 77, 78. 

Ethnological argument, 16. 

Etiological argument, 20, 275, 277, 
279. 

Evidence, various lines of, II. 275 ; 
forgotten, 276. 

Evil, less than good, 126. 

Evolution, 160, 164 ; opponents of, 
165 ; compatible with Theism, 
165, 168 ; relation to causation, 
167 ; to final causes, 169 ; to 
design, 172; to atheism, 174; to 
imagination, 177 ; to morals, 188 ; 
future, 174. 

Evolutionists, Theistic, 175. 

Ex nihilo nihil fit, 29, 55, 69. 86, 

95- . 
Experience, hereditary, 112 ; and 

generalization, 139, 1 40. 
" Explanation" defined, 90, 254. 

Faith, aided by science, 151, 156; 
commensurate with thought, 212 ; 
prior to knowledge, 219 ; re- 
sources against attack, 302. 

Faraday, 152. 

Fashion of unbelief, 149. 

Feeling and argument, 3. 

Fertilization of flowers, 157, 158. 

Final causes, 59, 100, 106, 123, 169, 

173- 
Finite and Infinite, 137, 138, 140. 

First cause, 65 ; explains nature, 
85 : eternal, 85 ; self-existent and 
necessary, 86 ; intelligent, 87 ; 
moral, 1 15; righteous, 124; per- 
sonal, 130 ; one and simple, 133 ; 
infinite, 136 ; good, 143. 

Fiske, 193. 

Flint, Prof., 62, 78, 285. 

Force, 82, 98, 106, 256, 257. 

Foster, Dr. A. M., 109, no. 



INDEX. 



30; 



Franklin, B., 152. 
Freedom, 118. 

General good and incidental evil, 
127. 

Generalization and experience, 139. 

Genesis of world, 290. 

Geology, 154. 

Gillespie, 18. 

God, a complex idea, 13 ; a uni- 
versal idea, 16 ; His constant 
energy, 233, 234; attributes of, 
290 ; resolved into energy, 228 ; 
character of, 283 ; of the Bible, 
285 ; true unity of, 290 ; moral 
government of, 292. 

Godless religion, 131. 

Good more than evil, 126 ; out of 
evil, 127. 

Goodness of First Cause, 123. 

Government, moral, 121. 

Haeckel, 153, 163, 253, 255. 
Hamilton, Sir W., 14, 18, 26. 30, 

45. 54. 57, 59, 95, 136. 137, H4, 
190, 191, 194, 195, 197, 198, 200, 
202, 209, 210, 214, 215, 223,225, 
226, 228, 242, 283. 

Handel's Messiah, 264. 

Harmony in nature, 249. 

Hearing and speech. 107. 

Heat, not substance, 47. 

Hegel, 246. 

Herbert, Lord, 282. 297. 

Hereditary experience, 112. 

Herschel, Sir John. 157, 257. 

Herschel, Sir W., 151, 152. 

Herschels, 152, 154. 

Heterogenesis, 179. 

Hodge, Prof., 145, 277, 278, 280. 

Holbach, 78, 253. 

Holyoake, 192. 

Hume. D., 35, 36, 41, 42, 112. 

Huxley. Prof., 43, 153, 163, 178. 

Hylozoism, 95, 240, 268, 269. 

Ideal plan of nature, 184. 

Ideas "regulative," 17, 145, 189, 

218. 
Ignorance, no evilence, 37. 

14 



Imperfection a limit, 143. 

Inadequacy of natural theology, 
288. 

Inadequate cause, 50. 

Indifference to Theism, 3. 

Inertia, 74, 91. 

Infinite, 195 ; regression, 51, 69 ; 
and finite, 138 ; philosophy of, 
189; believed, 210; and distinc- 
tion, 210 ; consciousness of, 213 ; 
idea of, 214, 215, 216, 218; a 
necessary idea, 217 ; knowable, 
218; qualitative and quantitative, 
199 ; perfection, 205. 

Infinity of God, 136, 141. 

Instinct, effect of mind, ill. 

Intelligence of First Cause, 19, 87, 
100. 

Interest in Theism, 4. 

Introduction. 3. 

Intuition, of Theism untenable, 12,' 
13, 14, 280 ; of memory, 42 ; 
criteria of, 30. 

Janet, 99, 101, 164, 168, 191. 
Jevons, 90, 202, 254. 
Joule, 55. 
Judgments, moral, 117. 

Kant, 17, 18, 30, 34, 46, 51, 52, 

53, 104. 114, 136, 138, 140. 163, 

189, 190, 195, 202, 225. 
Kepler, 153. 
Knowledge relative, 219 ; prior to 

faith, 219; necessary to belief, 

221, 222. 

La Mettrie, 253. 
Lange, 186. 




the supernatural, 113. 
Leibnitz, 152. 163, 241, 242. 
Less cannot produce greater, 48, 92, 

94. 
Lewes, 99. 

Life. 267 ; worth having, 125. 
Limitations, spurious, 143, 144. 
Locke, 37, 217. 



306 



INDEX. 



London Quarterly Review, 156. 
Lucretius, 159, 253. 
Lyall, Rev. W., 88. 
Lyell, 152. 

Mansel, Dean, 14, 190, 192, 194, 
195, 197, 198, 199, 201, 202, 205, 
208, 214, 215, 218, 222, 223, 225, 
226, 228. 

Materialism, 133, 244, 252, 253. 

Matter, not one but many, 256, 257 ; 
and force, 84 ; alien to mind, 89 ; 
*' collocations" of, 90. 

Maurice 91. 

Maxwell, Clerk, 153, 155, 164. 

M'Cosh, 27, 51, 191, 220, 223, 235, 
237. 238. 

Mechanical theory of world, 244, 
245, 260. 

Mechanist, God more than a, 245. 

Memory, intuitive, 42. 

Metaphysics, 18, 54, 55, 56, 77, 
256, 257. 

" Metaphysical teleology," 246. 

Meteoric theory of cosmogenesis, 267. 

Mill, J. S., 15, 39, 42, 71, 78, 80, 
81, 82, 84, 92, 93, 94, 104, 253 ; 
on world without law, 39 ; on 
memory, 42 ; a Humist, 92 ; his 
theory of ,( association," 42. 

Miller, Hugh, 152. 

Mind, effect of, 87, 91, 187, 250 ; 
alien to matter, 89 ; in nature, 
157, 267, 268, 269. 

Miracles, 132, 236, 283. 

Mivart, Prof., 57, 75, 152, 164. 

Modus operandi, God's, unknown, 
232, 233. 

Monism, 89, 248. 

Moral argument, 19 ; judgments, 
117; qualities, 117 ; freedom, 
118; order, 119; society, 119; 
government, 123, 292 ; purpose, 
122 ; evolution, 162, 188 ; cha- 
racter of God, 115 ; of man, 286. 

Morals and pantheism, 250. 

Mystery, not contradiction, 226. 

Natural evil explained by Chris- 
tianity, 128. 



Natural philosophy, 154. 

" Natural selection," 105, 163. 

Natural theology, and revealed. 273 ; 
a postulate revealed, 281 ; a con- 
firmation, 284 ; inadequate, 15, 
288. 

Nature, a system, 135 ; divinely sus- 
tained, 232, 237 ; its Theistic 
teaching recognised in Scripture, 
21. 

Nebular theory of cosmogenesis, 
266. 

Necessary First Cause, 86. 

Necessity, 68, 98, 261, 262, 263. 

Need of God, sense of, 4. 

Nescience, philosophy of, 194, 195, 
224, 225. 

Newton, Sir Isaac, 34, 56, 152, 264, 
300. 

Objections to moral character oi 
God, 125. 

Occasionalism, 243. 

One and simple First Cause, 133. 

Ontological argument, 17, 144. 

Order, moral, 119. 

Organs, rudimentary, 183 ; analo- 
gous, 183. 

Owen, Prof. R., 181. 

Paley, Dr., 21. 101, 159, 299. 
Pantheism, 65, 99, 113, 120, 132, 

133, 190, 201, 244, 246. 
Paradise Lost, 265. 
Parker, 153. 
Parsimony, law of, 57« 
Pasteur, 164. 
Paulsen, Dr., 192. 
Plan of world, 184, 185; unity of, 

Perfection, not limitation, 143. 
Personal First Cause, 130. 
Pessimism, 125. 
Philosophy and science, 130 ; seeks 

causes, ^ 
Physico-theological argument, 104. 
" Physicus," 3, 82, 89, 90, 96, 105, 

150, 167, 193, 246, 259. 
Plastic nature, 238. 
Plato, 238. 



INDEX. 



307 



Positivism, 167, 192, 193. 
Power, 44 ; infinite, 142 ; not pro- 
cess, 166. 
Praise and blame, 118. 
Precedence of cause, 52, 55. 
Pre-established harmony, 241. 
Presumptive argument, 282. 
Primary truths, defined, 25 ; criteria 
of, 26 ; examples, 26 ; classes, 
27 ; why taken for granted, 28 ; 
confirmed by experience, 28. 
Process, not power, 166. 
Proctor. 152. 
Properties, essential and accidental, 

88. 
Proposition No. I, 65 ; No. 2, 85 ; 
No. 3, 86; No. 4, 87; No. 5,115 ; 
No. 6, 130 ; No. 7, 133 ; No. 8, 
136. 
Protoplasm, 162, 187. 
Providence, 29 ; government of, 

123. 
Purpose, moral, 122. 
Pyrrhonism, 192. 

•Qualitative and quantitative in- 
finite, 199. 
Qualities, moral, 117. 

Reaction of revealed on natural 
theology, 298. 

Reason, 191 ; a test, 3 ; a faculty, 
5 ; fallible, 6 ; appeal to, 5 ; 
favours Theism, 5 ; relation to 
science, 99, 165 ; to experience, 
138 ; degraded, 225 ; made a 
suicide, 192, 255 ; dignity of, 230 ; 
wide range of, 253, 282 ; relation 
to materialism, 254, 255. 

Reasoning, unconscious, 14, 277, 
287. 

*' Reconciliation " of science and re- 
ligion. 192, 227, 228, 229. 

Redemption, 293. 
Regulative" ideas, 17, 145, 189, 
218. 

Reid, 26. 45, 211. 

Relation and limitation, 203, 204. 

Relativity of knowledge, 219. 

Religion, 267, 269 ; relation to pan- 



j. • 



theism, 251 ; assumes Theism, 
281 ; republication of, 281 ; man's 
need of, 284 ; confirmed by nature, 
284 ; self-evidencing, 287 ; sanc- 
tions of, 293. 

Reproduction, 169. 

Responsibility, 118. 

Revelation, 273, 286. 

Rousseau, 101. 

Row, Prebendary, 7, 233. 

Royal Society, 152. 

Rudimentary organs, 185. 

Rumford, 152. 



Sanctions of religion. 293. 

Schelling, 190, 195. 

Science, narrower and broader, 90, 

98 ; relation to reason, 99 ; to 

faith, 150, 164; to religion, 159; 

to art, 153 ; imagination mistaken 

for, 268 j its recantations, 151, 

152. 
Science and philosophy, 149. 
Scientists, Christian, 152. 
Scripture and nature, 21, 274. 
Second causes, inadequate, 50; not 

sin gle, 57 ; imperfect, 234 ; not 

to be excluded, 236. 
Self-caused, nothing. 68. 
Self-creation, impossible, 29. 
Self-evidence of causation, 30. 
Self-existence of First Cause, 86. 
Society and morals, 119. 
Space, 18, 209. 
Species, denied, 186. 
Speech and hearing, 107. 
Spencer, H., 71, 90, 106, 163, 164, 

171, 172, 173, 192, 205, 206, 213, 

215, 226, 228, 283. 
Spinoza, 113, 246, 248. 
Spontaneous generation, 177. 
Stallo, Dr., 157, 255, 264, 267. 
Substance, 45, 80. 
Substratum of matter, not First 

Cause, 71. 
Suicide of reason, 192, 229. 
Supernatural, 132, 187, 236. 
Sustenance of nature, 232, 237. 
Syllogisms, 67, 202. 



308 



INDEX. 



Tait, Prof., 47, 53, 54, 55> 5 6 > 57, 
89, 152, 155, 180. 

Theism, crisis of. 7 ; not an intuition, 
12, 13, 244,280; compatible with 
evolution, 165 ; our interest in. 4, 
254 ; basis wider than history, 284, 
286. 

Theodicy from nature, imperfect, 
128. 

Thermo-dynamics, 77. 

Thinking and conditioning. 202. 

Thompson, Sir W., 77, 152, 164. 

Thought, God's not as ours, 208. 

Tindal, Dr., 282. 

Tradition, obligation to, 15, 275. 

Traditive argument, 15. 

Tri-unity of God, 290. 

Truth, all at one, 153. 

Two and two four, 41, 42, 43. 

Tyndall, Prof., 90, 163, 268. 



Unconditioned, 195, 200. 
Unconscious reasoning. 14, 277, 287. 
Unity of Cause, 58, 257, 258 ; of 

plan of nature, 134. 
Universal intuition of causality, 32. 
Universe, effect of First Cause, 65 ; 

plan of, 184. 



Virchow, 164. 
Voltaire, 193. 



Wallace, 163. 

Ward, Dr., 42, 75. 

Whewell, 152, 154. 

"Whys" of children, 33. 

Wilson, Dr., 161, 163, 164, 182, 

184, 188. 
Worship, 131, 195, 224. 



X 






Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township, PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



